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GETTING TO WAIVER-A LEGISLATIVE
SOLUTION TO STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY




In the aftermath of the Supreme Court's decision in Seminole
Tribe of Florida v. Florida,' the inability of Congress to abrogate state
sovereign immunity pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code2 has been
repeatedly recognized." Yet it is essential for the fair and efficient
operation of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction that all creditors,
including those cloaked in the mantle of sovereign immunity,
become subject to that jurisdiction and participate fully in the
administration of bankruptcy cases.' While there may be other
* Associate Professor of Law at Wayne State University Law School. This Article grew
out of my participation in the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges in San Francisco,
during October 1999, as the recipient of a fellowship granted by the American Bankruptcy
Law Journal. My thanks to theJournal for making my participation possible and to two of my
fellow recipients, Jeffrey Davis and William A. Gregory, for helping me explore the topic. I
would also like to thank Dean Joan Mahoney for the research support she has granted me,
and my colleagues Robert Sedler and William Burnham for their valuable insights.
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,72-73 n.16 (1996).
The Bankruptcy Code (the "Code") is codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1999). In
this Article, all section references are to sections of the Code unless otherwise specified.
See inftaPartI.
See infra Part II.
BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTSJOURNAL
theories on the basis of which the supremacy of federal bankruptcy
law and the determinations of federal bankruptcy courts made
pursuant thereto may be enforced against unwilling state actors
despite their sovereign immunity,5 the protection of sovereign
immunity can be eliminated only on a consensual basis, that is,
when the state chooses to waive it.
This Article examines the concept of waiver of sovereign
immunity6  in the bankruptcy context. After reviewing the
See infraPart ]I.
6 Except where a court uses constitutional terminology, I use the term "sovereign
immunity" to refer to the protection afforded governmental units against being subjected to a
suit or proceeding in any court without their consent. The terminology has proven somewhat
confusing. Courts have long referred to this protection as embodied within the Eleventh
Amendment to the Constitution. In fact, the Eleventh Amendment is much narrower in
literal scope, explicitly providing merely that, "the Judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one
of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The Amendment was passed by Congress in 1794, hard on
the heels of the decision of the Supreme Court in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419
(1793), in which a divided Court concluded that pursuant to theJudiciaryAct of 1789, ch. 20,
§ 29, 1 Stat 73, the federal court had jurisdiction over a suit by the executor of the estate of a
deceased South Carolina merchant seeking payment for war supplies purchased by the State
of Georgia. In dissent, Justice Iredell not only concluded that the Judiciary Act provided no
such jurisdiction, but if Congress attempted to authorize such a suit, it would not be
warranted under the Constitution. See id. at 449-50 (Iredell,J., dissenting). The swift passage
and ratification (accomplished by February 1795) of the Eleventh Amendment effectively
reversed the Court's decision in Chisholm and barred suits against states by non-citizens
thereof in federal court. See generally CLYDE E. JAcOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND
SovEREIGN IMMUNrrY 46-74 (1972); Alan D. Cullison, Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment (A
Case of the White Knight's Green Whiskers), 5 HOUS. L. REv. 1, 10-14 (1967).
The next major expansion of the scope of the Eleventh Amendment came in response
to the Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470, which vested federal courts with concurrent
jurisdiction over all civil cases arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, i.e.,
the first federal question jurisdiction statute. Pursuant to this jurisdictional grant, a citizen of
Louisiana brought suit against his own state in federal court to recover money owed on state
obligations. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). In Hans, the Supreme Court upheld
the dismissal of the suit on Eleventh Amendment grounds, concluding that the Eleventh
Amendment rectified an erroneous interpretation of the scope of Article III of the
Constitution, and that the Constitution never contemplated that federal judicial power would
extend to suits against a state instituted by its own citizens any more than it extended to cross-
border diversity cases. See id. at 15.
Subsequent decisions have continued to refer to the inability to sue a state in federal
court, whether on the basis of diversity or federal question jurisdiction, as stemming from the
Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S.
468, 472 (1987); Quern v.Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342 (1979); Edelman v.Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,
662-63 (1974); Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Dep't of Pub. Health &




controversial holding of the Supreme Court in Seminole Tribe and its
implications for § 106(a) of the Code in Part I, Part II of this Article
explores why bankruptcy policy mandates the voluntary
participation of the states, and why other proposed solutions to
sovereign immunity are useful, but inherently flawed.
Having concluded that the bankruptcy system can operate
effectively only if states waive their sovereign immunity, Part III
looks at the concept of voluntary waiver and discusses what actions
constitute waiver, who can waive on behalf of a state, the potential
claims covered by a voluntary waiver, and which arms of the state are
bound thereby. Finally, Part IV concludes by suggesting legislative
actions that might encourage voluntary waivers by the states and
examines the constitutionality of these proposed legislative
amendments.
I. SECTION 106(a) AND SEMINOLE TRIBE
Although the Bankruptcy Act of 18987 conferred jurisdiction on
the bankruptcy courts over certain matters relating to claims of
sovereign entities against a debtor in § 2a thereof,8 it contained no
waiver of sovereign immunity on behalf of the federal government
or abrogation of immunity held by the states. Therefore, under the
Nevertheless, the Court has occasionally recognized that the doctrine of sovereign
immunity is extra-constitutional and that the Eleventh Amendment is merely one explicit
example of a more general limitation on judicial power. See, &g., Pennhurst State Sch. &
Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98 (1984); Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921).
Only recently in Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999), the Court acknowledged that the term
"Eleventh Amendment immunity" is "convenient shorthand but something of a misnomer, for
the sovereign immunity of the States neither derives from nor is limited by the terms of the
Eleventh Amendment." See Alden, 527 U.S. at 713. Instead, the Court characterized the right
of the states to be free from suit (their "sovereign immunity") as a "fundamental aspect of
[state] sovereignty" that survived the ratification of the Constitution except as specifically
altered thereby. Id. Consistent with the Court's suggestion, the term "sovereign immunity"
rather than "Eleventh Amendment immunity" is used throughout this Article to describe the
protection given states from nonconsensual suit.
7 Act ofJuly 1, 1898, ch. 541, §§ 1-70, 30 Stat. 544-66, repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598,92 Stat. 2549.
' For example, § 2a(2A) of the Bankruptcy Act, vested the federal courts, acting as
courts of bankruptcy, with jurisdiction to " [h i ear and determine ... any question arising as to
the amount or legality of any unpaid tax, whether or not previously assessed, which has not
prior to bankruptcy been contested before and adjudicated by a judicial or administrative
tribunal of competentjurisdiction...." 11 U.S.C. § 11(a)(2A) (1966), repealed by Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549. The courts also had jurisdiction to
allow or disallow claims, see id. § 11(a)(2), and determine the dischargeability of debts and
grant or deny discharge to debtors, see id. § 11 (a) (12).
2000]
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Act, courts concluded that a bankruptcy court could exercise its § 2a
jurisdiction even with respect to a governmental entity that had not
consented to the exercise of thatjurisdiction, 9 but could not subject
an unwilling state to suit because the Act did not abrogate a state's
sovereign immunity. °
In order to remedy this statutory deficiency, and consistent with
the recommendation of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of
the United States," Congress included a new provision in the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,12 codified as § 106(c) of the Code,'"
which purported to make all provisions of the Code dealing with
"creditors" applicable to governmental units and to bind them by
any court determination pursuant to such a provision,
"notwithstanding any assertion of sovereign immunity."' 4 The
provision was intended not only to codify the results of those cases
' See, e.g., Bostwick v. United States (In re Bostwick), 521 F.2d 741, 744 (8th Cir. 1975);
Gwilliam v. United States (In re Gwilliam), 519 F.2d 407, 410 (9th Cir. 1975); California State
Bd. of Equalization v. Goggin, 191 F.2d 726, 728 (9th Cir. 1951); In re Epstein, 416 F. Supp.
947, 949 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); In re Durensky, 377 F. Supp. 798, 800 (N.D. Tex. 1974), appeal
dismissed, 519 F.2d 1024 (5th Cir. 1975); In reMurphy, 381 F. Supp. 813, 816 (N.D. Ala. 1974)
(dictum), affid sub. noma. Murphy v. United States IRS, 533 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1976); In re
O'Ffill, 368 F. Supp. 345, 350-51 (D. Kan. 1973); In reSavage, 329 F. Supp. 968, 969 (C.D. Cal.
1971); see also Gardner v. New Jersey, 329 U.S. 565, 572 (1947) (exercise ofjurisdiction over
proof and allowance of tax claims under § 77 of Act was not suit against state). But cf United
States v. Mel's Lockers, Inc., 346 F.2d 168, 170 (10th Cir. 1965) (U.S. did not waive sovereign
immunity with respect to injunctions against acts by Small Business Administration;
bankruptcy injunction not binding on SBA).
0 See, e.g., New York 0. & W. Ry. Co. v. New York, 158 F.2d 769, 770-71 (2d Cir. 1947)
(reorganization trustees could not sue State of New York, and petition seeking return of
security deposit must be dismissed as to state); Blanchette v. New York, 412 F. Supp. 219, 221
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (dismissing action against state for compensation for use and occupation of
property of bankrupt condemned in violation of restraining order of district court). Cf.
American Guaranty Corp. v. Burton, 380 F.2d 789, 790-91 (1st Cir. 1967) (dismissing suit by
debtor against U.S. Secretary of Treasury).
SeeH.R. Doc. No. 93-137, at 10 (1973).
SeePub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
See11 U.S.C. § 106(c) (1978).
" See id. Section 106(c) of the Code, as enacted in 1978, provided as follows:
(c) Except as provided in subsection (a) [dealing with waiver of sovereign immunity
by the filing of a proof of claim] and (b) [dealing with offset against claims of
governmental units] of this section and notwithstanding any assertion of sovereign
immunity-
(1) a provision of this title that contains "creditor", "entity", or "governmental
unit" applies to governmental units; and




previously allowing a bankruptcy court to make determinations
within its jurisdictional grant that would be binding on
governmental players, 5 but also to permit the exercise of avoiding
powers against a governmental unit.
16
The statute worked effectively for several years, providing a
basis for rejecting assertions of sovereign immunity by
nonconsenting states in bankruptcy proceedings. But in 1989,
resolving a conflict between the circuits with respect to the impact
of § 106(c),' the Supreme Court held in Hoffman v. Connecticut
Department of Income Maintenance9 that § 106(c) of the Code did not
effectively abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity0 with
respect to money judgments, if a state had not filed a proof of claim
in the case. Relying on the Court's prior decision in Atascadero State
Hospital v. Scanlon,2' the plurality opinion concluded that Congress
had failed to make its intention to abrogate sovereign immunity
"unmistakably clear in the language of the statute."22 The plurality
viewed the language of § 106(c) as "more indicative of declaratory
and injunctive relief than of monetary recovery,"23 and concluded
that, while a state that did not file a proof of claim would be bound
by discharge of debts in bankruptcy, it would not be subject to
See supra note 9 and cases cited therein.
See 124 CONG. REc. H32,394 (Sept. 28, 1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards); id. at
S33,993 (Oct. 5, 1978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini) ("[S]ection 106(c) permits a trustee or
debtor in possession to assert avoiding powers under title 11 against a governmental unit.").
17 See, e.g., In re McVey Trucking, Inc., 812 F.2d 311, 327 (7th Cir. 1987); Murray v.
'Withrow (In re PM-Il Assocs., Inc.), 100 B.R. 940, 943 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989); Rhode Island
Ambulance Servs., Inc. v. Begin (In reRhode Island Ambulance Servs.), 92 B.R. 4, 6-7 (Bankr.
D.R.I. 1988); Ellenberg v. DeKalb County (In reMaytag Sales & Serv., Inc.), 23 B.R. 384, 389-
90 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1982).
" Compare In re McVey Trucking; Inc., 812 F.2d at 327 (finding that Congress intended to
make states liable in money damages for violations of applicable Code sections), and Vazquez
v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare (In re Vazquez), 788 F.2d 130, 133 (3d Cir. 1986)
(same). with Tew v. Arizona State Retirement Sys., 873 F.2d 1400, 1401 (11th Cir. 1989)
(finding that Congress intended only to bind states to bankruptcy court determinations, not
make them liable for moneyjudgments), andHoffman v. Connecticut Dep't of Income Maint.
(In reWillington Convalescent Home, Inc.), 850 F.2d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 1988), affd, 492 U.S. 96
(1989) (same), and Regal Constr. Co. v. Maryland State Highway Admin. Dep't of Transp. (In
reRegal Constr. Co.), 18 B.R. 353, 357 (Bankr. D. Md. 1982) (same).
" 492 U.S. 96 (1989).
With respect to the Court's invocation of the Eleventh Amendment, see supra note 6.
II 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
Hoffman, 492 U.S. at 101 (quoting Atascadero State Hosp., 473 U.S. at 242).
' Id. at 102.
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monetary judgments. 2' Therefore, the Court affirmed the dismissal
of actions by the trustee in bankruptcy against the state under § 542
(requiring turnover of property of the estate) and § 547 (avoidance
of preferences) as barred by the Eleventh Amendment.2s
Following Hoffman, lower courts were compelled to dismiss
claims seeking monetary relief against states under the Bankruptcy
Code.26 After the Supreme Court followed the analysis of the
Hoffman plurality to find the language of § 106(c) insufficiently clear
to abrogate federal sovereign immunity, as well as that of the states,27
Congress acted to express its intention more clearly. In the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994,28 Congress amended § 10629 to
24 See id.
Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Scalia reiterated his belief, first
expressed in his dissenting opinion in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., that Congress cannot
abrogate sovereign immunity pursuant to the exercise of its Article I powers. See 491 U.S. 1,
35-42 (1989) (ScaliaJ., dissenting), overruled by Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44
(1996). Noting that Union Gas involved the Commerce Clause (an Article I power),Justice
Scalia stated that, "there is no basis for treating [Congress's] powers under the Bankruptcy
Clause any differently." Hoffman, 492 U.S. at 105. The dissenting Justices agreed that
congressional power under the Bankruptcy Clause should be coextensive with its Commerce
Clause powers with respect to abrogation, and thus would have concluded that Union Gas
allowed abrogation of sovereign immunity pursuant to the Bankruptcy Clause. See id. at 111
(Marshall,J., dissenting). They also would have concluded that § 106(c) was sufficiently clear
to constitute such an abrogation. See id. at 106-09 (Marshall,J., dissenting).
' See, e.g., National Concrete Pipe Co. v. Guerra Constr. Co. (In re Guerra Constr. Co.),
142 B.R. 826, 829 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992); Murray Indus., Inc. v. Department of Revenue (In re
Murray Indus., Inc.), 125 B.R. 314,316 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991). Cf Richardson v. Mt. Adams
Furniture (In re Greene), 980 F.2d 590, 597-98 (9th Cir. 1992) (dismissing adversary
proceeding filed by trustee againstYakima Indian Nation on sovereign immunity grounds).
' See United States v. Nordic Village, 503 U.S. 30 (1992). Justice Scalia wrote the
opinion, which stated that the case was not controlled by Hoffman because the deciding vote
(his own concurrence) in Hoffman turned on the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the states
and the federal government has no such constitutional protection. See id. at 33.
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 113, 108 Stat. 4106, 4117-18.
The new § 106(a) provided:
(a) Notwithstanding an assertion of sovereign immunity, sovereign immunity is
abrogated as to a governmental unit to the extent set forth in this section with
respect to the following:
(1) Sections 105, 106, 107, 108, 303, 346, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 502, 503,
505, 506, 510, 522, 523, 524, 525, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550,
551, 552, 553, 722, 724, 726, 728, 744, 749, 764, 901, 922, 926, 928, 929, 944,
1107, 1141, 1142, 1143, 1146, 1201, 1203, 1205, 1206, 1227, 1231, 1301, 1303,
1305, and 1327 of this tide.
(2) The court may hear and determine any issue arising with respect to the
application of such sections to governmental units.
(3) The court may issue against a governmental unit an order, process or
judgment under such sections or the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure,
[Vol. 17
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"expressly provide[] for abrogation of sovereign immunity by
governmental units with respect to monetary recoveries as well as
declaratory and injunctive relief.""0  The amendment survived
challenge and was held to abrogate state sovereign immunity' until
the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Florida.12 Although not a bankruptcy case, Seminole Tribe demolished
the accepted constitutional foundations of § 106(a) of the Code,
and likely doomed all efforts at congressional abrogation of state
sovereign immunity in bankruptcy cases.
Pursuant to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA),"
enacted by Congress under the Indian Commerce Clause of the
Constitution,m Indian tribes are permitted to conduct certain
gaming activities only in conformance with a compact entered into
by the tribe and a state. 5 The IGRA states that, upon receiving a
request by a tribe, "the State shall negotiate with the Indian tribe in
including an order orjudgment awarding a money recovery, but not including
an award of punitive damages. Such order orjudgment for costs or fees under
this title or the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure against any
governmental unit shall be consistent with the provisions and limitations of
section 2412(d) (2) (A) of title 28.
(4) The enforcement of any such order, process, or judgment against any
governmental unit shall be consistent with appropriate nonbankruptcy law
applicable to such governmental unit and, in the case of a money judgment
against the United States, shall be paid as if it is a judgment rendered by a
district court of the United States.
(5) Nothing in this section shall create any substantive claim for relief or cause
of action not otherwise existing under this title, the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure, or nonbankruptcy law.
11 U.S.C. § 106(a) (1994).
140 CONG. REC. H27693 (Oct. 4, 1994) (statement of Rep. Brooks). See also H.R. REP.
NO. 103-835, at 42 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3351.
' See, e.g., In re Merchants Grain, Inc., 59 F.3d 630, 634-36 (7th Cir. 1995), vacated sub
nom. Ohio Agric. Commodity Depositors Fund v. Mahern, 517 U.S. 1130 (1996); Employment
Dev. Dep't v.Joseph (In re HPA Assoc.), 191 B.R. 167, 172-74 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995); Florida
Dep't of Revenue v. Sparkman (In reYork-Hannover Devs., Inc.), 190 B.R. 62, 64-65 (E.D.N.C.
1995); Stern v. Massachusetts Alcohol Beverage Control Comm'n (In reJ.F.D. Enters., Inc.),
183 B.RI 342, 354 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1995). See generally S. Elizabeth Gibson, Congressional
Response to Hoffman and Nordic Village: Amended Section 106 and Sovereign Immunity, 69 AM.
BANKR. LJ. 311, 345-46 (1995) [hereinafter Gibson, CongressionalResponse].
517 U.S. 44 (1996).
See Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1166-1168,25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (2000)).
-" SeeU.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Congress has the power "[t]o regulate commerce with
foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes...." Id.
" See25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(C) (2000).
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good faith to enter into such a compact." 6 The IGRA further
confers on the United States district courts jurisdiction over "any
cause of action initiated by an Indian tribe arising from the failure
of a State to enter into negotiations with the Indian tribe" with
respect to its request for a compact, "or to conduct such
negotiations in good faith."s7  The Seminole Tribe of Florida
commenced such an action against the State of Florida,- claiming
that Florida had refused to negotiate with respect to a compact39
The State moved to dismiss the complaint." It argued that it
had sovereign immunity from suit in federal court and that
Congress had no power to abrogate that immunity-as the IGRA
purported to do-when acting pursuant to the Indian Commerce
Clause.4 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit agreed,
remanding the case to the district court with directions to dismiss
the suit.42 The Seminole Tribe sought review by the Supreme Court.
By a five to four decision, the Court affirmed.45
Although Congress may abrogate the sovereign immunity of
the States, the Court emphasized it may do so only if two conditions
are satisfied. First, it must express its intent to do so
"unequivocally."' In the IGRA, the Court held, Congress's intent to
abrogate was "unmistakably clear."" Second, Congress must have
acted "pursuant to a valid exercise of power,"46 i.e., "a constitutional
m Id. § 2710(d)(3)(A).
Id. § 2710(d) (7) (A) (i). Such a suit by an Indian tribe can be commenced "only after
the close of the 180-day period beginning on the date on which the Indian tribe requested the
State to enter into negotiations." Id. § 2710(d) (7) (B) (i). The IGRA contains detailed
provisions with respect to burden of proof and available remedies in any such suit, including
provisions for mandatory mediation with respect to the compact. See id. § 2710(d) (7) (B) (ii)-
(vii).
SeeSeminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 801 F. Supp. 655 (S.D. Fla. 1992). The Tribe also
sued Lawton Chiles, Florida's then governor.
" See id. at 656.
4 See id.
41 See id.
' See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 11 F.3d 1016, 1029 (11th Cir. 1994). The court
agreed with the State both that abrogation of the State's sovereign immunity pursuant to the
Indian Commerce Clause was barred by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution and
that the Seminole Tribe could not compel compact negotiations by suing the governor under
Exparte Young 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
SeeSeminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
See id. at 55 (quoting Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985)).
See id. at 56 (quoting Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 228 (1989)).
Id. at 55 (quoting Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64,68 (1985)).
[Vol. 17
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provision granting Congress the power to abrogate."47 The Court
had previously identified section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment s
as such a provision, 49 but the IGRA was not enacted under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Yet, the Court had even more recently
held in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.50 that Congress had the power
to abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to the Interstate
Commerce Clause.51 The Court agreed with the petitioners that the
plurality opinion in Union Gas allowed "no principled distinction in
favor of the States to be drawn between the Indian Commerce
Clause [pursuant to which Congress enacted the IGRA] and the
Interstate Commerce Clause." 2
But instead of upholding the IGRA abrogation provisions, as
would be required by Union Gas, the Court concluded that "both the
result in Union Gas and the plurality's rationale depart from our
established understanding of the Eleventh Amendment and
undermine the accepted function of Article Ill."'3 Therefore, the
Court overruled Union Gas,M and instead stated flatly that "[t]he
Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial power under Article III,
and Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional
limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction." Acknowledging, as
Justice Stevens noted in dissent, 6 that its decision would apply to
Congressional attempts to abrogate state sovereign immunity
' - at 59.
" Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment (ratifiedJuly 9,1868) provides in part that,
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Section 5 of the Amendment states that, "The Congress shall
have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." Id. § 5.
See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976).
491 U.S. 1 (1989). The Union Gas decision was by a plurality of the Court. The fifth
vote was supplie by Justice White, who stated in his concurrence that, with respect to the
constitutional issue, "I agree with the conclusion... that Congress has the authority under
Article I to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the States, although I do not
agree with much of [the plurality's] reasoning." Id. at 57 (White, J., concurring). He
provided no elucidation on the source of his disagreement. See id.
S ee U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see supra note 34.




See id. at 77 n.1 (StevensJ., dissenting).
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pursuant to bankruptcy, copyright, and antitrust laws, 7 the Court
suggested that "there is no established tradition in the lower federal
courts of allowing enforcement of those federal statutes against the
States,"" and therefore the impact of the decision was not likely to
be significant. 9
The impact of Seminole Tribe on § 106(a) of the Code was
immediately apparent.60 Virtually every court faced with the issue
since Seminole Tribe has concluded that § 106(a) of the Code was
enacted pursuant to the Bankruptcy Clause of the Constitution, 6' an
Article I power, and that, under Seminole Tribe, § 106(a) cannot
abrogate a state's sovereign immunity. 2
" The Court has since explicitly applied Seminole Tribe to the Patent and Plant Variety
Protection Remedy Clarification Act (Patent Remedy Act), which purported to abrogate
explicitly sovereign immunity with respect to patent infringement actions. See 35 U.S.C.
§§ 271, 296(a) (2000). In Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings
Bank the Court noted that "Seminole Tribe makes clear that Congress may not abrogate state
sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article I powers; hence the Patent Remedy Act cannot be
sustained under either the Commerce Clause or the Patent Clause." 527 U.S. 627, 636
(1999).
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 n.16 (1996).
The Court further suggested that the availability of injunctive relief under Ex parte
Young; 209 U.S. 123 (1908), against a state officer's ongoing violation of federal law, would
help ensure state compliance with federal law. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72-73. However,
in Seminole Tribe, the Court declined to permit an Ex parte Young action against Governor
Chiles, concluding that, "where Congress has prescribed a detailed remedial scheme for the
enforcement against a State of a statutorily created right [as it did in § 2710(d) of the IGRA],
a court should hesitate before casting aside those limitations and permitting an action against
a state officer based upon Ex parte Young." Id. at 74.
60 After Seminole Tribe, the Court vacated and remanded to the Seventh Circuit for
reconsideration in light of Seminole Tribe a case in which that court had found the enactment
of § 106(a) a valid exercise of congressional power under the Bankruptcy Clause of Article 1.
See In re Merchants Grain Inc., 59 F.3d 630, 634-36 (7th Cir. 1995), vacated sub nom. Ohio
Agric. Depositors Fund v. Mahern, 517 U.S. 1130 (1996). This action certainly suggested that
the Supreme Court thought Seminole Tribe had some bearing on the constitutionality of
§ 106(a).
6, See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. Congress has the power "[t]o establish.., uniform
laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States...." Id.
62 See, e.g., Texas v. Walker, 142 F.3d 813, 824 (5th Cir. 1998); Sacred Heart Hosp. v.
Department of Pub. Welfare (In re Sacred Heart Hosp.), 133 F.3d 237, 243-45 (3d Cir. 1998);
Department of Transp. & Dev. v. PNL Asset Mgmt. Co. (In re Fernandez), 123 F.3d 241, 244-
46, amended by, 130 F.3d 1138 (5th Cir. 1997); Schlossberg v. Comptroller of Treasury (In re
Creative Goldsmiths of Washington, D.C., Inc.), 119 F.3d 1140, 1147 (4th Cir. 1997); United
States Dep't of Treasury v. Gosselin, 252 B.R. 854, 858 (D. Mass. 2000); Quesada v. Puerto
Rico Dep't of Health (In reArecibo Cmty. Health Care, Inc.), 233 B.R. 625, 628 (D.P.R. 1999);
United States v. Nebraska Dep't of Revenue (In re Doiel), 228 B.R. 439, 449 (D.S.D. 1998);
Kish v. Verniero (In re Kish), 212 B.R. 808, 815-17 (D.N.J. 1997); Grabscheid v. Michigan
Employment Sec. Comm'n (In re C.J. Rogers, Inc.), 212 B.R 265, 273 n.3 (E.D. Mich. 1997);
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A few recent bankruptcy court cases have tried to distinguish
the Article I Bankruptcy Clause from the Article I Indian Commerce
Clause at issue in Seminole Tribe by suggesting that ratification of the
Constitution, which includes a grant of the power to enact uniform
bankruptcy laws, itself constitutes a surrender of state sovereignty
effective when Congress chooses to enact such laws. 63 Although
there is no doubt the states surrendered some of their sovereignty
when they agreed to confer on Congress the power to enact
uniform bankruptcy laws, it seems unlikely that the scope of that
surrender extended beyond relinquishment of their sovereign
power to enact bankruptcy laws themselves.
A few courts have sought to overcome the clear import of
Seminole Tribe by finding that § 106 was enacted pursuant to section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment, which was the sole constitutional
source of power for congressional abrogation of state sovereign
immunity after Seminole Tribe.64 However, this argument has been
Peterson v. Florida (In re Peterson), 254 B.R 740, 745 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2000); Seay v.
Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. (In reSeay), 244 B.R. 112,116 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2000);
DeAngelis v. Laskey (In re DeAngelis), 239 B.R. 426, 431 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1999); Muir v. Sallie
Mae Servicing Corp. (In re Muir), 239 B.R. 213, 216 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1999); Pitts v. Ohio
Dep't of Taxation (In re Pitts), 241 B.R. 862, 876 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1999); Alston v. State Bd.
of Med. Exam'rs (In re Alston), 236 B.R. 214, 217 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1999); Schmitt v. Missouri
Western State College (In re Schmitt), 220 B.R. 68, 71 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1998); justice v.
Bureau of Workers' Comp. (In reJustice), 224 B.R. 631, 635 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1998); Morrell
v. Franchise Tax Bd. (In re Morrell), 218 B.R. 87, 91-92 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1997); Koehler v.
Iowa College Student Aid Comm'n (In re Koehler), 204 B.R. 210, 215-16 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1997); Mueller v. Idaho (In re Mueller), 211 B.R 737, 740-41 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1997); Rose v.
United States Dep't of Educ. (In reRose), 214 B.R. 372, 376 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1997), affd and
remanded, 187 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 1999); Ossen v. Dep't of Social Servs. (In re Charter Oak
Assocs.), 203 B.R. 17, 20-21 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1996); In reLush Lawns, Inc., 203 B.R. 418, 421
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1996). But see In re Barrett Ref. Corp., 221 B.R. 795, 808 (Bankr. W.D.
Okla. 1998) ("11 U.S.C. § 106 is not unconstitutional as the Eleventh Amendment does not
apply to bankruptcy cases.... ").
See Bliemeister v. Industrial Comm'n of Ariz. (In re Bliemeister), 251 B.R. 383, 391
(Bankr. D. Az. 2000); Nelson v. LaCrosse County Distr. Attorney (In re Nelson), 254 B.R. 436,
446 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 2000).
See Wyoming Dep't of Trans. v. Straight (In re Straight), 209 B.R. 540, 555 (D. Wyo.),
af'd 143 F.3d 1387 (10th Cir. 1997); Arnold v. Sallie Mae Serv. Corp. (In reAmold), 255 B.R.
845, 853 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 2000); Lees v. Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. (In reLees),
252 B.R. 441, 449 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 2000); Willis v. Oklahoma (In reWillis), 230 B.R. 619,
623 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1999); Burke v. Georgia ex reL Dep't of Revenue (In reBurke), 203 B.R.
493, 497 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996), affd, 146 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 1998); Headrickv. Georgia (In
re Headrick), 200 B.R. 963, 965-67 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996), ajfld sub. nom Georgia Dep't of
Rev. v. Burke, 146 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 1998); Mather v. Oklahoma Employment Sec.
Comm'n (In reSouthern Star Foods, Inc.), 190 B.R. 419,426 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1995).
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rejected by the vast majority of courts that have analyzed it,65 and is
even more problematic after the decisions of the Supreme Court in
Boerne v. Tlrs66 Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board
v. College Savings Bank,67 and Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents." These
cases imposed limits on congressional power under section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
In Boerne, the Court struck down the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA),69 ostensibly enacted by Congress
pursuant to its powers under section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment "to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions"
of the Amendment protecting all persons from state deprivation of
"life, liberty, or property, without due process of law" or "equal
protection of the laws."7° While acknowledging that the protections
afforded by the First Amendment, including the Free Exercise
Clause, 7' are included in the guarantee of "liberty" in the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 72  the Court
emphasized that congressional powers under section 5 were limited
to remedial acts aimed at enforcement of the substantive rights
guaranteed by the Amendment, not efforts to define (or redefine7 )
See, e.g.,In re Sacred Heart Hosp., 133 F.3d at 243-45; In re Fernandez, 123 F.3d at 245; In re
Creative Goldsmiths, 119 F.3d at 1146-47; In re Arecibo Cmty. Health Care, Inc., 233 B.R. at 629; In
reDoi4e 228 B.RI at 443-49; In reKish, 212 B.R. at 815-17; In re C.J. Rogers, Inc., 212 B.RL at 269-
73; In rePitts, 241 B.R. at 876.
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
527 U.S. 627 (1999).
528 U.S. 62 (2000).
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1993).
7' U.S. CONsr. amend. XIV, § 1; see supra note 48.
" U.S. CoNsr. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. ").
7 See Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997).
The RFRA was adopted by Congress in an effort to overturn the Supreme Court
decision in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), in which the Court rejected a
claim brought by members of the Native American Church who were refused unemployment
benefits when they lost their jobs because they used peyote (an illegal drug) for sacramental
purposes and challenged the drug lav under the Free Exercise Clause as made applicable to
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court refused to apply a test that would
have struck down a state law that substantially burdened a religious practice unless it served a
"compelling government interest." See id. at 883-89. Instead it held that a neutral, generally
applicable state law would be upheld despite its burden on religion unless other constitutional
protections were at stake. See id. at 881-82. The stated purposes of the RFRA included
.restor[ing] the compelling interest test... and to guarantee its application in all cases where
free exercise of religion is substantially burdened" and "to provide a claim or defense to
persons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by government." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000bb(b) (1993). The RFRA would thus redefine what constituted a constitutional claim
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what those rights are.74 To the extent that the RFRA could be
considered remedial rather than substantive, the Court emphasized
that there must still be a "congruence and proportionality between
the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to
that end."75 The solution proposed by Congress was "so out of
proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object"76 that it
could not stand.
If the Boerne decision put teeth into the requirement of
section 5 that congressional acts be designed "to enforce"77 rather
than to define Fourteenth Amendment fights, Florida Prepaid and
Kimel narrowly interpreted the requirement of section 5 that such
enforcement be "by appropriate legislation."78 The legislation at
issue in Florida Prepaid was the Patent and Plant Variety Protection
Remedy Clarification Act (Patent Remedy Act) 79 adopted by
Congress in 1992 to provide expressly for abrogation of state
sovereign immunity in patent infringement cases. Recognizing that,
after Seminole Tribe, the Patent Remedy Act could not be sustained if
it was enacted under one of the Article I powers of Congress, the
patent holder argued that the Patent Remedy Act was properly
enacted by Congress under section 5 to prevent deprivations of
property interests (which patent fights undoubtedly were) by
infringing states without "due process of law"s° in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. In response, the
Court held that, in order to sustain a legislative act under section 5,
Congress must "identify conduct transgressing the Fourteenth
Amendment's substantive provisions, and must tailor its legislative
scheme to remedying or preventing such conduct.""1 In enacting
the Patent Remedy Act, Congress had failed to do either.
The Court first found that Congress had not identified any
pattern of patent infringement by the states. Indeed, few instances
under the Free Exercise Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment.
" See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519.
See id. at 520.
Th See id. at 532.
See supra note 48.
See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000); Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 639-48 (1999).
Act of Oct. 28, 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-560, § 2(a) (2), 106 Stat. 4230 (codified at 35
U.S.C. §§ 271(h), 296(a) (2000)).




of patent infringement suits against states were prosecuted in the
110 years prior to enactment of the Patent Remedy Act.82 Even if
there were instances of patent infringement by states, they would
not rise to the level of a violation of the Due Process Clause unless
the states provided no remedy or an inadequate remedy (that is,
lack of "due process") to address the infringement. The Court
noted that Congress had not considered the availability of state
remedies for patent infringement.1 Nor can a deprivation of
property by a state constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause if
it is not intentional or reckless." The legislative record
demonstrated that most state infringement was negligent at worst."
Finally, the Court emphasized that even if a problem of
constitutional dimension were made out, Congress must tailor its
response proportionately.86 Here, Congress did not limit the scope
of the Patent Remedy Act to those states engaging in non-negligent
infringement, or those who provided inadequate state remedies, or
those who had a history of frequent infringement.87  Instead,
Congress merely sought to treat states on the same basis as other
patent infringers.88 The goal of a uniform remedy for patent
infringement, the Court held, is a proper one, but is not the focus
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, it can be effectuated by
Congress only pursuant to its Article I powers, which are limited by
state sovereign immunity.89
The Court reached the same conclusion with respect to the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA)9° in KimeL9'
Although concluding that Congress had made clear its intent to
abrogate the immunity from suit of discriminating state employers,92
See id.
See id. at 641-45.
See id.
See id. at 643-45.
See id. at 645-47.
See id
" See id. at 647-48.
See id
Pub. L. No. 90-202,81 Stat. 602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000)).
The ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer to "discriminate against any individual...
because of such individual's age." Id. § 623(a) (1).
91 See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor concluded that the enforcement
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, incorporated by reference into the ADEA, 29
U.S.C. § 626(b) (2000), that authorized employees to maintain actions for backpay "against
[Vol. 17
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the majority found Congress had failed to meet the "congruence
and proportionality" test established by Boerne and applied in Florida
Prepaid.93 Looking at the ADEA, the Court noted that the Act
purported to make unlawful conduct constituting discrimination
based on age that would not be unconstitutional under the
Fourteenth Amendment.94  While the Court emphasized that
Congress is given significant leeway in addressing difficult problems,
after examining the evidence of discrimination presented to
legislators, the Court found that application of the ADEA to the
states was "an unwarranted response to a perhaps inconsequential
problem" in that "Congress never identified any pattern of age
discrimination by the States, much less any discrimination
whatsoever that rose to the level of constitutional violation. '95 When
coupled with the "indiscriminate scope of the Act's substantive
provisions,9 6 the lack of evidence establishing a problem of
constitutional dimension doomed the ADEA abrogation provision.
To ground § 106(a) of the Code in congressional power under
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment after Boerne, Florida Prepaid
and Kimel, one would first have to find a substantive provision of the
Amendment the state violation of which § 106(a) is aimed at
redressing. Those courts that have upheld § 106(a) on this basis
have identified the Privileges or Immunities Clause97 as such a
provision. However, the problem with this analysis is that it is
any employer (including a public agency) in any Federal or State court of competent
jurisdiction," 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2000), constituted an explicit abrogation. See Kirne 528
U.S. at 73-76. While concurring in the remaining portions of Justice O'Connor's opinion
(and thejudgment),Justice Thomas (joined byJustice Kennedy) dissented with respect to this
conclusion. See id. at 100-05 (Thomas, J., concurring).
" See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank, 527 U.S.
627, 639 (1999).
The majority noted that age had consistently been held not to be a suspect
6lassification entitled to the benefit of heightened scrutiny under Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence. Therefore, discrimination on account of age would be sustained against
constitutional attack so long as the age classification is "rationally related to a legitimate state
interest." See Kime4 528 U.S. at 83. The ADEA's substantive provisions, the Court concluded,




U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. "No State shall make or enforce any Ia which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States...." See id.
ss The Code creates a "complex of privileges and immunities," including the:
privilege of efficient liquidation or other use and ratable distribution of a debtor's
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completely untenable as a matter of constitutional doctrine. The
Court made it very clear in Boerne that it is not the province of
Congress to define the substance of the lights protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment, but merely to enforce them. If Congress
could create "privileges or immunities" of citizenship merely by
legislating pursuant to its Article I powers, the substance of the
Constitution would be defined by the legislative branch of
government, rather than the judicial. The judicial branch has, in
fact, spoken on the privileges and immunities protected by the
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and
has found them to be extremely limited.9 Not only has the Court
assets, or... immunity from inefficient liquidation of use and inequitable
distribution of a debtor's assets which may obtain under State laws; the privilege of
discharge, or ... immunity from oppressive debt collection which may obtain under
State laws; liberty from economic bondage and protection against undue loss of value
of property in exigent financial circumstances; and fair and efficient determination
of all of the above, according to the process due in a national court of equitable
jurisdiction, without regard to persons or to any special privileges save those
considered by Congress to be justified as a matter of policy.
Mather v. Oklahoma Employment Sec. Comm'n (In re Southern Star Foods, Inc.), 190 B.R.
419, 426 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1995). See Wyoming Dep't of Transp. v. Straight (In re Straight),
209 B.R 540, 551, 555 (D. Wyo. 1997) affd, 143 F.3d 1387 (10th Cir. 1998); Willis v.
Oklahoma (In re Willis), 230 B.R. 619, 622-23 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1999) (following In re
Southern StarFoods, Inc., 190 B.RL at 426); see also Burke v. Georgia ew rel Dep't of Revenue (In
re Burke), 203 B.R. 493, 497 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996), afd, 146 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 1998)
(stating that the Code provides "privileges and immunities of federal citizenship"); Headrick
v. Georgia (In reHeadrick), 200 B.R. 963, 967 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996), af'd sub. nom., Georgia
Dep't of Rev. v. Burke, 146 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 1998) ("privileges and immunities of the
Bankruptcy Code" may be enforced through Fourteenth Amendment).
In the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872), a divided Court interpreted the
Privileges or Immunities Clause as protecting only those privileges and immunities "which
owe their existence to the Federal government, its National character, its Constitution, or its
laws." Id. at 79. The Court provided as examples,
the right of the citizen of this great country ... to come to the seat of government to
assert any claim he may have upon that government, to transact any business he may
have with it, to seek its protection, to share its offices, to engage in administering its
functions" as well as "the right of free access to its seaports,... to the subtreasuries,
land offices, and courts ofjustice in the several States.
Id. The Court also cited the right "to demand the care and protection of the Federal
government... when on the high seas or within the jurisdiction of a foreign government,"
and "the right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances, the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus" and "the right to use the navigable waters of the United States." Id.
Finally, the Court mentioned the right to "become a citizen of any State of the Union by a
bona fide residence therein, with the same rights as other citizens of that State" and "the
rights secured by the thirteenth and fifteenth articles of amendment, and by the other clause
of the fourteenth." Id. at 79-80. The decision in the Slaughter-House Cases effectively
eliminated the Clause as a useful constitutional check on state power. See generally, e.g.,
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never suggested that the rights created by the Code are privileges or
immunities of citizenship, it has expressly concluded that no debtor
has a constitutional right to a discharge of his debts in bankruptcy
or, indeed, even access to the bankruptcy process if he cannot
prepay filing fees."' To suggest that operation of the bankruptcy
system with involuntary state participation is a privilege or immunity
of federal citizenship is fanciful,'0 ' and most courts have rejected the
notion.102
Of course, there are other substantive protections provided by
the Fourteenth Amendment, in particular the Due Process Clause
and Equal Protection Clause."3 But arguments that § 106(a) was
enacted, or could have been enacted, pursuant to section 5 to
remedy violations of these substantive clauses, have uniformly
Michael Kent Curtis, Resurrecting the Privileges or Immunities Clause and Revising the Slaughter-
House Cases Without ExhumingLochner Individual Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 38 B.C. L.
REV. 1 (1996); Jeffrey Rosen, Translating the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 66 GEo. WASH. L.
REv. 1241 (1998); Kimberly C. Shankman & Roger Pilon, Reviving the Privileges or Immunities
Clause to Redress the Balance Among States, Individuals, and the Federal Government, 3 TEX. REv. L.
& POL 1 (1998).
The Court recently invoked the Privileges or Immunities Clause in striking down a
California statute that limited welfare benefits payable to new state residents to the amount
payable by the state from which the resident moved until the resident had lived in California
for twelve months. In Saenz v. Ro4 526 U.S. 489 (1999), the Court found the Clause protected
the right of a citizen of the United States to choose to become a citizen of a state, and
thereafter be afforded the same rights under state law as other citizens of that state. The
Court viewed this protection as part of the constitutional right to travel from one state to
another. See id. at 501-04.
... See United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 446 (1973). The Court saw bankruptcy as "in
the area of economics and social welfare" and the discharge as "a legislatively created benefit,
not a constitutional one, and.., a benefit withheld, save for three short periods, during the
first 110 years of the Nation's life." Id. at 446-47.
.0 In fact, the provisions of the Code benefit all debtors, not merely those who are
citizens of the United States. A "debtor" under the Code "means person or municipality
concerning which a case under this title has been commenced." 11 U.S.C. § 101 (13) (1999).
A "person" "includes individual, partnership, and corporation...." 11 U.S.C. § 101(41)
Nothing precludes a non-citizen from seeking protection under the Code. The rights or
privileges afforded by the Code therefore cannot be "rights or privileges of citizens of the
United States" referred to in the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
1 See, e.g., Sacred Heart Hosp. v. Department of Pub. Welfare (In re Sacred Heart
Hosp.), 133 F.3d 237, 244-45 (3d Cir. 1998); Elias v. United States (In reElias), 218 B.R. 80,85-
86 (BA P. 9th Cir. 1998), afi'd, 216 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2000); Kish v. Verniero (In reKish),
212 B.R. 808, 817 (D.NJ. 1997); Pitts v. Ohio Dep't of Taxation (In re Pitts), 241 B.R. 862, 876
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1999); Neary v. Department of Revenue (In re Neary), 220 B.R. 864, 867
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1998); Morrell v. Franchise Tax Bd. (In re Morrell), 218 B.R. 87, 91 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. 1997).
103 See supra note 48.
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failed;0 4 and it is difficult to see where the failure to include states in
the bankruptcy process, who do not choose such inclusion, amounts
to constitutionally prohibited discrimination 15 or deprivation of
property without due process of law.'06
Even if one could identify a substantive right protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment, which would be furthered by abrogating
state sovereign immunity in bankruptcy, the hurdles erected by
Florida Prepaid and Kimel to upholding § 106(a) under section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment would be difficult to overcome. First,
one must locate a pattern of Code provision violations by the states.
Neither at the time of the original enactment of § 106, nor when it
was amended to waive sovereign immunity more clearly,"7 did
Congress analyze whether states were frequently violating the
Code, O8 and a fortiori did not consider whether an alternative
"' See, e.g., United States v. Nebraska Dep't of Revenue (In reDoiel), 228 B.R. 439,445-48
(D.S.D. 1998); see also cases cited supra note 65.
1" Given that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was intended
to ensure nondiscriminatory treatment by government, see, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384
U.S. 641, 652 (1966), one might ask what constitutes the class against which the state
discriminates by retaining sovereign immunity in bankruptcy cases. Debtors? Debtors without
assets available to distribute to creditors (because if there are assets available the state will file
a proof of claim and thereby consent to jurisdiction)? Debtors without assets available to
distribute to creditors in excess of any preferential payments or fraudulent transfers the state
has received? Or perhaps not debtors at all, but other non-governmental creditors of debtors
without assets available to distribute to creditors in excess of any preferential payments or
fraudulent transfers the state has received? There is simply no readily definable class, suspect
or other, that can be seen as the object of invidious discrimination by state action. Cf. Wilson-
Jones v. Caviness, 99 F.3d 203, 210 (6th Cir. 1996) ("We think it best to 'regard as an
enactment to enforce' the Equal Protection Clause, in the absence of explicit comment by
Congress, only efforts to remedy discrimination against a class of persons that Fourteenth
Amendmentjurisprudence has already identified as deserving special protection.").
16 The argument has been made that a state's refusal to consent to the jurisdiction of
the bankruptcy court deprives the bankruptcy estate of property in the form of its claim
against the state, and therefore the Due Process Clause is implicated. See Kenneth N. Klee et
al., State Defiance of Bankruptcy Law, 52 VAND. L. REv. 1527, 1583 n.284 (1999). But § 106(a)
purported to make states subject to suit only for certain causes of action created by the Code
itself, not state law claims that might devolve to the bankruptcy estate by virtue of § 541. In
the absence of§ 106(a), there is no cause of action against a nonconsenting state to constitute
property of the estate. Therefore, the inability of the trustee to pursue these causes of action
against the nonconsenting state does not deprive the estate of property because the estate
would have had the property in the first instance only if § 106(a) withstood constitutional
attack.
107 See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
1 In connection with the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, see supra note 28, Kenneth N.
Klee, then chairman of the Legislation Committee for the National Bankruptcy Conference,
submitted to Congress a National Bankruptcy Conference Position Paper including a
Getting to Waiver
remedy might be provided to those injured by any such violation in
state court. Even if Congress were now to undertake such an
investigation, only a legislative response that is "tailor[ed] ... to
remedying or preventing such conduct '"09 can be upheld under
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Section 106(a) makes no
distinction between states that transgress and those which do not,
states which provide alternative remedies and those which do not,
or states which intentionally violate the Code and those whose
violations are inadvertent. It is intended, as was the Patent Remedy
Act at issue in Florida Prepaid, simply to provide for uniform
treatment as between states and others with respect to the federal
rights afforded by the legislation, bankruptcy in one case and patent
infringement in the other. That goal of uniformity, the Supreme
Court held in Florida Prepaid, is an Article I goal, and legislation
promoting it cannot be upheld under the Fourteenth
Amendment. n°  The abrogation of state sovereign immunity
contained in § 106(a) of the Code, intended to place governmental
creditors on a uniform footing with nongovernmental creditors,
cannot be sustained pursuant to section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
II. WHY DOES SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY MATTER IN BANKRUPTCY?
Why should we be concerned that § 106(a) is unconstitutional
as applied to the states? After all, the states are certainly bound by
federal law, including the substantive provisions of the Code, by
virtue of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution."' Even if a state
"sampling of selected cases on sovereign immunity of the United States Government" as part
of his testimony to the Subcommittee on Economic and Commercial Law of the House
Judiciary Committee. See Bankruptcy Law Reform: Hearings on H.R. 5116 Before the Subcomm. on
Economic and Commercial Law of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 103rd
Cong. (Aug. 17, 1994) (statement of Kenneth N. Klee). The Position Paper provided no cases
in which a state (rather than the federal government) asserted sovereign immunity, and
Congress never systematically examined the scope of state violations of the Code. "Until
Congress makes findings of a pattern of state violations and passes legislation that is
proportional to its remedial aims, § 106(a) must be viewed as an unconstitutional assertion of
Congress's power, because it fails the congruence requirement of City of Boerne." Mitchell v.
Franchise Tax Bd. (In reMitchell), 209 F.3d 1111, 1120 (9th Cir. 2000).
'0 Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627,
639 (1999).
"' See id. at 645-648.
... U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, provides: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
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is a creditor, the bankruptcy case filed by or against the debtor is not
a suit "against" the state and is therefore not barred by sovereign
immunity.12 And the states are also bound by the consequences of
any such case, including the discharge of their debts, whether they
file a proof of claim or not."' Why is submission of states to the
bankruptcy jurisdiction of the federal courts necessary? The short
answer is that federal bankruptcy policy is undermined to the extent
that a federal court cannot directly enforce the provisions of the
Code against a nonconsenting state creditor of a debtor.
Underlying the Code are two fundamental objectives. First,
Congress wished to provide an opportunity for honest debtors"4 to
obtain a fresh start in life after paying what they can to their
creditors."5 Second, the Code was intended to provide a collective
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." The Bankruptcy Code, enacted pursuant to the
Bankruptcy Clause, see supra note 61, is such a law of the United States and is binding on the
states, preempting any contrary state law. See, e.g., Maryland v. Antonelli Creditors'
Liquidating Trust, 123 F.3d 777, 781 (4th Cir. 1997); Ocasek v. Manville Corp. Asbestos
Disease Compensation Fund, 956 F.2d 152, 154 (7th Cir. 1992); Jones v. Keene Corp., 933
F.2d 209, 214 (3d Cir. 1991); Goergv. Parungao (In reGoerg), 844 F.2d 1562, 1565 (11th Cir.
1988); Consumers Realty & Dev. Co. v. Goetze (In re Consumers Realty & Dev. Co.), 238 B.R.
418, 426 (BAP. 8th Cir. 1999); In re Havens, 229 B.RI 613, 629 (Bankr. D.NJ. 1998). Cf.
Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 652 (1971) (holding invalid under the Supremacy Clause a
state motor vehicle safety responsibility act that provided for suspension of the driver's license
of debtor who filed to satisfy discharged judgment against him arising from the operation of a
motor vehicle because it conflicted with the discharge provisions of the Bankruptcy Act).
... See, e.g., Virginia v. Collins (In re Collins), 173 F.3d 924, 929-30 (4th Cir. 1999); Texas
v. Walker, 142 F.3d, 813, 822 (5th Cir. 1998); Antonelli Creditors'Liquidating Trust, 123 F.3d at
786-87.
.. See, e.g., In re Collins, 173 F.3d at 929-30; Walker, 142 F.3d at 822; Antonelli Creditors'
Liquidating Trus 123 F.3d at 786-87; Franchise Tax Bd. v. Lapin (In re Lapin), 226 B.R. 637,
647 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998); NewJersey v. Mocco, 206 B.R. 691, 693 (D.NJ. 1997); Muir v. Sallie
Mae Servicing Corp. (In re Muir), 239 B.R. 213, 221 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1999); Phelps v. Sallie
Mae Loan Serv. Cir. (In re Phelps), 237 B.R 527, 534 (Bankr. D.R.1I. 1999); In re Burkhardt,
220 B.R. 837,847 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1998).
12 The debtors with whom Congress was concerned were individual debtors; others are
not entitled to a discharge. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (1) (1999).
15 See, e.g., BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 563 (1994); Grogan v. Garner,
498 U.S. 279, 28687 (1991); Field v. Mans, 157 F.3d 35, 44 (1st Cir. 1998); Capital
Communications Fed. Credit Union v. Boodrow (In re Boodrow), 126 F.3d 43, 51 (2d Cir.
1997); see also H.R. REP. No. 103-835, at 32-33 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340,
3341. See generally Charles G. Hallinan, The "Fresh-Start" Policy in Consumer Bankruptcy: A
Historical Inventory and an Interpretive Theory, 21 U. RICH. L. REv. 49 (1986); Thomas H.
Jackson, TheFresh Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARv. L. REv. 1393 (1985); CharlesJordan
Tabb, The Scope of the Fresh Start in Bankruptcy: Collateral Conversions and the Dischargeability
Debate, 59 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 56 (1990).
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mechanism for satisfaction of creditors pursuant to which similarly
situated creditors would be treated equally, without preference of
one over the other. 6 This collective system has the additional
benefit of maximizing value for all creditors over that obtainable by
the piecemeal dismemberment of the debtor when individual
creditors pursue their own interests in separate proceedings.1
7
How does the nonparticipation by unwilling states affect these
goals? To reflect on this question, one must first consider what
aspects of the Code may be at issue between the state and the other
interested parties in the bankruptcy case.
When the debtor files for protection under the Code, "all legal
or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the
commencement of the case" become part of the bankruptcy
"estate.""' If any such property is in the hands of a third party, such
third party must deliver it to the trustee under the Code's turnover
provisions. 9 In addition, all entities are subject to the automatic
stay, 2' which protects the debtor, his property, and property of the
estate from various acts. At this stage of the case, a nonconsenting
"6 As Congress described it in 1994, the Code is intended "to enforce a distribution of
the debtor's assets in an orderly manner in which the claims of all creditors are considered
fairly, in accordance with established principles rather than on the basis of the inside
influence or economic leverage of a particular creditor." H.1L REP. No. 103-835, at 33 (1994),
reprinted in 1994 U.S.CC.A.N. 3340, 3341. See, e.g., New York State Elec. & Gas Corp. v.
McMahon (In re McMahon), 129 F.3d 93, 97 (2d Cir. 1997); Newbery Corp. v. Fireman's Fund
Ins. Co., 95 F.3d 1392, 1399 (9th Cir. 1996); Liona Corp. v. PCH Assoc. (In re PCH Assoc.),
949 F.2d 585, 598 (2d Cir. 1991); Epstein v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re
Piper Aircraft Corp.), 168 B.R. 434, 440 (S.D. Fla. 1994), affd, 58 F.3d 1573 (11th Cir. 1995);
Universal Life Church, Inc. v. United States (In re Universal Life Church, Inc.), 127 B.R. 453,
454 (E.D. Cal. 1991), aff'd, 965 F.2d 777 (9th Cir. 1992). See generally Ralph Brubaker,
Bankruptcy Injunctions and Complex Litigation: A Critical Reappraisal of Non-Debtor Releases in
Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 1997 U. IL. L. REV. 959, 980-81; Frederick Tung, Taking Future
Claims Seriously: Future Claims and Successor Liability in Bankruptcy, 49 CAsEW. RES. L. REv. 435,
482 & n.184 (1999); Pamela KohIman Webster, The Malpractice of Health Care Bankruptcy
Reform, 32 Loy. LA. L. REv. 1045, 1054 (1999). Of course, there are exceptions to this
general policy of equal treatment. Certain debts are excepted from discharge as a matter of
public policy, see 11 U.S.C. § 523 (1999), and others are given priority in the distribution of
the assets of the estate, see id. § 507(a). As discussed infra Part IV, the Code already gives
governmental units special treatment over other creditors.
"' See, e.g., THOMAS H.JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMrTs OF BANKRUPTCYLAW 7-19 (1986);
Douglas G. Baird, A World Without Bankruptcy, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 183-84 (1987);
Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World, 92 MICH. L. REv. 336, 344
(1993).
S11 U.S.C. § 541 (a) (1) (1999).
See id. §§ 542,543.
"0 See id. § 362.
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state may be in possession of property of the estate, or may
(inadvertently or intentionally) take actions that are precluded by
the automatic stay.
Next, the trustee seeks to augment the estate by pursuing
claims held by the estate against others. Among those claims will be
causes of action created by the Code itself, such as claims for
preferences,12' fraudulent conveyances,ss preferential set-offs,ss and
avoidable postpetition transfers.' 24 Given that the state, in its role as
taxing authority, is likely to be a creditor of every debtor, and one
with significant leverage to obtain payment of amounts due, the
recipient of those preferences, fraudulent conveyances, preferential
set-offs, and postpetition transfers may well be a state.
The trustee may also seek to avoid creditor liens, either because
they are unperfectedss or because they impair the debtor's
exemptions, or may seek to determine who has title to certain
property. The state may hold such a lien (for example, a tax lien
that has not been filed) or have a claim to such property.
Because certain tax debts2 7 and debts for educational loans
made, insured, or guaranteed by governmental units are not
dischargeable if the provisions of § 523(a) of the Code exclude
them from discharge,12' either before or after discharge is granted,
the debtor may wish to seek a determination of whether such claims
are dischargeable. Those claims may be held by the state.
Upon discharge, the debtor has the benefit of a permanent
injunction against actions to collect any discharged debt.'3" In
addition, governmental units are prohibited from certain
discriminatory treatment of debtors or former debtors with respect
to licenses, permits, charters, franchises or other similar grants,
121 See id. § 547.
'2 See id. § 548.
" See id. § 553.
"' See id- § 549.
See id. § 544(a).
' See id. § 522(f) (1).
' See id. § 523(a) (1) (c) (excluding from discharge, among other tax debts, those "with
respect to which the debtor made a fraudulent return or willfully attempted in any manner to
evade or defeat such tax").
't Section 523 (a) (8) makes such debts for educational loans non-dischargeable, unless
excepting the debt from discharge "will impose an undue hardship on the debtor and the
debtor's dependents." Id. § 523(a) (8).




employment, and student loan programs.'1 The state may be the
party to whom such discharged debt was owing, and may take
actions (again, inadvertently or intentionally) to collect such
discharged debt. The state may also be the governmental unit that
engages in discriminatory treatment prohibited by the Code.
Now suppose the trustee or the debtor wishes to pursue the
remedies provided for these wrongs under the Code, that is, request
the bankruptcy court to do any of the following: to compel the state
to turn over property of the estate; to enjoin the state's violations of
the automatic stay and obtain damages for any past violation; to
force the state to disgorge any preference or fraudulent conveyance
or preferential set-off it received prior to the filing of the petition
and return any post-petition transfers it received; to avoid the state's
lien or determine whether the state has title to property; to
determine the dischargeability of tax debts or student loans owed to
a state agency; to enjoin violations of the permanent injunction or
seek a declaration that the state's conduct violates the injunction,
and secure damages for such violations; to order the state to grant a
license, permit, charter, franchise, or other similar grant; or to
order the state to offer employment or a student loan to the debtor.
In the absence of sovereign immunity, all those remedies are within
the power of a bankruptcy court and may be ordered against a
creditor. The problem for the post-Seminole Tribe trustee or debtor is
that a cause of action seeking each type of relief listed above must
be brought as an adversary proceeding, 1 2 commenced by filing a
complaint and serving a summons and complaint upon the
defendant.3s Each of those types of adversary proceeding against a
nonconsenting state has been found barred by sovereign immunity
in the aftermath of Seminole Tribe.1M
.. See id. §§ 525(a), 523(c).
"3 Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7001 defines an adversary proceeding (in
relevant part) as a proceeding: "(1) to recover money or property... (2) to determine the
validity, priority, or extent of a lien or other interest in property... (6) to determine the
dischargeability of a debt, (7) to obtain an injunction or other equitable relief... (9) to
obtain a declaratoryjudgment relating to any of the foregoing...." FED. R. BANKR P.7001.
'" See id. 7003-04.
I' Turnover of property of the estate: Bakst v. Division of Taxation-Income Tax (In re Ross),
234 B.R 199, 202 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1999); Guiding Light Corp. v. Louisiana ex reL Dep't of
Health & Hosp. (In re Guiding Light Corp.), 213 B.R. 489, 491 (Bankr. E.D. La. 1997). But cf.
Honvitz v. Zywiczynski (In re Zywiczynski), 210 B.R 924, 931 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding
that court has jurisdiction to determine whether certificate of deposit, held by a third party
but in which the state claimed interest, was subject to turnover).
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Violation of a stay: Womack v. Mays (In reWomack), 253 B.R. 241, 243 (Bankr. E.D. Ark.
2000); Rainwater v. Alabama (In re Rainwater), 233 B.R. 126, 146 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1999);
Technologies Int'l Holdings, Inc. v. Kentucky (In re Technologies Int'l Holdings, Inc.), 234
B.R. 699, 711 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1999);Justice v. Bureau of Workers' Comp. (In reJustice) 224
B.R. 631, 635 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1998); Ranstrom v. IRS (In re Ranstrom), 215 B.R. 454, 455
(Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1997); Louis; Harris v. Barall (In reLouis;Harris), 213 B.R. 796, 798 (Bankr.
D. Conn. 1997); Tri-City Turf Club, Inc. v. Kentucky Racing Comm'n (In reTri-City Turf Club,
Inc.), 203 B.R. 617, 619 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1996).
Preference, fraudulent conveyance, post-petition transfer. Schlossberg v. Comptroller of
Treasury (In re Creative Goldsmiths of Washington, D.C., Inc.), 119 F.3d 1140, 1150 (4th Cir.
1997); Brewer v. New York State Dep't of Corr. Serv. (In reValue-Added Communications,
Inc.), 224 B.R. 354, 359 (N.D. Tex. 1998); Grabscheid v. Michigan Employment Sec. Comm'n
(In re C.J. Rogers, Inc.) 212 B.R. 265, 276 (E.D. Mich. 1997); In re Technologies Int'l Holdings,
Inc., 234 B.R. at 711; In re Ross, 234 B.R. at 202. But see O'Brien v. Agency of Natural Res. (In re
O'Brien), 216 B.R. 731,737 (Bankr. D. VL 1998), appeal dismissed, 184 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 1999)
(finding that sovereign immunity does not apply to preference action, which is in rem).
Avoiding lien or determining interest in property: Department of Transp. & Dev. v. PNL
Asset (In re Fernandez), 123 F.3d 241, 246 (5th Cir. 1997); In re Christie, 222 B.R. 64, 68
(Bankr. D.NJ. 1998); In re Zywiczynsk4 210 B.R. at 932. Cf In reNational Cattle Congress, 247
B.R. 259, 271 (Bankr. N. D. Iowa 2000) (confirmation of plan extinguishing nonconsenting
sovereign's lien barred by sovereign immunity).
Determining disclargeability of tax debts: Mitchell v. Franchise Tax Bd. (In reMitchell), 209
F.3d 1111, 1117 (9th Cir. 2000); United States Dep't of Treasury v. Gosselin, 252 B.R. 854, 859
(D. Mass. 2000); Chandler v. Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n (In re Chandler), 251
B.R. 872, 875 (BAP. 10th Cir. 2000); Elias v. United States (In re Elias), 218 B.R. 80, 87
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998), affd, 216 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2000); Taylor v. Georgia (In reTaylor),
249 B.R. 571, 574-75 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2000); Pitts v. Ohio Dep't of Taxation (In re Pitts), 241
B.1L 862, 869 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1999); Neary v. Department of Revenue (In re Neary), 220
B.R. 864, 870 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1998); Morrell v. Franchise Tax Bd. (In reMorrell), 218 B.R. 87,
92 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1997); Mueller v. Idaho (In re Mueller), 211 B.R. 737, 743 (Bankr. D.
Mont. 1997). But seeln reRanstrom, 215 B.R. at 456.
Determining dischargeability of student loans: University of Virginia v. Robertson, 243 B.R1
657, 665 (W.D. Va. 2000); Texas Higher Educ. Coordinating Bd. v. Greenwood (In re
Greenwood), 237 B.R. 128, 132 (N.D. Tex. 1999);Janc v. Coordinating Bd. for Higher Educ.
(In reJanc), 251 B.R. 525, 530 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2000); Seay v. Tennessee Student Assistance
Corp. (In re Seay), 244 B.R. 112,120 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2000); Scarborough v. Michigan
Collection Div. (In re Scarborough), 229 B.R. 145, 151 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1999); Holland v.
United States Dep't of Educ. (In reHolland), 230 B.R. 387,390 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1999); Stout
v. United States Dep't of Educ. (In re Stout), 231 B.R. 313, 316-17 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1999);
Kahl v. Texas Higher Educ. Coordinating Bd. (In reKahl), 240 B.R. 524, 536 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1999); Snyder v. Board of Regents (In re Snyder), 228 B.R. 712, 718 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1998);
Perkins v. Coordinating Bd. For Higher Educ. (In rePerkins), 228 B.R. 431, 434 (Bankr. E.D.
Mo. 1998). But cf Muir v. Sallie Mae Serv. Corp. (In re Muir), 239 B.R 213, 222 (Bankr. D.
Mont 1999) (allowing adversary proceeding against state higher education services
corporation which purchased student loans after petition was filed as required by federal
regulations, but violated federal regulations by claiming sovereign immunity rather than
contesting dischargeability).
Dischargeability of other debts owed the State: Kish v. Verniero (In re Kish), 212 B.R. 808,
817 (D.N.J. 1997) (surcharges for motor vehicle offenses).
Violations of permanent injunction In re Lapin, 226 B.R. 637, 645 (BAP. 9th Cir. 1998);
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Nor can the complainant circumvent the state's sovereign
immunity by bringing its request for relief to the bankruptcy court
through the mechanism of initiating a contested matter rather than
filing an adversary proceeding91m As is the case for adversary
proceedings, contested matters seek to resolve "an actual dispute"
between two or more parties.136 If a contested matter is prosecuted
against a state, especially if such matter seeks recovery of money, the
dispute is no less a suit against the state for sovereign immunity
purposes than would be an adversary proceeding in which the
complaint named the state as defendant.37
Alston v. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs (In re Alston), 236 B.R. 214, 217 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1999);
Kidd v. Driver Control Section Dep't of Fin. & Admin. (In reKidd), 227 B.R. 161, 162 (Bankr.
E.D. Ark. 1998). Cf A.H. Robins Co. v. Dieleuterio (In reA.H. Robins Co.), 235 B.R. 406,410-
11 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1999) (adversary proceeding seeking declaratory relief against state
officials with respect to tax provisions of confirmed plan barred); ef. also Texas v. Walker, 142
F.3d 813, 820 n.9 (5th Cir. 1998) (distinguishing assertion of discharge as defense in state
action for conversion and breach of contract from "seeking affirmative relief, such as an
injunction against further collection efforts under 11 U.S.C. § 524" for sovereign immunity
purposes and declining to express an opinion about the latter).
Enforcement of antidiscrimination provisions: In re Alston, 236 B.R. at 217; In re Technologies
Int'l Holdings, Inc., 234 B.R. at 711; In re Kidd, 227 B.R. at 162; In re Burkhardt, 220 B.R. 837,
843-44 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1998); In re Perez, 220 B.L 216, 224-25 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1998), affd, No.
98-2043NPH, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21513 (D.N.J. Aug. 10, 1998).
' "Whenever there is an actual dispute, other than an adversary proceeding, before the
bankruptcy court, the litigation to resolve that dispute is a contested matter." FED. R. BANKs,.
P. 9014 (advisory committee's note). Contested matters are commenced by motion rather
than complaint, but the motion is served in the same way as a summons and complaint
pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7004. SeeFED. R. BANKR. P. 9014. "[Tlhe
party against whom relief is sought" must be afforded "reasonable notice and opportunity for
hearing." Id.
1'5 See FED. R. BANmK. P. 9014 (advisory committee's note).
"7 See, e.g., NVR Homes, Inc. v. Clerks of Circuit Courts (In re NVR, LP), 189 F.3d 442,
454 (4th Cir. 1999) (dismissing motion under § 1146(c) seeking declaration that certain
transfers of real property during bankruptcy case were exempt from state transfer and
recordation tax, payment of which had already been made); In reA.H. Robins Co., 251 B.R.
312, 321-22 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2000) (dismissing motion for determination that reorganized
debtor was entitled to claim debtor's net operating losses on its state income tax returns); In re
Lush Lawns, Inc., 203 B.R. 418, 421 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1996) (denying motion to have state
appear and show cause why it should not be held in contempt for willful violation of
automatic stay). Cf In re Hechinger Inv. Co. of Del., Inc., 254 B.R. 306, 313 (Bankr. D. Del.
2000) (holding that motion under § 1146(c) seeking declaration that sales of real property
were exempt from state tax was not a "suit" if taxes had not previously been collected); In re
Mozingo, 222 B.R. 475, 478 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1998), vacated on other grounds, 234 B.R. 867 (E.D.
Pa. 1999) (finding state agency waived sovereign immunity by filing proof of claim and that
court had jurisdiction to hear motion to avoid agency's lien); In re Merry-Go-Round Enters.,
Inc., 227 B.R. 775, 780 (Bankr. D. Md. 1998) (finding objection to proof of claim filed by
county was not suit against county, but if it was, county waived sovereign immunity by filing
proof of claim); In re Layton, 220 B.R. 508, 514 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding county
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Therefore, we are left with a system under which bankruptcy
cases can, and indeed must, be brought in the federal district
courts," and such courts may exercise their jurisdiction to confirm
a plan"9 and discharge debts4 ' (including state debts"'); however
many of the tools provided to debtors and trustees to enforce
provisions of the Code against recalcitrant creditors are
jurisdictionally unavailable when that creditor is a nonconsenting
state.
The policies underlying the Code are necessarily impacted by
this jurisdictional impotence. For example, take the case of an
individual debtor who seeks the protection of a bankruptcy filing
because of crushing educational debts held by a state educational
agency. Although educational debts are generally not subject to
discharge under § 523(a) (8), the debtor may show that excepting
the debts from discharge would "impose an undue hardship on the
debtor and the debtor's dependents" within the meaning of that
section of the Code. 2 The "fresh start" policy underlying the Code
requires discharge of the educational debts of such a debtor. But
because the debtor cannot commence an adversary proceeding
against the state requesting determination of the dischargeability of
the educational debts, the benefits of the bankruptcy case are lost to
this debtor, undermining the congressional goal of discharge. The
"fresh start" policy is also impaired when bankruptcy courts cannot
waived sovereign immunity with respect to motion seeking order finding county in contempt
for violation of automatic stay and awarding damages). But see In re Collins, 173 F.3d 924, 929
(4th Cir. 1999) (deciding motion to reopen case to enable the court to determine whether
debt to state was discharged not barred by sovereign immunity); Harden v. Gilbert (In relnt'l
Heritage, Inc.), 239 B.R. 306, 310 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1999) (holding motion to determine
whether automatic stay barred administrative proceedings by state commissioner of securities
not barred); In re Psychiatric Hosp. of Fla., Inc., 217 B.R. 645, 649-50 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997),
aft'd, 216 B.R. 660, 661 (M.D. Fla. 1998) (holding motion to determine tax liability under
§ 505 not suit against state).
. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (1999) (giving the district courts "original and exclusive
jurisdiction of all cases under title 11"). By standing rule, each district has referred all
bankruptcy cases, as well as "all proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a
case under title 11," to the bankruptcyjudges for the district. See28 U.S.C. § 157(a).
'N See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129, 1225, 1325 (1994). There is no plan in connection with a
chapter 7 liquidation.
.. See id. §§ 727, 1141(d), 1228, 1328. A discharge under § 727 is available only to an
individual debtor. See id. § 727(a) (1).
14' See supra note 113.
. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (8).
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compel compliance with the permanent injunction or enforce the
anti-discrimination provisions of the Code.
The presence of nonconsenting state creditors also harms the
equality principle, the objective that similarly-situated creditors
should be treated in the same way in bankruptcy. Here, we can
imagine a debtor who, pressured by the state authorities, made a
significant payment of overdue taxes a month before filing for
bankruptcy protection, satisfying all obligations owing to the state.
No non-exempt assets remain in the bankruptcy estate. To
effectuate the equality principle, Congress included § 547 in the
Code, enabling the trustee to recover any preferential transfers
made on the eve of bankruptcy and to force the recipient of any
such transfer to share pro rata in the estate assets with others having
equal priority claims. Yet, because the trustee cannot bring an
adversary proceeding against the state (and the state in these
circumstances certainly has no reason to submit to the jurisdiction
of the court), the state can keep its preferential payment, thereby
boosting itself ahead of other creditors who are legally entitled to
the same amount under the Code or, indeed, whose priority in a
bankruptcy distribution would be higher.
The consequences of this inability to recover payments could
be even more troubling than the inequity of treating individual
creditors differently in a particular case. As cogently described by
Justice Marshall in his dissent in Hoffman v. Connecticut Department of
Income Maintenance.
[A] ny State owed money by a debtor with financial problems will have
a strong incentive to collect whatever it can, as fast as it can, even if
doing so pushes the debtor into bankruptcy. Ordinary creditors will
soon realize that States can receive more than their fair share; the
very existence of this governmental power will cause these other
creditors, in turn, to increase pressure on the debtor. The turnover
provision is designed to prevent third parties from keeping property
of the debtor or from refusing to make payments owed to the debtor,
thereby aiding the reorganization of the debtor's affairs or the
orderly and equitable distribution of the estate. Exempting States
from this provision, as well as from the preference provision,
143undermines these important policy goals of the Code.
"' 492 U.S. 96, 110-11 (1989) (Marshall,J, dissenting) (citations omitted).
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In effect, state sovereign immunity turns the states into "preferred
creditor[s] in every bankruptcy,"1' who cannot be compelled by the
bankruptcy court to honor the automatic stay, turn over estate
property, give up preferential transfers or set-offs or fraudulent
conveyances, or relinquish avoidable liens. Although it is perfectly
appropriate to respect state sovereignty by denying Congress the
power to abrogate state immunity, nothing could be more inimical
to the principle of equality in bankruptcy than the exercise of that
immunity to immunize states from liability other similarly situated
creditors accept. And the incentives that preferred position creates
to engage in coercive conduct toward troubled debtors-not only
for the state, but for all other creditors who must compete with the
state for the debtor's assets on an unequal footing-tend to force
debtors into bankruptcy rather than keeping them out, contrary to
congressional intent.
Perhaps this doomsday scenario overstates the harm caused by
nonparticipating state creditors in bankruptcy. There are some
"solutions" to ameliorate the impact of the preferred position
conferred by state sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court in
Seminole Tribe identified three "methods of ensuring the States'
compliance with federal la,: 4 . (1) the federal government can
bring suit in federal court against a state; (2) an individual can bring
suit against a state officer in order to ensure that the officer's
conduct is in compliance with federal law; and (3) review by the
Court of any question of federal law arising from a state court
decision where a state has consented to suit.1 6  Although these
procedures in the bankruptcy context either are or could be
available, none is completely satisfactory.
4
'" See In re McVey Trucking, Inc., 812 F.2d 311, 328 (7th Cir. 1987); see also Steven M.
Richman, More Equal Than Others: State Sovereign Immunity Under the Bankruptcy Code, 21
RuTGERS LJ. 603, 604 (1990) (asserting that states enjoy the "position of a supercreditor, one
that apparently has many of the rights but few of the liabilities facing most commercial
creditors in a bankruptcy proceeding").
",. 517 U.S. at 71 n.14.
1"6 See id.
"' A fourth "solution" occasionally raised should also be mentioned. Some courts have
suggested that because the bankruptcy court exercises in remjurisdiction over a res consisting
of the bankruptcy estate, see 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e) (1999), any action that properly falls within
that in remjurisdiction is not properly characterized as an action "against a state" but is rather
the exercise of jurisdiction with respect to the property itself. This approach has been
successfully urged with respect to a confirmation order to which the state did not object. See
Maryland v. Antonelli Creditors' Liquidating Trust, 123 F.3d 777, 787 (4th Cir. 1997) ("the
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The first solution-the amenability of states to suit in federal
court by the federal government-stems from the recognition that,
in ratifying the Constitution, states consented to jurisdiction of
federal courts over suits brought against them by other states and by
the federal government itself.14' As explained by the Court in Alden
power of the bankruptcy court to enter an order confirming a plan... derives not from
jurisdiction over the state or other creditors, but rather from jurisdiction over debtors and
their estates"). Cf Honvitz v. Zywiczynski (In re Zywiczynski), 210 B.R. 924, 925 (Bankr.
W.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding that court could make preliminary determination of whether
property in possession of third party but in which state claimed an interest was property of the
estate and subject to turnover over sovereign immunity objection of state because of
fundamental policy of Code with respect to "control of the property of the estate").
Yet, each of these cases concerned actions that were not, in fact, "against" the state, and
can be explained on that basis. More problematic is the invocation of in remjurisdiction to
justify the exercise of jurisdiction over a nonconsenting state in an adversary proceeding or
contested matter against the state. See, e.g., Bliemeister v. Industrial Comm'n of Ariz. (In re
Bliemeister), 251 B.R. 383, 393 (Bankr. D. Az. 2000) (allowing motion to determine
dischargeability of state claim); O'Brien v. Vermont Agency of Natural Res. (In re O'Brien),
216 B.R. 731, 737 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1998), appeal dismissed, 184 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 1999) (allowing
preference action seeking to avoid prejudgment attachment on debtor's land). The problem
with this solution in that context is that it flies in the face of Supreme Court jurisprudence.
The Court has emphasized in a bankruptcy case that "we have never applied an in rem
exception to the sovereign-immunity bar against monetary recovery and have suggested no
such exception exists." United States v. Nordic Village, 503 U.S. 30, 38 (1992) (finding IRS
had not waived sovereign immunity with respect to adversary proceeding to recover
unauthorized postpetition transfer); see also Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18, 28 (1933) ("The
fact that a suit in a federal court is in rem, or quasi in rem, furnishes no ground for the issue of
process against a non-consenting State."). More recently the Court did, in fact, recognize an
in rem exception to sovereign immunity in the admiralty context, but only where the objecting
state was not in possession of the property at issue. See California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc.,
523 U.S. 491 (1998) (holding that court had jurisdiction to determine title to abandoned
shipwreck over sovereign immunity objection when state was one of the claimants). However,
the Court provided no encouragement for any extension of its holding beyond the admiralty
context or, indeed, within the Court's admiralty jurisdiction if the state had actual possession
of the res. As a result, most courts have rejected any suggestion that a bankruptcy court's in rem
jurisdiction gives it the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity. See, e.g., In re Doiel, 228
B.R. 439, 441 n.1 (D.S.D. 1998); In reLapin, 226 B.R. 637, 645 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998); Mitchell
v. California Franchise Tax Bd. (In re Mitchell), 222 B.R. 877,885 (BAP. 9th Cir. 1998), affd,
209 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2000); French v. Georgia Dep't of Revenue (In reABEPP Acquisition
Corp.), 215 B.R- 513, 516-17 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 1997); In re Havens, 229 B.R. 613, 626-27 (Bankr.
D.NJ. 1998). See generally Mark Browning, A Magic Bullet to Beat Seminole?, 17 AM. BANK. INST.
J. 10 (Feb. 1998); Klee et al., supra note 106, at 1575; Richard Lieb, Bankruptcy After Seminole
Tribe: New Currents of Legal Thought, 8 NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER 1 (1998); Richard Lieb,
Eleventh Amendment Immunity of a State in Bankruptcy Cases: A NewJurisprudentialApproach, 7 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 269, 306-10 (1999) [hereinafter Lieb, Eleventh Amendment Immunity];
Adam L. Rosen, Is the In Rem Exception to Sovereign Immunity Expanding?, 16 BANKR. STRATEGIST,
No. 4, at 8 (1999).
.. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl.1 explicitly includes within the judicial power of the United
States all "controversies to which the United States shall be a party" and "controversies
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v. Maine,14 9 "[s]uits brought by the United States itself require the
exercise of political responsibility for each suit prosecuted against a
State, a control which is absent from a broad delegation to private
persons to sue nonconsenting States."'"0
However, the absence of sovereign immunity in a suit by the
federal government provides a "solution" that is more theoretical
than practical in bankruptcy. The Code is a mechanism for
resolving competing claims to the bankrupt estate; it is a
commercial statute, not a penal one. Unlike criminal cases in which
the government acts as prosecutor, 5 1 the federal government now
has three basic roles in the bankruptcy process. First, it provides the
judicial forum for resolution of the dispute.'52 Second, it represents
its own interests as creditor.5 3 Third, through the U.S. Trustee
system, it "supervise [s] the administration of cases and [private]
trustees. .. ""' Causes of action giving rise to defenses of state
sovereign immunity are currently pursued not by the bankruptcy
between two or more States." Therefore, the states have no sovereign immunity as against the
federal government. See West Virginia v. United States, 479 U.S. 305, 311 (1987); United
States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140 (1965); Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S.
313, 328-29 (1934); United States v. Minnesota, 270 U.S. 181, 195 (1926); Oklahoma v. Texas,
258 U.S. 574, 581 (1922); United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 643-46 (1892).
... 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
Id. at 756.
15 Of course, actions relating to the bankruptcy case may become the basis of a criminal
proceeding prosecuted by the federal government. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 151 (2000).
See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (1999) (conferring original and exclusive jurisdiction over
bankruptcy cases on the federal district courts).
'5 In most cases, the government's involvement is limited to representing the Internal
Revenue Service with respect to tax claims. See Craig A. Gargotta, The United States Attorney's
Role in Bankruptcy: Representing the Internal Revenue Service in Bankruptcy, 12 AM BANKR. INST. J.
30, 30 (1993); William S. Parkinson, The Contempt Power of the Bankruptcy Court Fact or Fiction:
The Debate Continues, 65 AM. BANK LJ. 591, 609 (1991). However, other agencies may also
assert claims. See Gargotta, at 30.
This representation [of a federal entity as creditor] usually includes such federal
agencies as the Department of Veterans Affairs, Small Business Administration,
Farmer's Home Administration or Department of Housing and Urban
Development .... Other areas of representation might include the Federal Highway
Administration, Department of Interior, or United States Custom Service, where the
United States seeks enforcement and collection on an assessment for a fine or
penalty in violation of a federal statute.
Id. See also I NAT'L BANKR. REVIEW COMM'N REP. 900 (1997) ("States... appear[] in many
bankruptcy cases in a myriad of roles-as priority tax creditor, secured creditor, unsecured
creditor, police and regulatory authority, environmental creditor, landlord, guarantor,
bondholder, leaseholder, and equity interest holder.").
" 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(3) (1999).
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court or by the U.S. Trustee, but are pursued by the debtor or the
trustee in bankruptcy.15
Although Congress could amend the Judicial Code to make the
U.S. Trustee the acting bankruptcy trustee in every bankruptcy case
with respect to any cause of action against a state that would be
barred by sovereign immunity were it brought by a private party,"' it
is unlikely to do so. Additional duties for the U.S. Trustees require
additional resources. If the beneficiary of any such action were the
estate rather than the U.S. Treasury, the proposal would seem to
promote private interests over state autonomy, all at federal
government expense, a politically unpalatable justification for
passage."" And even if Congress empowered private parties to
' See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 547(d) (1999) ("The trustee may avoid a transfer .... "); 11 U.S.C.
§ 548(a) (1) ("The trustee may avoid any transfer...."); 11 U.S.C. § 549(a) ("[Tlhe trustee
may avoid a transfer .... ."); 11 U.S.C. §505(b) ("A trustee may request a
determination .... "); 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) ("An individual injured by any willful violation of a
stay .... "). The U.S. Trustee may serve as trustee in a bankruptcy case when required to serve
in such a case. See 28 U.S.C. § 586(a) (2).
.. See Daniel J. Meltzer, The Seminole Decision and State Sovereign Immunity, 1996 Sup. Cr.
REV. 1,56-57. Cf Mark H. Berman, Compelling State Compliance with Chapter 11 Tax Exemptions
in the Post-Seminole Era, 103 ComIi. LJ. 1,13 (1998) (plan proponent "may solicit the aid of the
Office of the United States Trustee to initiate suit to compel a state's compliance with a
confirmed plan").
"' Apart from the political realities, the proposal may not work to avoid a sovereign
immunity defense. First, if the U.S. Trustee assumes the role of bankruptcy trustee, one could
argue that the U.S. Trustee has relinquished his governmental role and has instead become a
private actor in the bankruptcy case. Cf California State Bd. of Equilization v. Sierra Summit,
Inc., 490 U.S. 844, 849 (1989) ("The bankruptcy trustee is the representative of the estate of
the debtor, not an arm of the government.") (citation omitted); Schulman v. California State
Water Res. Control Bd. (In re Lazar), 200 B.R 358, 376 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996) (finding
bankruptcy trustee is not exempt from Eleventh Amendment defense to federal jurisdiction).
In such capacity, the U.S. Trustee may not enjoy freedom from the sovereign immunity of the
states.
Second, even if the U.S. Trustee is deemed to remain a representative of the federal
government when acting in this non-governmental role, the government's interest in these
causes of action against the state may be too insignificant to support an exemption from the
sovereign immunity defense. In New Hampshire v. Louisiana, the Court refused to permit New
Hampshire, as assignee of a claim by a private New Hampshire citizen, to bring suit in federal
court against the State of Louisiana in the face of an Eleventh Amendment objection. See 108
U.S. 76 (1883). The Court characterized New Hampshire as a "nominal actor" for the true
party in interest, its private assignor. See id. at 89. Because the U.S. government has no
financial or other interest in a private party's bankruptcy estate but would instead be asserting
claims on behalf of private creditors (which may or may not include the U.S. government), its
position under this proposal may be subject to the same constitutional deficiencies. See
generally Scott P. Glauberman, Citizen Suits Against States: The ExclusiveJurisdiction Dilemma, 45
JOURNAL, COPMIGHT SOC. OF U.SA 63, 104-06 (1997); Klee et al., supra note 106, at 1585
n.295;Joseph F. Riga, State Immunity in Bankruptcy After Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 28 SETON HALL
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pursue any such action on behalf of the federal government
(thereby limiting the direct cost to the U.S. government),58 such a
legislative scheme is of questionable constitutionality. 9
The second proposed solution, suing a state officer to ensure
compliance with federal law, was formulated by the Supreme
Court's opinion in Ex parte Young.'O Ex parte Young was heard on a
petition for habeas corpus seeking release of the Attorney General
of Minnesota from custody. He was being held for contempt of
court for enforcing a state law regulating rates charged by railroads
in Minnesota in violation of a preliminary injunction granted by a
federal court. Stockholders of the railway companies challenged
the state law, claiming it deprived them of their property without
due process of law and denied them equal protection of the laws in
violation of the U.S. Constitution. The attorney general sought
dismissal of the suit, declined to obey the preliminary injunction,
and sought release from custody. He claimed that the federal court
L. REV. 29, 58-63 (1997). Cf. Justin V. Switzer, Note, Did They Really Think This Over? Seminole
Tribe v. Florida and the Bankruptcy Code, 34 Hous. L. REv. 1243, 1276-77 (1997) (proposing that
the Code be rewritten to vest the bankruptcy estate in the United States in trust for the benefit
of the creditors, thereby giving the administrator on behalf of the U.S. the power to sue free
of sovereign immunity objection).
" This proposal, developed by analogy to the qui tam action (which is brought by an
individual on behalf of both the individual and the government, who both share in the
recovery), was proposed in an article that predated Seminole Tribe. See Jonathan R. Siegel, The
Hidden Source of Congress's Power to Abrogate State Sovereign Immunity, 73 TEX. L. REV. 539, 551-70
(1995).
"" The Court has consistently viewed with skepticism any "broad delegation to private
persons [of the right] to sue nonconsenting States," seeing such delegation as lacking "the
exercise of political responsibility for each suit prosecuted against a State." Alden v. Maine,
527 U.S. 706, 756 (1999); see also Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 785-86
(1991) (suggesting in dictum that congressional delegation to a private party of the ability of
the United States to sue a state is a "strange notion," and emphasizing that "[tihe consent...
to suit by the United States-at the instance and under the control of responsible federal
officers-is not consent to suit by anyone whom the United States might select"). See generally
Glauberman, supra note 157, at 102-03 (characterizing the structure as "little more than an
end run around the Eleventh Amendment"); TedJanger, Strategies for Preserving the Bankruptcy
Trustee's Avoidance Power Against States After Seminole Tribe, 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1431, 1439
(1997) (criticizing this structure, suggesting that, "to satisfy Seminole Tribe, control over
avoidance litigation would have to remain with the U.S. Trustee or some other executive
official"); Henry Paul Monaghan, The Sovereign Immunity "Exception,"110 HARV. L. REv. 102,
125-26 n.162 (1996) ("Whether the Seminole Tribe majority would permit so transparent an
evisceration of its holdings [as Congressionally-authorized qui tam actions on behalf of the
U.S. by private parties] is unclear"); but see Siegel, supra note 158, at 558-63 (arguing that
allowing delegation of control over government litigation is consistent with historical practice
and congressional authority under separation of powers doctrine).
. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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had no jurisdiction over him by virtue of Minnesota's sovereign
immunity and his position as a state official.
The Court first concluded that the lower federal court, which
issued the contempt order, had jurisdiction over the case because
federal questions were at issue.'r" After holding that the Minnesota
statutes at issue were in fact unconstitutional on their face, 62 the
Court turned to the Eleventh Amendment defense. The Court
found that when a state official seeks to enforce an unconstitutional
statute,
[i] t is simply an illegal act upon the part of a state official in
attempting, by the use of the name of the state, to enforce a
legislative enactment which is void because unconstitutional. If the
act which the state attorney general seeks to enforce be a violation of
the Federal Constitution, the officer, in proceeding under such
enactment, comes into conflict with the superior authority of that
Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or
representative character and is subjected in his person to the
consequences of his individual conduct. The state has no power to
impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme
authority of the United States.
In other words, a state official is never acting in his or her official
capacity (and therefore is not sheltered by sovereign immunity)
when the official engages in conduct which violates federal law or
the U.S. Constitution.
Ex parte Young has remained the main enforcement mechanism
for the supremacy of federal law over contrary state enactments.TM
The Supreme Court mentioned it favorably in Seminole Tribe,65 and
the Court's more recent sovereign immunity decision, Alden v.
Maine, 16  emphasized that, notwithstanding state sovereign
161 See id. at 145.
'2 See id. at 148.
.. Id. at 159-60.
1' See generally Patricia L. Barsalou &Scott A. Stengel, Ex Parte Young Relativity in Practice,
72AM. BANKR. LJ. 455 (1998); Monaghan, supra note 159.
' See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 71 n.14 (1996) ("[A]n individual
can bring suit against a state officer in order to ensure that the officer's conduct is in
compliance with federal law, see, e.g., Ex pante Young...." (citation omitted)); id at 72 n.16
("[A]n individual may obtain injunctive relief under Exparte Youngin order to remedy a state
officer's ongoing violation of federal law.").
' 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
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immunity, "certain suits for declaratory or injunctive relief against
state officers must... be permitted if the Constitution is to remain
the supreme law of the land." 67
In the wake of opinions striking down congressional abrogation
of state sovereign immunity in § 106(a),'6' the Ex parte Young
doctrine has become an important means of ensuring compliance
by state officials with certain Code provisions.69 However, it has
severe limitations.
170
167 Id. at 747; see also id. at 756-57.
'' See supra note 62 and cases cited therein.
See, e.g., Rainwater v. Alabama (In re Rainwater), 233 B.R. 126, 149 (Bankr. N.D. Ala.
1999) (violation of automatic stay); Ellett v. Goldberg (In re Ellett), 229 B.R 202, 209 (Bankr.
E.D. Cal.), aft'd, 243 B.R. 741 (BAP. 9th Cir. 1999) (violation of § 524); Technologies Int'l
Holdings, Inc. v. Kentucky (In re Technologies Int'l Holdings, Inc.), 234 B.R. 699, 713-14
(Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1999) (violation of Code priority scheme); DeAngelis v. Laskey (In re
DeAngelis), 239 B.R. 426, 432 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1999) (violation of§ 524); Kish v. Vemiero (In
re Kish), 238 B.R. 271, 282 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1999) (violation of § 524); Alston v. State Bd. of
Med. Exam'rs (In re Alston), 236 B.R. 214, 218 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1999) (violations of §§ 524,
525); Kidd v. Driver Control Section Dep't of Fin. & Admin. (In re Kidd), 227 B.R. 161, 163
(Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1998) (violation of §§ 524, 525); Guiding Light Corp. v. Louisiana (In re
Guiding Light), 213 B.R. 489,492 (Bankr. E.D. La. 1997) (violation of§ 542); cf Muir v. Sallie
Mae Servicing Corp. (In re Muir), 239 B.R. 213, 222 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1999) (suggesting that
Ex parte Young declaratory relief may be available against any state officer who seeks to collect
a discharged student loan).
1'7 Seminole Tribe itself restricted Ex pare Young actions intended to remedy state
violations of federal law to those federal laws in which Congress has not "prescribed a detailed
remedial scheme for the enforcement against a state of a statutorily created right." 517 U.S.
at 74. See generally Meltzer, supra note 156, at 36-41. Unlike the IGRA at issue in Seminole Tribe,
see supra note 33, which the Court concluded contained such a detailed scheme, see supra note
59, the Code specifies no remedies particular to state actors for the violation of its provisions.
See, e.g., In re Ellett, 229 B.R. at 206; In re Technologies Int'l Holdings, Inc., 234 B.IL at 713; In re
Guiding Light, 213 BiL at 492. See generally S. Elizabeth Gibson, Sovereign Immunity in
Bankruptcy: The Next Chapter, 70 AM. BANK. L.J. 195, 214-15 & n.137 (1996) [hereinafter
Gibson, Sovereign Immunity] (arguing that the statutory scheme in Seminole Tribe "Is
distinguishable from the bankruptcy provision in which Congress authorized relief against the
states"); Janger, supra note 159, at 1434 ("The Bankruptcy Code differs from the Indian
Gaming Act [in terms of Congressional intent to permit remedies against states]"); Klee et al.,
supra note 106, at 1570 ("Although the Bankruptcy Code is certainly an intricate weaving of
various policies and considerations, there is nothing in the Code that indicates Congress
intended to limit or prevent certain remedies against a state or state officials.").
More recently, in Idaho v. CoeurdAlene Tribe while emphasizing that "[w]e do not, then,
question the continuing validity of the Ex parte Young doctrine," 521 U.S. 261, 269 (1997),
Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, recognized an additional limitation on the availability
of Ex pare Young relief. See id. at 281. Acknowledging that "[a]n allegation of an on-going
violation of federal law where the requested relief is prospective is ordinarily sufficient to
invoke the Young fiction," the Court declined to permit such a suit when it would be "the
functional equivalent of a quiet tide action [with respect to submerged lands and lake bed
and various tributaries] which implicates special sovereignty interest." Id. Given the "unique
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First, the object of a suit based on Exparte Young must be a state
official, not the state itself, regardless of the nature of the relief
sought.17" ' This creates a pleading trap for the unwary, and
bankruptcy courts may dismiss actions against the state rather than
permit amendment to add a state official who is susceptible to suit
under Exparte Young.
7
Second, in order to sustain such an action, the complainant
must demonstrate an "ongoing violation of federal law."'73 This
limitation has two components. First, there must be some violation
of federal law'74 by the state official. Take our hypothetical debtor
status in the law" afforded the sovereignty interests of states over submerged lands, the
"special sovereignty interests" limitation on Ex parte Young relief is unlikely to limit its
availability in bankruptcy cases. Id. at 283. See, e.g., In re Rainwater, 233 B.IL at 149; In reEllett,
229 B.R1 at 208-09; In re Technologies Int'l Holdings, Inc., 234 B.L at 713. Cf In reDeAngelis, 239
B.R. at 431-32 (erroneously stating that the "special sovereignty interest" limitation was not
part of the opinion of the Court in Coeur d'A/ene and declining to apply it). See generally I
NAT'L BANKR. REvmW COMM'N REP. 904 (1997) (stating that Coeur d'Alene may apply "only
where the state would lose regulatory control as a result of the Ex parte Young action. These
circumstances would rarely, if ever, be present in bankruptcy").
Justice Kennedy also observed that there are "in general, two instances where Young has
been applied." Coeur d'Alene Tribe; 521 U.S. at 270. He noted that "where there is no state
forum available to vindicate federal interests.... the Young rule has special significance." Id.
at 270-71. He also suggested that Exparte Young"may serve an important interest... when the
case calls for the interpretation of federal law." Id. at 274. Despite the fact that this portion of
Justice Kennedy's opinion was joined only by Justice Rehnquist, and thus represented a
minority view, see id. at 291-97 (O'Connor, J., concurring), it has been applied by several
judges in deciding whether an Ex parte Young action should lie. See, e.g., Burtch v. LaVecchia
(In re PHP NJ MSO, Inc.), Nos. 98-2609, 98-2610, 1999 WL 360199, at *7 (D. Del. May 7,
1999); In re Rainwater, 233 B.R. at 147-49; In reHavens, 229 B.R. at 628-29; In reNeay, 220 B.R.
at 869-70.
.'. See Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146
(1993); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101-02 (1983); Cory v.
White, 457 U.S. 85, 90-91 (1982); see also Elias v. U.S. & California Franchise Tax Bd. (In re
Elias), 218 B.R 80, 86 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998), affd, 216 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2000); Peterson v.
Florida (In re Peterson), 254 B.R. 740, 746 (Bankr. N.D. Il1. 2000); Pitts v. Ohio Dep't of
Taxation (In re Pitts), 241 B.R. 862, 871 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1999); In re Rainwater, 233 B.R. at
146; Schmitt v. Missouri Western State College (In re Schmitt), 220 B.R 68, 74 (Bankr. W.D.
Mo. 1998).
12 See, e.g., In reElias, 218 B.R. at 86; Neary v. Penn. Dep't of Revenue (In reNeary), 220
B.R 864, 869-70 (Bankr. E.D. Penn. 1998); In re Schmitt, 220 B.R. at 74. Cf Justice v. Ohio
Bureau of Workers' Comp. (In re Justice), 224 B.R. 631, 639 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1998);
(refusing to allow amendment after concluding there was no substantive violation of federal
law).
'7 See Seminole Tribe of Fla. V. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72 n.16 (1996); see also Coeur d'Alene
Tibe, 521 U.S. at 281 ("an on-going violation of federal law where the requested relief is
prospective"); Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985) (finding that an Ex parte Young suit
may be brought to enjoin "a continuing violation of federal lawv").
... Ex parte Young is not available to compel state officials to comply with state law. See
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who filed for bankruptcy protection because of educational loans
made by a state educational agency. We already determined that
the debtor could not bring an adversary proceeding against the state
agency under § 523(a) (8) to show undue hardship warranting
discharge of the loans if the agency does not consent to federal
jurisdiction.'75 After the debtor receives a discharge, which does not
include the student loans, the state educational agency commences
an action seeking to collect those loans. The debtor wishes to file
an Ex parte Young action with the bankruptcy court against the
individual who heads the state agency, seeking to enjoin his
collection efforts because the loans are dischargeable on the
grounds of undue hardship; but because the loans were not
discharged, the actions of the state agency, in seeking to collect
them, do not violate any provision of the Code. Ex parte Young
cannot be used by the debtor to obtain an initial determination
upon which the illegality of the state's conduct depends.7
Second, the violation of federal law by the state official must be
ongoing, not merely some past action that was unlawful.1
7
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 465 U.S. at 103-06. See generally David L. Shapiro, Wrong Turns:
The Eleventh Amendment and the Pennhurst Case, 98 HARV. L. REv. 61, 84-85 (1984).
' See supra note 134; text following supra note 141.
See, e.g., Holland v. United States Dep't of Educ. (In re Holland), 230 B.R. 387, 391
(Bankr. W.D. Missouri 1999); Stout v. United States Dep't of Educ. (In re Stout), 231 B.R. 313,
316 (Bankr. W.D. Missouri 1999); Snyder v. Board of Regents (In re Snyder), 228 B.R. 712, 718
(Bankr. D. Neb. 1998). But see In re Schmitt, 220 B.R. at 73 (suggesting that Ex parte Young
action could appropriately determine dischargeability of student loans). Cf Seayv. Tennessee
Student Assistance Corp. (In re Seay), 244 B.R. 112, 120 (Banks. E.D. Tenn. 2000) (stating that
the dischargeability of the student loan under § 523(a) (8) would be an "affirmative defense"
to a collection action by the state in state court); Kahl v. Texas Higher Educ. Coordinating Bd.
(In re Kahl), 240 B.R. 524, 530 (Bankr. E.D. Penn. 1999) (suggesting that § 523(a) (8) might
serve as an "affirmative defense" in state court litigation).
n See, e.g., Burtch v. Lavecchia (In re PHP NJ MSO, Inc.), Nos. 98-2609, 98-2610, 1999
WL 360199, at *8 (D. Del. May 7, 1999); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Lapin (In re Lapin), 226 B.R.
637,646 (BAP. 9th Cir. 1998); French v. Georgia Dep't of Revenue (In reABEPP Acquisition
Corp.), 215 B.R. 513, 519 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997); Peterson v. Florida (In rePeterson), 254 B.R.
740, 746 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2000); Guiding Light Corp. v. Jindal (In re Guiding Light Corp.),
217 B.R. 493, 498-99 (Bankr. E.D. Conn. 1997); In re Louis;Harris, 213 B.R. 796, 798 (Bankr.
D. Conn. 1997); Tri-City Turf Club, Inc. v. Kentucky Racing Comm'n (In reTri-City Turf Club,
Inc.), 203 B.R. 617, 620 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1996). Distinguishing between ongoing and past acts
is often a game of semantics. For example, if the state official declines to grant a permit to a
former bankrupt in violation of § 525, one could characterize the violation as a single
completed act or label the continued refusal to grant the permit as an ongoing violation of
the legal requirement not to discriminate against former bankrupts. If the latter
characterization is used, although an adversary proceeding could not be brought directly
against the state for violation of § 525, see supra note 134, an Ex parte Young action could be
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Therefore, Ex parte Young does not provide any basis for remedying
an act that, however flagrant and intentional a violation of the
Code, is completed prior to the time suit was brought. This creates
a strange incentive for states to engage in unlawful conduct quickly,
before a debtor can bring an Exparte Young action seeking to enjoin
such conduct.7 8
Finally, the only relief that can be granted under Ex parte Young
is injunctive or declaratory relief; an award of damages is not
available.'79 This means that if the state's violation of the Code
resulted in the receipt of funds from the debtor, Ex parte Young
cannot be used to obtain restitution.8 °
The final method for ensuring the supremacy of federal law is
to permit suits to enforce federal law to be brought in state court,
subjecting them to federal court review in the usual course. But this
brought against the state official seeking an injunction ordering that the permit be granted.
But whenever the state has acted in violation of law and either has not yet conformed its
conduct to legal requirements by undoing its bad act, it could be argued that the violation is
"ongoing" if the court wishes to provide a remedy. A more meaningful limitation on the Ex
parte Youngdoctrine is its limitation to prospective non-monetary relief.
" Some commentators have suggested that this incentive may be removed by amending
the Code to add a statutory injunction against violations of Code provisions. See Klee et al.,
supra note 106, at 1588-89. However, as damages for past violations of federal law remain
unavailable from a state which has not consented to federal jurisdiction, such a legislative
provision is unlikely to have any effect on pre-filing behavior.
' See, e.g., Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139,
145 (1993); Edelman v.Jordon, 415 U.S. 651, 669 (1974); Ford Motor Co. v. Department of
Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945); see also College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 704 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that Ex parte
Young "is still available, though effective only where damages remedies are not important").
Prospective relief of an equitable nature may, in fact, have meaningful financial consequences
on the state, as, for example, if the state official is ordered to hire a former bankrupt whose
application for employment was rejected in violation of § 525. But the monetary costs of
compliance with an injunction are not barred by Exparte Young. See, e.g., Edelman, 415 U.S. at
667-68 ("The injunction issued in Exparte Young-was not totally without effect on the State's
revenues .... But the fiscal consequences... were the necessary result of compliance with
decrees which by their terms were prospective in nature.... Such an ancillary effect on the
state treasury is a permissible and often an inevitable consequence of the principle
announced in Ex parte Young."). In addition, if the state violates the automatic stay or the
permanent discharge injunction in bad faith, the Eleventh Amendment is no bar to
assessment of monetary penalties under Hutto v. Finney. See 437 U.S. 678, 691 (1978)
("The... power to impose a fine [for civil contempt] is properly treated as ancillary to the
federal court's power to impose injunctive relief."). However, when the very nature of the
relief sought is compensatory damages, Exparte Young is not available.
" See, e,g., In re PHP NJ MSO, Inc., 1999 WL 360199, at *8; In re Lapin, 226 B.R. at 646;
DeAngelis v. Laskey (In re DeAngelis), 239 B.R. 426, 432 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1999); In re Guiding
Light Corp., 217 B.1L at 498-99; In reLouis;Ha-ris, 213 B.R at 798.
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solution also has serious deficiencies, particularly when one is
dealing with bankruptcy jurisdiction.
The Judicial Code contemplates that, although the bankruptcy
case itself lies within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal district
courts,18 state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over all civil
proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to cases
under title 11.182 Nevertheless, few matters that fall within the
jurisdiction of the federal district court with respect to bankruptcyI83
have been brought in state court, unless they are based upon a State
law claim or State law cause of action and are subject to mandatory
abstention.'TM Legal, practical, and policy concerns demonstrate the
undesirability of a state forum for resolving bankruptcy claims
against the states, even when they fall within the concurrent
jurisdiction of the state courts.
As an initial matter, it is not clear that the state courts will be
available to plaintiffs seeking redress for state violations of federal
1"' See28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (1999).
.. See id. § 1334(b). See, e.g., Sanders v. Brady (In re Brady, Texas, Mun. Gas Corp.), 936
F.2d 212, 218 (5th Cir. 1991); Pavelich v. McCormick, Barstow, Sheppard, Wayte & Carruth
(In re Pavelich), 229 B.R. 777, 784 (BAP. 9th Cir. 1999) (as amended); Ung v. Boni (In re
Boni), 240 B.R. 381, 386 (B.AP. 9th Cir. 1999); Watson v. Shandell (In re Watson), 192 B.R.
739, 746 (BAP. 9th Cir. 1996), af'd, 116 F.3d 488 (9th Cir. 1997); In re Ford, 188 B.R. 523,
526 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995); Haga v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. (In re Haga), 131 B.R. 320,
326 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1991); Richards v. Richards (In re Richards), 131 B.R. 76, 78 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1991); see also Powell v. Washington Land Co., 684 A.2d 769, 773 (D.C. 1996);
Wagner v. Key Bank, 846 P.2d 112, 116 (Alaska 1993); Carlson v. Central Trust Bank, 838
S.W.2d 483, 484-85 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992); Lewis v. Berry Hill, No. 01-A-019105CH00192, 1992
WL 212360, at *2 (Tenn. CL App. Sept. 4, 1992); Picker v. Rollins Leasing Corp., 776 P.2d 1,
2-3 (Or. Ct. App. 1989). The district court may also abstain from hearing a matter within the
concurrentjurisdiction of the state court "in the interest ofjustice, or in the interest of comity
with State courts or respect for State law." 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1). See, e.g., O'Brien v.
Vermont Agency of Natural Res. (In re O'Brien), 216 B.R. 731, 740 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1998),
appeal dismissed, 184 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 1999); Rumbaugh v. Beck, 601 A.2d 319, 324 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1991).
... One notable exception is the defense of discharge raised in a post-bankruptcy state
court enforcement action by a creditor against the debtor. See, e.g., Lewis v. Lewis, 646 A.2d
273, 275 (Conn. App. Ct. 1994); Peabody v. Peabody, No. 504914, 1995 WL 415823, at *3
(Conn. Super. Ct. July 10, 1995); Clark v. Trumble, 692 N.E.2d 74, 78-79 (Mass. App. Ct.
1998); Shockley v. Brown, 831 P.2d 1010, 1014 (Okla. Ct. App. 1992); Jenkins v. Redland
Springs Homeowners Ass'n, No. 04-98-00255-CV, 1999 WL 215453, at *5 (Tex. Ct. App. April
14, 1999).
"' See28 U.S.C. § 1334(c) (2) (1999). See, e.g., Loomis Elec., Inc. v. Lucerne Prods., Inc.,
225 B.R 381, 387-88 (N.D. Ohio 1998); Luevano v. Dow Coming Corp., 183 B.R. 751, 753
(W.D. Tex. 1995); Sweeney v. Citicorp Person-to-Person Fin. Ctr., Inc., 510 N.E.2d 93, 95-96
(Ill. App. Ct. 1987); Turner v. Ferrin, 757 P.2d 335, 336 (Mont. 1988); Bill Walker & Assocs.,
Inc. v. Parrish, 770 S.W.2d 764, 768-69 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989).
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law. Just as the Supreme Court held in Seminole Tribe that Congress
cannot abrogate state sovereign immunity in federal courts pursuant
to its Article I powers,"' the Court concluded in Alden v. Maine""
that Congress could not subject nonconsenting states to suit in their
own courts by Article I legislation. 187 Therefore, unless a state has
consented to be sued in its own court with respect to the federal
claim at issue (that is, has waived sovereign immunity with respect to
such suits), this alternative venue is also closed.ss But even
assuming the states open their courts to such claims, other
considerations render this forum less than adequate.
One concern is timing. Litigants have generally believed that a
federal bankruptcy court can resolve a bankruptcy matter more
quickly than can a state court.8 9 Because time is critical in achieving
a successful outcome of a bankruptcy case, such a delay may make
reorganization infeasible, or may deny a debtor an expeditious fresh
start, especially if the claim against the nonconsenting state is a
critical component of the case.
Costs will also necessarily increase if bankruptcy proceedings
are bifurcated between multiple jurisdictions.190 Quite apart from
the additional filing fees (which may be prohibitive for some
debtors),'91 there may be a need for travel expenses, additional
attorneys' fees for multiple counsel, and incremental costs for
representation over a longer period of time. All of these costs are
borne by the estate, and ultimately by the creditors who share in its
residue. One of the goals of bankruptcy is the minimization of
' See supra notes 32-59 and accompanying text.
' 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
" See id. at 754.
's This prospect particularly troubled the dissenting Justices, who saw the Court
abandoning "a principle nearly as inveterate, and much closer to the hearts of the Framers
[than sovereign immunity]: that where there is a right, there must be a remedy." Id, at 811
(SouterJ., dissenting).
'0 See, e.g., Gibson, Sovereign Immunity, supra note 170, at 204 & n.69 (citing Report of the
Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, pt. 1, at 85-
102 (1973)).
to See generaUy Samuel L. Bufford, 38 No. 1 JUDGES'JOuRNAL 6 (1999); Gibson, Sovereign
Immunity, supra note 170, at 204 & n.69; Troy A. McKenzie, Note, Eleventh Amendment Immunity
in Bankruptcy: Breaking the Seminole Tribe Barrer, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 199, 283-34 (2000).
'9' See, e.g., Snyder v. Board of Regents (In reSnyder), 228 B.IR 712, 719 (Bankr. D. Neb.
1998) (finding that state courts do not waive filing fee for debtors); Horvitz v. Zywiczynski (In
re Zywiczynski), 210 B.R. 924, 925 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1997) (noting that trustee had "no




collection costs by the collectivization of creditor action in a single
forum. 92 The enforced pursuit of state claims in state courts
undermines this goal.
Bankruptcy courts also have expertise in resolving bankruptcy
claims that state court judges, however bright and energetic,
necessarily lack. Congress perceived the need for a specialized
corps of bankruptcy experts when it enacted the Code in 1978,g-
and placing the resolution of bankruptcy claims against the states in
the hands of state court judges casts aside the accumulated learning
of the federal courts in dealing with similar matters involving non-
state litigants.
94
Related to the state court lack of experience with bankruptcy
matters is the likely consequence of state court decisions, both in
the individual case and for the bankruptcy system as a whole. The
state court, having before it only a small piece of a much larger case,
may render a decision that does not fit nicely into the larger picture;
that is, uniformity of decision-making within a single case is lost.
This means that the state court may reach a decision with respect to
a state's rights in or obligations to the bankruptcy estate that is
inconsistent with decisions of the bankruptcy court respecting other
Seesupra note 117.
The specialization of bankruptcy judges evolved over time from the structure of the
Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, under which cases were sometimes
referred by the district courts to referees, mostly for administrative purposes, to the
"judiciaization" of the duties of the referees by the Chandler Act ofJune 22, 1938, ch. 575,
§§ 38-39, 52 Stat. 840, to the creation of separate specialized Article I courts with broad
jurisdiction under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549. See
generallyH.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 7-9 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,5969-71.
This final step was found to be unconstitutional in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982), and Congress responded in the Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333, by
designating the bankruptcy judges as a "unit of the district court to be known as the
bankruptcy court for that district," 28 U.S.C. § 151 (1984), serving as "judicial officers of the
United States district court," 28 U.S.C. § 152(a) (1) (1984). Congress continued to provide for
the potential referral of the district court's broad jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases and "all
civil proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or related to cases under title 11," 28
U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1999), to these specialized adjuncts. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (1984).
'" See, e.g., In re Snyder, 228 B.R. at 718-19 (stating that relegating the debtor to state
court bars debtor "from the forum most uniquely qualified to resolve" issue under the Code
and that state courts "do not have the institutional memory or frequent contact" with
bankruptcy litigation). Federal courts have, as a consequence, sometimes resisted recognizing
the concurrent jurisdiction of state courts over bankruptcy matters. See, e.g., Halas v. Platek,
239 B.L 784, 792 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (state court does not have jurisdiction over § 362(h)
sanctions "despite § 1334(b)'s language"). See generally Bufford, supra note 190, at 6.
[Vol. 17
Getting to Waiver
creditors. Bifurcation of decision-making power risks undermining
the fundamental bankruptcy policy of equal treatment of similarly-
situated creditors.19'5
When this lack of uniformity expands from a single case to
multiple cases nationwide, the probability of conflicting
interpretations of the Code between jurisdictions and within single
jurisdictions becomes much higher. The drafters of the
Constitution perceived this risk of non-uniform bankruptcy
treatment between the states as sufficiently harmful to include
within the Article I powers of Congress the power to establish
"uniform" bankruptcy laws "throughout the United States."196 But
even a single supposedly uniform bankruptcy law becomes far less
uniform when it is administered in a disparate fashion nationwide,
with the only possibility for federal oversight being the normal
appellate process from state courts to the Supreme Court.9 7 The
" See, e.g., In re Snyder, 228 B.R. at 719 ("Removing isolated issues of discharge to state
court from the context of a larger bankruptcy proceeding in bankruptcy court removes the
ability of a bankruptcy court to review a debtor's entire financial picture and to ensure an
equitable result for both the debtor and all creditors."); see also I NAT'L BANKR. REV. COMM'N
REP. 899 (1997) ("By providing a single forum governed by a single set of procedural rules,
the bankruptcy process ensures uniform procedural treatment for every type of claimant ...
[S]eparate treatment in multiple courts may also result in unequal treatment of similarly-
situated creditors.").
Even some state courts appear reluctant to exercise their bankruptcy jurisdiction or to
recognize that it exists. See, eg., Dixon v. Nationsbanc Mortgage Corp., No. CV970406469S,
1998 WL 300964, at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 27, 1998) (concluding state court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over proceeding related to pending bankruptcy case); Eways v.
Governor's Island, 391 S.E.2d 182, 185 (N.C. 1990) (dismissing state court action initiated
after federal court abstained under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c) (1) based on doctrine of "prior action
pending").
"' SeeU.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cd. 4. James Madison justified congressional power in this
area by stating:
The power of establishing uniform laws of bankruptcy is so intimately connected
with the regulation of commerce, and will prevent so many frauds where the parties
or their property may lie or be removed into different States, that the expediency of
it seems not likely to be drawn into question.
THE FEDERAIST No. 42, at 271 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also MSR
Exploration, Ltd. v. Meridian Oil, Inc., 74 F.3d 910, 915 (9th Cir. 1996) ("[T]he unique,
historical and even constitutional need for uniformity in the administration of the bankruptcy
laws is another indication that Congress wished to leave the regulation of parties before the
bankruptcy court in the hands of the federal courts alone.").
.. The Eleventh Amendment does not bar Supreme Court review of cases arising in state
courts. See South Cent. Bell Tel. Co. v. Alabama, 526 U.S. 160, 166 (1999); McKesson Corp. v.
Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 31 (1990). One commentator has
proposed expanding appellate review of state courtjudgments by giving appellate jurisdiction
to intermediate federal appellate courts, thereby allowing them to exercise primary
20001
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Supreme Court's docket is limited, 98 and the Court seldom grants
review merely because a lower court reaches an erroneous
decision" Reliance on Supreme Court review as a "solution" to the
problem of states refusing to enforce the federal rights afforded by
the Code is unwarranted.
This discussion leads to the ineludible conclusion that none of
the suggested methods for enforcing the Code against
nonconsenting states provides a complete solution to the problem
of state sovereign immunity in bankruptcy. The only true solution
grows out of the inherent nature of sovereign immunity: "sovereign
immunity bars suits only in the absence of consent."2" The problem
of states opting out of the federal bankruptcy process, therefore, can
be solved by turning nonconsenting states into consenting states
through waiver of sovereign immunity.
III. THE CONCEPT OF VOLUNTARYWAIVER
Although sovereign immunity limits the jurisdiction of a federal
court (and thus can, as a procedural matter, be raised at any stage in
the judicial proceedings by the litigants or by the court sua
sponte20 ), unlike other jurisdictional limitations, it can be waived by
the state entitled to its protection.2  Conceptually, waiver seems
responsibility for monitoring compliance with federal law. See generalyJames E. Pfander, An
Intermediate Solution to State Sovereign Immunity: Federal Appellate Court Review of State-Court
Judgments After Seminole Tribe, 46 UCLA L. REv. 161 (1998).
See generally Frank B. Cross, The Justices of Strategy, 48 DuKE LJ. 511, 557-59 (1998)
(book review); Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court, 1996 Sup. Cr.
REV. 403; Michael H. Koby, The Supreme Court's Declining Reliance on Legislative Histoiy: The
Impact of Justice Scalia's Critique, 36 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 369, 384-85, n.87 (1999); David M.
O'Brien, Join-3 Votes, the Rule of Four, The Cert. Poo4 and the Supreme Court's Shrinking Plenary
Docket, 13 J. L. & PoL 779 (1997); Stephen M. Shapiro, Certiorari Practice: The Supreme Court's
ShrinkingDocket, 24 LITIG. 25 (1998).
" Supreme Court Rule 10, entitled "Considerations Governing Review on Certiorari,"
states in part that "[a] petition for writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted error
consists of erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a properly stated rule of law."
Sup. Cr. R. 10.
'0 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755 (1999).
2" See, e.g., Edelman v.Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677-78 (1974); California Franchise Tax Bd.
v.Jackson (In reJackson), 184 F.3d 1046, 1048 (9th Cir. 1999); Charley's Taxi Radio Dispatch
Corp. v. SIDA of Hawaii, Inc., 810 F.2d 869, 873 n.2 (9th Cir. 1987).
See, e.g., College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527
U.S. 666, 670 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996); Atascadero
State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985); Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 200
U.S. 273, 284 (1906); Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883); In rejackson, 184 F.3d at
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straightforward, but in practice even this simple notion becomes far
more complex. The difficulties tend to group around four basic
questions, as discussed in turn.
A. What Actions Constitute Waiver of Sovereign Immunity?
Three types of actions by sovereign entities have traditionally
been thought to create some possibility of constituting a waiver of
sovereign immunity.13 The first can be characterized as "litigative"
in nature, involving the state's actions with respect to a pending
court action. The second is contractual, the relinquishment of
sovereign immunity as a part of a binding agreement between the
state and another party. The third is legislative, where the state,
either pursuant to its constitution or duly enacted legislation, waives
sovereign immunity.
1. Waiver through Acts in Litigation
A bankruptcy case is commenced by the filing of a petition with
the bankruptcy court, either by the debtor 4 or by the statutorily-
prescribed number of qualifying creditors.0 5 Were a state to join in
1048; Burlington Motor Carriers Inc. v. Indiana Dep't of Revenue (In re Burlington Motors
Holdings Inc.), 242 B.R 156, 162 (Bankr. D. Del. 1999).
The action of a state in voluntarily participating in a federal program that provides, as
a condition of participation, for states to subject themselves to federal jurisdiction has recently
been rejected by the Supreme Court as a fourth basis for waiver of sovereign immunity. In
College Savings Bank v. Forida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board, 527 U.S. 666
(1999), the Court rejected the concept of "implied" or "constructive" vaiver, which grew out
of Parden v. TerminalRailway ofAlabama StateDocks Departmen 377 U.S. 184 (1964). The Court
in Parden interpreted a provision of the Federal Employers' Liability Act that subjected to suit
in federal court "[e]very common carrier by railroad.., engaging in commerce between...
the several States," 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1940), as subjecting the state of Alabama to federal
jurisdiction when it chose to operate a railroad in interstate commerce, thereby "accept[ing]
that condition and thus... consent[ing] to suit." Pardon, 377 U.S. at 192. Characterizing
Parden as "the nadir of our waiver (and, for that matter, sovereign immunity) jurisprudence,"
the Court in College Savings Bank expressly overruled Parden and emphasized that a state's
"express wvaiver of sovereign immunity [must] be unequivocal." 527 U.S. at 676, 680. Waiver
will be found only if the state "either... voluntarily invokes our jurisdiction... or else...
makes a 'clear declaration' that it intends to submit itself to our jurisdiction." Id. at 675-76
(quoting Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47,54 (1944)).
See 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1999). Such a case is a "voluntary" case under the Code, and the
commencement of the case constitutes an order for relief.
' An involuntary case maybe commenced only under chapter 7 or 11 of the Code, and
generally requires the filing of a petition by three or more holders of noncontingent, non-
disputed unsecured claims aggregating at least $10,775. See id. § 303.
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initiating a bankruptcy case, it would undoubtedly be deemed to
have waived sovereign immunity with respect to its claim in that
206
case.
In the more common voluntary bankruptcy case, the state
creditor is most likely to take affirmative action in the litigation only
if it files a proof of claim pursuant to § 501 (a), seeking participation
in the distribution of the estate assets.217  The Supreme Court
concluded in Gardner v. NewJersey' s that "[w] hen the State becomes
the actor and files a claim against the fund, it waives any immunity
which it otherwise might have had respecting the adjudication of
the claim. "209 Allowance or disallowance of claims rests within the
equitable power of the bankruptcy court, and by filing a proof of
claim the state submits to that federal courtjurisdiction."0
The Code itself contemplates such a type of waiver. In § 106(b)
Congress provided that "[a] governmental unit that has filed a proof
of claim in the case is deemed to have waived sovereign immunity
with respect to a claim against such governmental unit that is
property of the estate and that arose out of the same transaction or
occurrence out of which the claim of such governmental unit
arose."21' Although courts differ over whether the "deemed" waiver
'w Such an event has been characterized as "uncommon (even unheard of)." Riga, supra
note 157, at 56 n.1,13. However, a state is certainly an "entity" eligible tojoin in an involuntary
petition, see id., and initiation of a bankruptcy case should waive sovereign immunity to the
same extent any other voluntary appearance in federal court would. Cf DeKalb County Div. of
Family & Children Servs. v. Platter (In re Platter), 140 F.3d 676, 679 (7th Cir. 1998);
Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation Tribal Credit v. White (In re White), 139 F.3d
1268, 1271 (9th Cir. 1998); New Jersey v. Chen (In re Chen), 227 B.R. 614, 623 (D.NJ. 1998)
(waiver by filing adversary proceeding in bankruptcy case).
'0 Filed claims are deemed allowed unless a party in interest objects. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 502(a). If objection is made, the court, after notice and a hearing, determines the amount
of the claim (if any) to be allowed within the parameters of§ 502(b)-(i). Only allowed claims
share in distributions of property under chapter 7. See 11 U.S.C. § 726(a). Only holders of
allowed claims are entitled to vote on a chapter 11 plan, see id. § 1126(a), and only such
holders are entitled to distributions under plans proposed under chapter 11, 12 or 13, see id.
§§ 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii), 1225(a)(4), 1325(a)(4). Only a holder of an allowed unsecured claim
may invoke the disposable income test of§ 1325(b). See id. § 1325(b).
329 U.S. 565 (1947).
Id. at 574. See also Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 200 U.S. 273, 284 (1906);
Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447-48 (1883). The scope of that waiver with respect to claims
by the debtor against the filing state is discussed infra Part I1.C.
"' See Langenkamp v. Culp, 498 U.S. 42, 44 (1990); Granfinanciera, SA. v. Nordberg,
492 U.S. 33, 58-59 8 n.14 (1989); Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 335 (1966).
"' 11 U.S.C. § 106(b) (1999).
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of § 106(b) survives constitutional challenge after Seminole Tribe,212
and arguments could be made that the act of filing a proof of claim
is not the express and unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity the
Supreme Court requires, 213 the Court itself has reaffirmed its
adherence to the principles of Gardner even after Seminole Tribe.
214
Courts have consistently continued to find a waiver of state
sovereign immunity when the state files a proof of claim in the
bankruptcy case.215 Indeed, courts are continuing to explore
"' Compare Schlossberg v. Comptroller of Treasury (In re Creative Goldsmiths of
Washington, D.C., Inc.), 119 F.3d 1140, 1147 (4th Cir. 1997) (§ 106(b) is unconstitutional
abrogation of state sovereign immunity), and Grabscheid v. Michigan Employment Sec.
Comm'n (In re CJ. Rogers, Inc.), 212 B.R. 265, 271 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (same), and Rose v.
United States Dep't of Educ. (In re Rose), 215 B.R. 755, 758 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1997), affd and
remanded, 187 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 1999) (same), and In reNVR L.P., 206 B.R. 831, 839 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. 1997), affd, 222 B.L 514 (E.D. Va. 1998), rev'd, 189 F.3d 442 (4th Cir. 1999) (same),
with Wyoming Dep't of Transp. v. Straight (In re Straight), 143 F.3d 1387, 1392 (10th Cir.
1998) (concluding that § 106(b) merely codifies the Gardnerdoctrine), and Quesadav. Puerto
Rico Dep't of Health (In reArecibo Cmty. Health Care, Inc.), 233 B.R. 625, 630 (D.P.R. 1999)
(same), and Nana's Petroleum, Inc. v. Clark (In reNana's Petroleum, Inc.), 234 B.R. 838, 847
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1999) (same). Cf AER-Aerotron, Inc. v. Texas Dep't of Transp., 104 F.3d
677, 681 (4th Cir. 1997) (declining to address issue because state did not file proof of claim);
Pitts v. Ohio Dep't of Taxation (In re Pitts), 241 B.R 862, 862 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1999) ("the
constitutionality of § 106(b) [is] now suspect"). See generally Patricia L. Barsalou, Defining the
Limits of Federal Court Jurisdiction Over States in Bankruptcy Court, 28 ST. MARY'S LJ. 575, 615-17
(1997) (suggesting that § 106(b) "should be unconstitutional"); Mark Browning, Seminole Tribe
of Florida v. Florida: A Closer Look, 15 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 10, 38 (1996) (whether § 106(b) is
unconstitutional abrogation of immunity "is a fertile ground for litigation"); Klee et al., supra
note 106 (cases upholding § 106(b) "represent the better view"); Riga, supra note 157, at 71
(§ 10 6(b) "is by no means above challenge").
2' Cf Gibson, Congressional Response; supra note 31, at 346-47 (suggesting that filing a
proof of claim may not be a sufficiently voluntary act to constitute express waiver but may
constitute a "constructive waiver" of sovereign immunity); Gibson, Sovereign Immunity, supra
note 170, at 211-12; Lieb, Eleventh Amendment Immunity, supra note 147, at 321-22 (filing a
proof of claim "does not demonstrate an intent to relinquish its Eleventh Amendment
immunity, but merely a desire to participate with other creditors in distributions to be made
in the bankruptcy case" and thus has nothing to do with the concept of waiver).
214 In his dissenting opinion in College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Education Expense Board, 527 U.S. 666 (1999),Justice Breyer cited Gardneras authority for the
proposition that a waiver of sovereign immunity did not have to be "express" and
"unequivocal" and suggested that it supported the holding of the Court in Parden v. Terminal
Railway of Alabama State Docks Departmen 377 U.S. 184 (1964). See527 U.S. at 696-97 (Breyer,
J., dissenting). The majority overruled Parden, but found nothing troubling in Gardner, which
"stands for the unremarkable proposition that a State waives its sovereign immunity by
voluntarily invoking the jurisdiction of the federal courts." Id. at 670 n.3.
2' See, e.g., Rose v. United States Dep't of Educ. (In reRose), 187 F.3d 926, 929 (8th Cir.
1999); California Franchise Tax Bd. v.Jackson (In reJackson), 184 F.3d 1046, 1050 (9th Cir.
1999); Georgia Dep't of Revenue v. Burke (In reBurke), 146 F.3d 1313, 1319 (11th Cir. 1998);
In re Fennelly, 212 B.R1 61, 64 (D.NJ. 1997); In re Merry-Go-Round Enters., Inc., 227 B.R. 775,
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whether other affirmative acts by the state in the bankruptcy case
may also constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity. Although
merely raising the state's sovereign immunity defense by a motion to
dismiss is insufficient to waive its protection, 16 waiver has been
found, for example, when the state files its own adversary
proceeding seeking to declare its debt nondischargeable.2 7 What
other actions are sufficient to waive sovereign immunity is unclear.
Some courts tolerate a great deal of participation of the bankruptcy
case short of filing a proof of claim,218 while others find an active
role sufficient to constitute a waiver.219 These cases suggest that a
779 (Bankr. D. Md. 1998); In re Barrett Ref. Corp., 221 B.R 795, 810 (Bankr. W.D. Okla.
1998); In re Layton, 220 B.R. 508, 514 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1998); Schulman v. California State
Water Res. Control Bd. (In re Lazar), 200 B.R. 358, 377 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1960). But see In re
National Cattle Congress, 247 B.R. 259, 268 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2000) (filing of proof of claim
with "Waiver Disclaimer" was effective to preserve sovereign immunity, but sovereign creditor
must elect either to withdraw proof of claim or waive immunity); but cf. New Jersey v. Mocco,
206 B.R. 691, 693 (D.N.J. 1997) (suggesting in dictum that state would retain its sovereign
immunity even if it files proof of claim).
. See, e.g., Barfield v. Blackwood (In re Secretary of Dep't of Crime Control & Pub.
Safety), 7 F.3d 1140, 1148 n.6 (4th Cir. 1993); Technologies Int'l Holdings Inc. v. Kentucky
(In reTechnologies Int'l Holdings Inc.), 234 B.R 699, 711 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1999); O'Brien v.
Agency of Natural Res. (In re O'Brien), 216 B.R. 731,734 (Bankr. D.Vt. 1998), appeal dismnissed,
184 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 1999).
"' See, e.g., DeKalb County Div. of Family & Children Servs. v. Platter (In re Platter), 140
F.3d 676, 679 (7th Cir. 1998); Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation Tribal Credit v.
White (In reWhite), 139 F.3d 1268, 1271 (9th Cir. 1998); New Jersey v. Chen (In reChen), 227
B.R 614, 623 (D.N.J. 1998). Cf Koehler v. Ioia College StudentAid Comm'n (In reKoehler),
204 B.R. 210, 220-21 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1997) (filing counterclaim for debt in adversary
proceeding filed by debtor seeking to declare state's debt dischargeable "vaived sovereign
immunity).
... See, e.g., May v. Missouri Dep't of Revenue (In re May), 251 B.R. 714, 720 (B.A.P. 8th
Cir. 2000) (state did not vaive sovereign immunity by filing answer to complaint to determine
dischargeability of taxes); Burtch v. LaVecchia (In re PHP NJ MSO, Inc.), Nos. 98-2609, 98-
2610, 1999 WL 360199 at *4 (D. Del. May 7, 1999) (state commissioner filed motion to
transfer venue, motion requesting abstention by bankruptcy court, motion for relief from
automatic stay, objection to motion seeking extension of time to assume or reject executory
contracts, entered into stipulation with debtor with respect to time to assume or reject
executory contracts, and entered into stipulation with debtor providing for partial payment to
state; no waiver found); In re O'Brien, 216 B.R. at 734-35 (state did not waive sovereign
immunity by participating in confirmation proceedings).
21 See, e.g., In re White, 139 F.3d at 1271 (finding waiver because creditor "acknowledged
that it had a claim, objected to confirmation of [debtor's] plan of reorganization... and it
sought relief from the bankruptcy court in the form of an order denying confirmation. It
twice voted against plans of reorganization"); Sullivan v. Town & Country Home Nursing
Servs., Inc. (In re Town & Country Home Nursing Servs., Inc.), 963 F.2d 1146, 1153-54 (9th
Cir. 1992) (government waived by offsetting prepetition overpayments by debtor against post-
petition payments due debtor); Bliemeister v. Industrial Comm'n of Arizona (In re
Bliemeister), 251 B.R. 383, 393 (Bankr. D. Az. 2000) (state affirmatively sought summary
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state that becomes too comfortable appearing in a federal
bankruptcy court may be found to have consented to being there.
While the doctrine that finds a waiver of sovereign immunity
based on conduct in bankruptcy litigation is a valuable tool in
encouraging state participation in the bankruptcy process, it has its
limitations. First, the state will not choose to file a proof of claim or
otherwise appear in the bankruptcy case unless it will derive some
financial benefit thereby. As the majority of bankruptcy filings are
"no asset" cases, waiver of sovereign immunity will not be obtained
in those cases. Even if the estate is able to make some distribution
to creditors, a state will generally not choose to file a proof of claim
unless the distribution it would receive as a result exceeds any
amount it might be required to disgorge were it subject to suit in
the bankruptcy case. Finally, even if the state does file a proof of
claim or actively litigate with respect to its claim, thereby waiving
sovereign immunity with respect to that claim, not only does such
waiver not necessarily apply to all claims against the state in that
bankruptcy case,22' but it will have no effect on any other bankruptcy
case. Waiver by litigation can be accomplished only on a case-by-
case basis, which is inherently unpredictable and expensive, and
provides states an unfair advantage that is not a necessary corollary
of sovereign immunity.
2. Waiver by Contract
Like any other entity capable of binding itself to legal
obligations by contract, a state may enter into a contractual
arrangement that includes an agreement with respect to submission
of the parties to the jurisdiction of a federal court or waiver of
sovereign immunity. Such contractual clauses are quite common in
judgment in contested matter seeking determination of dischargeability of state claim); In re
Lazar, 200 B.R. at 381 (numerous appearances by state to protect its secured creditor status in
consequences of tax liens constituted a "general appearance" and waived immunity). Cf In re
Rose, 187 F.3d at 930 n.6 (noting that, while filing of proof of claim was sufficient to waive
sovereign immunity, state student loan program's "active participation in the dischargeability
proceedings and belated assertion of sovereign immunity are other factors which might have
been relevant to the issue of waiver"); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Operation
Open City v. New York State Dep't of State (In re Operation Open City, Inc.), 170 B.R. 818,
824 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (taking a set-off without first requesting relief from stay constitutes
waiver).
See infra Part M.C.
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contracts to which foreign sovereign entities are parties.22' The
purpose behind such provisions is to ensure that the non-sovereign
contractual party will be able to enforce the contractual provisions
against the sovereign in a forum that is not subject to the control of
the sovereign itself (that is, a court other than a court of the
sovereign jurisdiction) and which has expertise in the subject matter
of the contract and will apply substantive and procedural rules with
which the non-sovereign contracting party is more comfortable.222
If a claim by a debtor against a state arises pursuant to a
contract between the two in which the state waived its sovereign
immunity, resolution of such claim in the bankruptcy court should
be possible, even over the objection of the state.223 However,
contractual waiver does not solve the problem of state sovereign
immunity in bankruptcy for several reasons. First, most potential
claims against a state, such as those for preferential payment of taxes
or violation of the automatic stay or discharge injunction do not
arise under a contract but under substantive provisions of the Code.
In those few cases where the claim is based on a contract, only
the rare party contracting with the state has the negotiating leverage
to obtain a contractual waiver of sovereign immunity. Parties with
such leverage tend to be those who have sufficient financial
resources that they are not dependent on the state contract. Such
parties are generally less likely than others to find themselves in
' The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act recognizes that "(a) a foreign state shall not
be immune from jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States in any case (1) in
which the foreign state has waived its immunity either explicitly or by implication .... " Pub.
L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 8891, § 4(a) (1976) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (a) (1)
(1999)). See, e.g., Proyecfin de Venezuela, SA v. Banco Indus. de Venezuela, SA., 760 F.2d
390, 393 (2d Cir. 1985); Berdakin v. Consulado de La Republica de El Salvador, 912 F. Supp.
458,461 (C.D. Cal. 1995); Triton Container Int'l, Ltd. v. M/S Itapage, 774 F. Supp. 1349, 1351
(M.D. Fla. 1990). Cf. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Val-U Constr. Co., 50 F.3d 560, 562 (8th Cir.
1995) (arbitration clause in contract waived Tribe's sovereign immunity with respect to
contract claims).
2n Cf M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1972) ("Not surprisingly,
foreign businessmen prefer, as do we, to have disputes resolved in their own courts, but if that
choice is not available, then in a neutral forum with expertise in the subject matter."). See
generally Michael Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses in International and Interstate Commercial
Agreements, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 133; Reade H. Ryan, Jr., Defaults and Remedies Under
International Bank Loan Agreements with Foreign Sovereign Borrowers: A New York Lawyer's
Perspective, 1982 U. ILL L. REV. 89, 110-113; George Weisz et aL., Selected Issues in Sovereign Debt
Litigation, 12 U. PA.J. INT'LBus. L. 1 (1991).
m See, e.g., Innes v. Kansas State Univ. (In re Innes), 184 F.3d 1275, 1282 (10th Cir.
1999); In reMagnolia Venture Capital Corp., 218 B.R 843,849-50 (S.D. Miss. 1997).
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bankruptcy, so most contracts between a debtor and the state will
not have such a provision.
Even assuming the debtor, although now in bankruptcy, had
the ability to bargain for such a clause at the time the contract was
made, if the provision is less than explicit with respect to the waiver,
the state may still contest its efficacy.224 Waivers of sovereign
immunity must be "unequivocally expressed" to be effective. In
addition, even if the provision is interpreted to waive sovereign
immunity sufficiently expressly, states have argued, sometimes
successfully,26 that the signatory of the contract, while having
authority to bind the state to its substantive provisions, had no
authority to waive the state's sovereign immunity.
2 27
n For example, in In re Magnolia Venture Capital Corp., the contract provided that "courts
within the State of Mississippi shall have jurisdiction over any and all disputes between the
parties to this Pledge .... Venue in any such dispute, whether in federal or state court, shall
be laid in Hinds County, Mississippi." 218 B.R. at 849-50. The state argued that the provision
waived state immunity from suit only in state courts. The court interpreted the sentence
dealing with venue to clarify the prior submission to jurisdiction clause to embrace federal
courts in Hinds County, Mississippi. Similarly, in In re Ines, Kansas State University (KSU)
had entered into a contract with the U.S. Department of Education to participate in the
federal Perkins Loan Program. See 184 F.3d at 1283. Among the provisions of that contract
was a clause under which KSU agreed to abide by specified federal regulations, which
imposed on KSU the obligation, among others, to file a proof of claim in all bankruptcy cases
of student borrowers that are not no-asset cases, and to oppose a request for discharge in
appropriate cases. KSU argued that its agreement to abide by federal regulations was not a
waiver of sovereign immunity. See id. The court disagreed, finding the agreement explicitly
subjected KSU to federal bankruptcy courtjurisdiction. See id.
. See, e.g., Department of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. 255, 261 (1999); United
States v. Idaho, 508 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1993); United States v. Nordic Village, 503 U.S. 30, 34 (1992);
Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp.
v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984); United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980);
Edelman v.Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974).
See Magnolia Venture Capital Corp. v. Prudential Secs., Inc., 151 F.3d 439, 445 (5th
Cir. 1998);Janc v. Coordinating Bd. for Higher Educ. (In reJanc), 251 B.R. 525, 537 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 2000); Snyder v. Board of Regents (In re Snyder), 228 B.R. 712, 717-18 (Bankr.
D.Neb. 1998).
2n See, eg., In re Innes, 184 F.3d at 1284; In re Snyder, 228 B.R. at 717-18. See generally
Patrick H. Tyler, In re Innes: The Supreme Court's Next Eleventh Amendment Case?, 18 AM. BANKR.
INST. J. 16, 17 (1999) (criticizing the Innes court for its conclusion that KSU's authority to
enter into contracts gave KSU the power to waive sovereign immunity). The justification
generally given for finding that the power to enter into a contract on behalf of the state
carries with it the implicit power to waive state sovereign immunity with respect to that
contract is the requirement that contracts have a mutuality of obligation and remedy, and it
would be unfair to allow a state to benefit from a contract which cannot be enforced against it
by virtue of the state's sovereign immunity. See, e.g., In reMagnolia Venture Capital Corp., 218
B.R. 843, 850 (S.D. Miss. 1997); Na-Ja Constr. Corp. v. Roberts, 259 F. Supp. 895, 896-97 (D.
Del. 1966).
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In sum, while contractual waivers of sovereign immunity are
useful, they are of limited usefulness in most bankruptcy cases and
with respect to a small universe of potential claims against states. If
waiver by state sovereign entities is the solution to the
nonconsenting state actor in bankruptcy, it must be accomplished
by non-contractual means.
3. Waiver by Legislative or Constitutional Provision
The most direct method of waiving state sovereign immunity is
the inclusion of such a waiver in a state constitution or the
enactment of state legislation providing for consent to suit. That
such constitutional or legislative provisions are effective to waive the
protection afforded by the Eleventh Amendment and extra-
constitutional notions of sovereign immunity is clear.22 Assuming
that there is no issue as to the validity of the constitutional or
provion,2 the only issues relating to such waivers turn onstatutory rvsin  nyise aigtosc vr no
interpretation.
The Supreme Court has emphasized that "a State will be
deemed to have waived its immunity only where stated by the most
express language or by such overwhelming implication from the
text as [will] leave no room for any other reasonable
construction. " m° The state enactment must provide "an unequivocal
indication that the State intends to consent to federal jurisdiction
that otherwise would be barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
'2 31
The test, the Court says, "is a stringent one." 2
Such clarity of expression is unlikely to be found unless the
state utilizes words that link the provision to such a waiver. Thus,
unless the statutory or constitutional language includes a reference
to "sovereign immunity" or "consent to suit" or "submission to
See, e.g., Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 305 (1990);
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985).
If the legislative provision was improperly enacted or violated either the United States
or state constitution in some other respect, it would not be valid without regard to any waiver
of sovereign immunity contained therein.
o Atascadero State Hosp., 473 U.S. at 239 (quoting Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673
(1974)) (internal quotations omitted); see also Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 495 U.S. at 305;
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 465 U.S. at 99; Florida Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v.
Florida Nursing Home Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147, 150 (1981).
"" Atascadero State Hosp., 473 U.S. at 238 n.1; see also Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 465 U.S.
at 99 ("the State's consent [must] be unequivocally expressed").
'3 Atascadero StateHosp., 473 U.S. at 241.
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jurisdiction," a waiver of sovereign immunity is unlikely to be
inferredsss In case of inherent ambiguities in the language
employed by the state, any clear expression by the state in the same
provision that no waiver of sovereign immunity is intended is likely
to be decisive.M Waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a
constitutionally-recognized right, and if intent is lacking waiver
cannot be found.
Even if the provision at issue does clearly concern a waiver of
sovereign immunity, the protection afforded a state by the doctrine
"encompasses not merely whether it may be sued, but where it may be
sued. "2"' Thus, a provision clearly subjecting states to suit in state
court will not be deemed to waive sovereign immunity from suit in
federal court. 6 States will not be deemed to have submitted to the
jurisdiction of federal courts unless the language employed in the
waiver expressly so states.23
' See, e.g., Santee Sioux Tribe v. Nebraska, 121 F.3d 427, 431 (8th Cir. 1997) (statute
directed Governor to negotiate tribal-state compacts); Barfield v. Blackwood,, 7 F.3d 1140,
1146 (4th Cir. 1993) (statute provided for state to pay judgments against state employees);
Angela R. v. Clinton, 999 F.2d 320, 325 (8th Cir. 1993) (statute acknowledged pendency of
federal case); Burk v. Beene, 948 F.2d 489, 493 (8th Cir. 1991) (statute provided for
indemnification for damages assessed against state employees or officials by state or federal
court); Kroll v. Board of Trustees, 934 F.2d 904, 909-910 (7th Cir. 1991) (special merger
legislation made Board of Trustees liable for liabilities of merged entities, one of which had
case pending against it in federal court); Tuveson v. Florida Governor's Council on Indian
Affairs, Inc., 734 F.2d 730, 734 (l1th Cir. 1984) (statute contained direction that Council
register as not-for-profit corporation); Williams v. Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370, 1377-78 (1lth Cir.
1982) (statute provided for state to pay judgments awarded against certain state officers for
acts in their official capacity); Kane v. Iowa Dep't of Human Servs., 955 F. Supp. 1117, 1129-30
(N.D. Iowa 1997) (Iowa Civil Rights Act defined employer as including state and provided for
action against employer to be commenced in district court); McGuire v. Switzer, 734 F. Supp.
99, 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (education law provided for state to accept provisions of federal law
with respect to apportionment of grants among states).
' See, e.g., Bafzeld, 7 F.3d at 1146 n.3; Wil!iams, 689 F.2d at 1378; Richins v. Industrial
Constr., Inc., 502 F.2d 1051, 1055 (10th Cir. 1974); Elliott v. Hinds, 573 F. Supp. 571, 575
(N.D. Ind. 1983).
m Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 465 U.S. at 99; see also Atascadero State Hosp., 473 U.S. at
241.
See Florida Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Florida Nursing Home Ass'n, 450
U.S. 147, 150 (1981); see also Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 306
(1990); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 465 U.S. at99 n.9; Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S.
47, 54 (1944); FrancesJ. v. Wright, 19 F.3d 337, 343 (7th Cir. 1994); Wisconsin Dep't of Corr.
v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381 (1998); Barfield 7 F.3d at 1147; Montana v. Peretti, 661 F.2d 756, 758
(9th Cir. 1981); Long v. Curators of University of Missouri, No. 92-0814-CV-W-6, 1993 WL
52821, at *1 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 23, 1993).
See Atascadero State Hosp., 473 U.S. at 241.
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Finally, even if the state has enacted a valid, clearly expressed
waiver of sovereign immunity with respect to certain claims in
federal court, the claim at issue must fall within the scope of that
waiver. The state has no obligation to waive its immunity with
respect to all claims, or even all related claims. It can define the
extent of its waiver as broadly or narrowly as it sees fit.' If the claim
sought to be asserted does not fall within the legislative language, it
cannot be brought against the state in federal court even though
other claims could be asserted in thatjurisdiction.2 9
B. Who Can Waive Sovereign Immunity on Behalf of the State?
When waiver is accomplished by legislative or constitutional
provision, its efficacy is clear; as long as it has been duly adopted
pursuant to state law, and expressly sets forth the state's intent to
subject itself to suit in federal court, it is effective without regard to
the identity of those participating in the process.
However, when state officials take actions in pending litigation
that result in waiver of sovereign immunity, or sign contracts that
subject the state to federal jurisdiction, the question arises whether
the officials taking such action were authorized to waive sovereign
immunity on behalf of the state, or whether their acts should be
deemed ultra vires and ineffective to accomplish that result.
In the leading case examining this question, Ford Motor Co. v.
Department of Treasuiy of Indiana,4 a foreign manufacturing company
sought a refund of taxes paid to the state treasury and sued the
department and various state officials. The state prevailed below,
and the taxpayer sought certiorari, claiming that the court of
appeals had erroneously decided an important question of Indiana
law. Rather than addressing that issue, the Supreme Court found
that the action could not be maintained in federal court.
First, the Court found that the suit against the treasury
department and the state officials constituted "an action against the
' See, e.g., Hankins v. Finnel, 964 F.2d 853, 856 (8th Cir. 1992). See generallyJohn Evans
Taylor, Express Waiver ofEleventh Amendment immunity, 17 GA. L. REv. 513, 526-32 (1983).
See, e.g., Gamble v. Florida Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 779 F.2d 1509,
1514-15 (11th Cir. 1986) (waiver as to traditional tort claims does not constitute waiver as to
§ 1983 action). Cf Montana v. Peretti, 661 F.2d 756, 758 (9th Cir. 1981) (district court's
conclusion that breach of contract constituted an injury to property and fell within terms of
statutory waiver was "dubious").
, 323 U.S. 459 (1945).
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State of Indiana" for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment.24' The
Court then moved to the question of whether the State of Indiana
had consented to be sued in federal court. Finding no statutory
provision clearly waiving the state's immunity from prosecution in
federal courts, the Court examined whether the Attorney General of
the State of Indiana, by appearing in the case below to defend on
the merits and failing to object to jurisdiction until the case was
before the Supreme Court, had waived the state's sovereign
immunity. The State conceded that, if the Attorney General had
the power to waive the State's sovereign immunity, his actions had
accomplished that result.242 However, the State successfully argued
that Indiana law denied the Attorney General the power to effect
such a waiver. The Indiana Constitution contained a provision
authorizing the state legislature to consent to suit only by general
law, which the Court interpreted to preclude discretionary waivers
in individual cases; the Court found nothing in the powers
specifically granted the Attorney General that would confer on him
the power to consent to suit against the state where the legislature
had not acted.4
It is important to note that Ford Motor Co. does not hold that a
state attorney general can never waive a state's sovereign immunity
unless expressly authorized to do so by state statute. Rather, the
inability of the Indiana Attorney General to waive the state's
immunity sprang from the state Constitution, which vested in the
state legislature the exclusive power to waive state sovereign
immunity by enacting a law of general applicability. A fair reading
of Ford Motor Co. would suggest that, while state law may deny state
officials the power to waive sovereign immunity by their actions,2"
21 Id. at 463-64.
2 See id. at 467.
245 See id. at 468-69.
2" See, e.g., Booth v. Maryland, 112 F.3d 139, 145 n.2 (4th Cir. 1997); Tuveson v. Florida
Governor's Council on Indian Affairs, Inc., 734 F.2d 730, 734 (11th Cir. 1984); Linkenhoker
v. Weinberger, 529 F.2d 51, 54 (4th Cir. 1975); Williams v. Eaton, 443 F.2d 422, 428 (10th Cir.
1971); O'Connor v. Slaker, 22 F.2d 147, 153 (8th Cir. 1927), appeal dismissed, 278 U.S. 188
(1929); David Nursing Home v. Michigan Dep't of Social Servs., 579 F. Supp. 285, 288 (E.D.
Micli. 1984); Snyder v. Board of Regents (In re Snyder), 228 B.R. 712, 717-18 (Bankr. D. Neb.
1998); Ellenberg v. Board of Regents (In re Midland Mech. Contractors, Inc.), 200 B.P, 453,
458-59 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1996).
Even if the state constitution or statutory authority precludes waiver by non-legislative
means, when the state official seeks affirmative relief in federal court and is statutorily
authorized to do so, consent to jurisdiction may be deemed given. See Ford Motor Co. v.
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BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTSJOURNAL
no affirmative grant of power is necessary in the absence of a
preexisting prohibition. Rather, if state law authorizes a state
official to take certain litigative actions (such as commencing an
action in federal court or filing a proof of claim) or to bind the state
to contracts, and state law does not expressly limit the ability of that
state official to waive sovereign immunity, then when the state
official engages in that authorized conduct, the loss of sovereign
immunity follows.
2 5
Nevertheless, Ford Motor Co. has been read far more broadly.
Even when a state actor has taken action-in litigation or by
contract-that demonstrates a clear intent to permit adjudication by
a federal court, decisions have permitted the state to disclaim those
actions as ineffective to waive sovereign immunity because no
express grant of power to waive immunity was conferred on that
state actor by state law.246 When coupled with the holding of Ford
Motor Co. that the defense of sovereign immunity can be raised at
Department of Treasury of Ind., 323 U.S 459, 467 n.12 (1945); In re Barrett Ref. Corp., 221
B.L 795,809 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1998).
" See, e.g., Innes v. Kansas (In relnnes), 184 F.3d 1275, 1284 (10th Cir. 1999); Georgia
Dep't of Revenue v. Burke (In re Burke), 146 F3d 1313, 1319 (l1th Cir. 1998); Confederated
Tribes of Colville Reservation Tribal Credit v. White (In re White), 139 F.3d 1268, 1271 (9th
Cir. 1998); Hankins v. Finnel, 964 F.2d 853, 858-59 (8th Cir. 1992); Beasley v. Alabama State
Univ., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1304, 1324-25 (M.D. Ala. 1998); In re Barrett Refining Corp., 221 B.R1 at
811.
" See, e.g., Magnolia Venture Capital Corp. v. Prudential Secs., Inc., 151 F.3d 439, 445
(5th Cir. 1998) (Mississippi Department of Economic and Community Development entered
into contract providing for waiver of immunity); Schlossberg v. Comptroller of Treasury (In re
Creative Goldsmiths of Washington, D.C., Inc.), 119 F.3d 1140, 1149 (4th Cir. 1997) (state
attorney general defended case on the merits, raising sovereign immunity defense only on
appeal); Santee Sioux Tribe v. Nebraska, 121 F.3d 427, 431-32 (8th Cir. 1997) (state attorney
general answered federal complaint and filed counterclaim); Estate of Porter v. Illinois Dep't
of Mental Health, 36 F.3d 684, 690-91 (7th Cir. 1994) (attorney general removed state court
action to federal court); Silver v. Baggiano, 804 F.2d 1211, 1214 (lth Cir. 1986) (state
defendants removed action to federal court); Terrell v. United States, 783 F.2d 1562, 1566
(11th Cir. 1986) (Florida Department of Transportation filed pretrial stipulation that district
court had jurisdiction); Gwinn Area Cmty. Schs. v. Michigan, 741 F.2d 840, 847 (6th Cir.
1984) (state defendants removed action to federal court); Freimanis v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc.,
654 F.2d 1155, 1160 (5th Cir. 1981) (attorney for Department of Transportation and
Development entered into consent judgment with plaintiff); Linkenhoker, 529 F.2d at 53
(assistant attorney general expressly represented to the court that state waived its Eleventh
Amendment immunity); Reefshare, Ltd. v. Nagata, No. CV 87-0024, 1987 WL 109921 at *12-14
(D. Hawaii Aug. 4, 1987) (defendant made general appearance, responded to discovery and
participated at trial). Cf Pitts v. Ohio Dep't of Taxation (In re Pitts), 241 B.R. 862, 878
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1999) (noting that the court could find no Ohio law conferring upon




any stage of the proceedings,247 these cases encourage states to play
games with federal jurisdiction, taking advantage of favorable
decisions in federal court while raising the court's lack of
jurisdiction if the decisions initially go against them.2
But whether Ford Motor Co. is read broadly or more narrowly,
the task of a federal court in determining whether actions by
particular state officials have waived the state's sovereign immunity
is not an easy one. If the state has constitutional or statutory
provisions bearing on the authority of the official to waive, the
federal court must interpret the state law, an undertaking that
federalism suggests should be avoided whenever possible. Even if
there is no applicable state law constraining the power of the state
actor to waive the state's immunity, the federal court must make a
factual assessment in each case, determining whether the state actor
did "enough" to consent to federal jurisdiction on behalf of the
state. These difficulties make the desirability of encouraging clear
legislative or constitutional waivers of sovereign immunity even
more patent.
C. As to What Claims Is a Waiver of Sovereign Immunity Effective?
Again, when a state waives its sovereign immunity by
constitutional provision or legislative act, the claims as to which it is
waiving that immunity will be specified in the waiver provision itself.
Similarly, when a waiver is contemplated by contractual provision,
the words chosen by the negotiating parties will determine what
247 See Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of Ind., 323 U.S. 459, 467 (1945)
(defense was raised for first time in Supreme Court).
'0 The bankruptcy judge deciding In re Midland Mechanical Contractors, Inc., 200 B.1R at
453, commented on this gamesmanship, suggesting that it:
... substantially contradicts the Court's own notion of fair play and equity. Through
this course of events the estate has incurred substantial litigation expenses and much
time has been devoted to the resolution of this controversy. Now, only after
receiving a judgment adverse to its interests, the Board has chosen to reassert its
Eleventh Amendment immunity to avoid thatjudgment's consequences.
Id. at 459 n.6; see also Katrina A. Kelly, In the Aftermath of Seminole: Waiver of Sovereign Immunity
Under Section 106(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, 15 BANKR. DEv.J. 151,179 (1998).
Although the lack of a legislative grant of authority to waive sovereign immunity may
encourage states that do not fare as well as they would hope in a bankruptcy
proceeding to argue that their sovereign immunity was not waived, even by the filing
of a claim, bankruptcy courts may not look favorably on states trying to have their
cake and eat it too.
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claims are covered. But when waiver is accomplished by a voluntary
act undertaken by a duly empowered state official in pending
litigation, the scope of that waiver is unclear. With respect to what
potential claims against the state is the waiver effective?
Here, courts are confronted with two related issues. First, what
is the applicable standard to be applied in analyzing whether a
consent to federal jurisdiction with respect to one claim also waives
immunity with respect to another? Second, once the applicable
standard is identified, do the claims at issue in any particular case
satisfy that standard?
In the bankruptcy context, waiver of sovereign immunity by
litigative action is most likely to occur by the filing of a proof of
claim by the state or one of its agencies. The leading Supreme
Court case on waiver by submission of a proof of claim, Gardner v.
New Jersey,2 9 did not need to address the scope of the state's waiver of
sovereign immunity in any detail, because the claims by the estate
against the state were all in the nature of objections to the state's
claim for unpaid taxes. The Court noted that by filing a proof of
claim "[t]he State is seeking something from the debtor. No
judgment is sought against the State.... When the State becomes
the actor and files a claim against the fund it waives any immunity
which it otherwise might have had respecting the adjudication of
the claim."20 At a minimum, therefore, the filing of a proof of
claim, or the assertion of any other claim in bankruptcy court,
waives sovereign immunity with respect to defensive counterclaims
to the claim asserted by the state.nl So long as the estate seeks no
recovery from the state, but merely seeks to relieve itself of liability
to the state, the waiver resulting from the assertion of the claim by
the state covers any defensive claim filed against it.
But does the waiver go further, to permit recovery from the
state in excess of any claim asserted by it? The scope of a waiver by
filing a proof of claim is addressed in the Code, which makes such a
filing a "deemed" waiver "with respect to a claim against such
governmental unit that is property of the estate and that arose out
249 329 U.S. 565 (1947).
2' I& at 574.
2" See, e.g., Parker N. Am. Corp. v. Resolution Trust Corp. (In reParker N. Am. Corp.), 24
F.Sd 1145, 1155 (9th Cir. 1994) (preference action against RTC is properly characterized as
an "affirmative defense" rather than counterclaim and lies within jurisdiction of bankruptcy
court where claim filed against debtor by RTC exceeds amount of preference).
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of the same transaction or occurrence out of which the claim of
such governmental unit arose."2 2 The language employed in
§ 106(b) is similar to that used with respect to compulsory
counterclaims in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, s and courts
have interpreted it to call for the same type of analysis applied
under the civil rules.2 This test would, unlike § 106(c) which
provides for an "offset" against claims of governmental units claims
by the estate against them,55 permit recovery by the estate against
2 11 U.S.C. § 106(b) (1999). Until the amendments to § 106 adopted as part of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, see supra note 29 and accompanying text, the same provision
was designated as § 106(a).
' Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a) provides, "A pleading shall state as a
counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any
opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the
opposing party's claim...." FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a). The Supreme Court has characterized the
language now set forth in § 106(b) as dealing with "compulsory counterclaims to
governmental claims." United States v. Nordic Village, 503 U.S. 30, 34 (1992); see also
Wyoming Dep't of Transp. v. Straight (In re Straight), 143 F.3d 1387, 1391 (10th Cir. 1998);
Schlossberg v. Comptroller of Treasury (In re Creative Goldsmiths of Washington, D.C., Inc.),
119 F.d 1140, 1149 (4th Cir. 1997); Quality Tooling, Inc. v. United States, 47 F.3d 1569, 1576
(CA. Fed. Cir. 1995); Price v. United States (In re Price), 42 F.3d 1068, 1072 (7th Cir. 1994);
Graham v. United States (In re Graham), 981 F.2d 1135, 1141 (10th Cir. 1992); Sullivan v.
Town & Country Home Nursing Servs., Inc. (In re Town & Country Home Nursing Servs.,
Inc.), 963 F.2d 1146, 1150 (9th Cir. 1992); Brown v. United States (In reRebel Coal Co.), 944
F.2d 320, 321 (6th Cir. 1991).
The legislative history of § 106 as originally enacted as part of the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978 supports this characterization:
Section 106 provides for a limited waiver of sovereign immunity in bankruptcy
cases .... [T] he filing of a proof of claim against the estate by a governmental unit
is a waiver by that governmental unit of sovereign immunity with respect to
compulsory counterclaims, as defined in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure...
The governmental unit cannot receive a distribution from the estate without
subjecting itself to any liability it has to the estate within the confines of a
compulsory counterclaim rule.
S. REP. No. 95-989, at 29 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.CA.N. 5787, 5815.
See, e.g., In re Price, 42 F.3d at 1073; University Med. Ctr. v. Sullivan (In re University
Med. Ctr.), 973 F.2d 1065, 1086 (3d Cir. 1992); In re Rebel Coal Co., Inc., 944 F.2d at 321;
Brewer v. NewYork Dep't of Corr. Servs. (In reValue-Added Communications), 224 B.R. 354,
358 (N.D. Tex. 1998); Schulman v. California State Water Res. Control Bd. (In reLazar), 200
B.R. 358, 378 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996).
2" See 11 U.S.C. § 106(c) (1999). Section 106(c) provides, "Notwithstanding any
assertion of sovereign immunity by a governmental unit, there shall be offset against a claim
or interest of a governmental unit any claim against such governmental unit that is property
of the estate." See id. This provision, without the introductory clause, was designated as
§ 106(b) prior to the amendments to § 106 adopted as part of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1994. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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the governmental unit in excess of the amount of the claim by the
governmental unit against the estate."s
In applying the statutory language, courts have looked to
whether there is a "logical relationship" between the claim by the
governmental unit against the debtor and the claim by the estate
against the governmental unit.27 The test is a reasonably generous
one. Counterclaims are most likely to fail the test if they relate to
different time periods," s different types of claims,29 or different
governmental entities.2 °
See, e.g., Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't of Income Maint (In re Willington
Convalescent Home, Inc.), 850 F.2d 50, 54 (2d Cir. 1988), aftd, 492 U.S. 96 (1989); Davis v.
IRS, 136 B.R. 414,420 (E.D. Va. 1992); Eli Witt Co. v. Florida (In rEli Witt Co.), 243 B.R. 528,
531 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1999). See also S. REP. No. 95-989, supra note 253 ("The counterclaim
by the estate against the governmental unit is without limit.").
"' See, e.g., In re Pric 42 F.3d at 1073; In re University Med. Ctr., 973 F.2d at 1086; In re
Rebel Coal Co., Inc., 944 F.2d at 322; In re Value-Added Communications, 224 B.R. at 358; In re
Lazar, 200 B.R. at 378; United States v. Fingers (In re Fingers), 170 B.R. 419, 429 (S.D. Cal.
1994); United States v. Fernandez (In re Fernandez), 132 B.R. 775, 779 (M.D. Fla. 1991);
French v. Georgia Dep't of Revenue (In re ABEPP Acquisition Corp.), 215 BR. 513, 518
(B.A.P. 6th Cir. 1997); United States v. Bulson (In re Bulson), 117 B.R. 537, 541 (BA.P. 9th
Cir. 1990), affd, 974 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1992).
.. See, e.g., In re Graham, 981 F.2d at 1141; Dav:s, 136 B.R. at 422; In re ABEPP Acquisition
Corp., 215 B.R. at 518; Field v. Montgomery County (In reAnton Motors, Inc.), 177 B.R. 58, 66
(Bankr. D. Md. 1995).
2" See, e.g., In re Creative Goldsmiths of Washington, D.C., Inc., 119 F.3d at 1149 (claim for
sales and withholding taxes did not arise from same transaction or occurrence as claim for
preferential payment of corporate income tax);Ashbrookv. Block, 917 F.2d 918,924 (6th Cir.
1990) (debtors' tort claim against government for failure to render credit and management
counseling and denial of operating and emergency loans was not related to claim for amounts
due on outstanding loans); WJM, Inc. v. Massachusetts Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 840 F.2d 996,
1003-04 (1st Cir. 1988) (debtors' claims for medicaid reimbursements did not arise out of
same transaction or occurrence as state's claim for unpaid taxes); In re ABEPP Acquisition
Corp., 215 B.R. at 518 (sales tax penalty did not arise out of same transaction or occurrence as
3% tax on sale of property); cf. In re Rebel Goal Co., Inc., 944 F.2d at 322 (preference action to
recover funds garnished to satisfyjudgment for penalties under Mine Safety and Health Act
was not sufficiently related to claim for other unpaid civil penalties under Act); Scay v.
Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. (In re Seay), 244 B.R. 112, 118 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2000)
(adversary proceeding for determination of discharge of student loan was distinct from claims
allowance process, and state did not waive immunity by filing proof of claim for student
loans).
See infra Part III.D. Cf Jones v. Yorke (In re Friendship Med. Ctr., Ltd.), 710 F.2d
1297, 1301 (7th Cir. 1983) (claims by state agency against debtor were not related to claims by
other creditors against state agency); William Ross, Inc. v. Biehn Constr., Inc. (In reWilliam
Ross, Inc.), 199 B.R. 551, 554 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1996) (claim against state Department of
General Services not sufficiently related to claims filed by Departments of Revenue and Labor
& Industry).
20001 Getting to Waiver
After Seminole Tribe, courts differ over whether § 106(b) survives
constitutional challenge.261  Those that conclude it does obviously
continue to apply the compulsory counterclaim ("same transaction
or occurrence") test with respect to a state's waiver of sovereign
immunity by filing a proof of claim. 262 But surprisingly, the majority
of those courts that have concluded that § 106(b) fails constitutional
muster (or who are no longer willing to rely on its validity) also
continue to apply the compulsory counterclaim test, finding it
consistent with the Gardner analysis.263  Other post-Seminole Tribe
decisions decline to go beyond the holding of Gardner and limit the
scope of the waiver to defensive counterclaims, those that bear
directly on the adjudication of the state's filed claim.2
.' Seesupra note 212 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Wyoming Dep't of Transp. v. Straight (In re Straight), 143 F.3d 1387, 1391-92
(10th Cir. 1998); Quesada v. Puerto Rico Dep't of Health (In reArecibo Cmty. Health Care,
Inc.) 233 B.R. 625, 630 (D.P.R. 1999); Ossen v. Dep't of Social Servs. (In re Charter Oak
Assocs.), 203 B.R. 17,23 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1996).
See, e.g., In re Creative Goldsmiths of Washington, D.C., Inc., 119 F.3d at 1147; Brewer v.
NewYork State Dep't of Corr. Serv. (In reValue-Added Communications, Inc.), 224 B.R. 354,
357-58 & 357 n.1 (N.D. Tex. 1998); Schulman v. California State Water Res. Control Bd. (In re
Lazar), 200 B.R 358, 378 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996). Cf Georgia Dep't of Revenue v. Burke (In
re Burke), 146 F.3d 1313, 1317 n.8, 1318 n.10, 1319 (11th Cir. 1998) (assuming § 106(b) is
invalid, but holding that claim for costs and fees incurred in enforcing automatic stay were
matters "respecting the adjudication of the claim" under Gardner and also arose out of the
"same transaction or occurrence" as state's claim). See generally Teresa K. Goebel, Comment,
ObtainingJurisdiction Over States in Bankruptcy Proceedings After Seminole Tribe, 65 U. CHL L. REV.
911, 925 (1998) (advocating adoption of the same transaction or occurrence test and its
liberal application even if § 106(b) is unconstitutional "because it better serves important
policy goals of the bankruptcy system while still respecting the federalism concerns underlying
the Eleventh Amendment"); Klee et al., supra note 106, at 1566-67 (calling the same
transaction or occurrence test "a rough majority rule" and suggesting the same results will
occur whether or not § 106(b) is constitutional).
r See, e.g., Grabscheid v. Michigan Employment Sec. Comm'n (In re CJ. Rogers, Inc.),
212 B.R. 265, 274 (E.D. Mich. 1997). Cf Koehler v. Iowa College StudentAid Comm'n (In re
Koehler), 204 B.R. 210, 219 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1997) (suggesting in dictum that, to the extent
§ 106(b) goes beyond recoupment cases, it may be subject to constitutional challenge). This
narrower reading of Gardner seems justified. Pre-Code (but post-Gardner) cases also took the
position that "affirmative recovery against the sovereign is not a corollary of the sovereign's
right to sue or present a claim for bankruptcy adjudication," and that the waiver created by
filing a claim-in the absence of a valid statutory waiver-does not extend to a counterclaim
for affirmative relief against the government. See Danning v. United States, 259 F.2d 305, 309-
10 (9th Cir. 1958). See also Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Quinn, 419 F.2d 1014, 1017 (7th
Cir. 1969) (by filing suit government waived immunity only with respect to matters "in
recoupment" to the extent of defeating government's claim); Frederick v. United States, 386
F.2d 481, 488 (5th Cir. 1967) (when sovereign sues it waives immunity as to claims of
defendant for recoupment, but not as to claims exceeding in amount that sought by sovereign
as plaintiff); United States v. Kennedy (In re Greenstreet, Inc.), 209 F.2d 660, 663, 664 (7th
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Thus, the scope of the waiver resulting from litigative conduct
by a state after Seminole Tribe remains problematic. It is unclear
whether § 106(b) remains valid, and even if it does, application of
its compulsory counterclaim test is not always easy. If it is not valid,
uncertainty prevails as to the appropriate test for determining
whether a state asserting a claim against the estate has waived
immunity with respect to a claim against it and how to apply any
such test. This uncertainty benefits no one, not the debtor, not the
bankruptcy estate and its non-sovereign creditors, and certainly not
the governmental unit, which must decide whether to seek recovery
from the estate. Waivers of sovereign immunity should be clear,
certain, and create predictable results to promote the goals of both
sovereign creditors and other bankruptcy parties. A valid
constitutional or legislative waiver would accomplish this objective.
D. As to What Entities Within the State is a Waiver of Sovereign Immunity
Effective?
Sovereign immunity may be asserted on behalf of a state not
only by the governor or attorney general but by any state agency that
is in essence an arm of the state as a matter of federal law. 25  This
Cir. 1954) (consent by initiating action extends only to defensive plea, not affirmative
judgment on counterclaim); Woelffer v. Happy States of Am., Inc., 626 F. Supp. 499, 502
(N.D. fI1. 1985) (state plaintiff waives immunity only for defensive counterclaim, not for claim
seeking affirmative recovery); United States v. Gregory Park, Section II, Inc., 373 F. Supp. 317,
351 (D.NJ. 1974) (institution of suit by United States did not waive sovereign immunity with
respect to counterclaim for affirmative relief in excess of government's claim). See generally
Kelly, supra note 248, at 177 (unlike § 106(b), "constructive waiver [by filing a proof of claim]
only allows the debtor to recover up to the amount of their state's claim against the debtor");
McKenzie, supra note 190, at 225 (suggesting that because § 106(b) allows affirmative recovery
against a state, "it is doubtful [it] could withstand attack").
0 See, e.g., Pendergrass v. Greater New Orleans Expressway Comm'n, 144 F.3d 342, 344
(5th Cir. 1998) (court must consider (1) whether state law characterizes agency as arm of
state; (2) source of funds; (3) degree of autonomy; (4) whether entity is concerned with
primarily local as opposed to statewide problems; (5) authority to sue and be sued; (6) right
to hold and use property); Duke v. Grady Mun. Sch., 127 F.3d 972, 974 n.3 (10th Cir. 1997)
(four factors to be considered are (1) characterization under state law; (2) guidance and
control exercised by state; (3) degree of state funding; and (4) local entity's ability to raise
funds on its own behalf); Mancuso v. NewYork State Thruway Auth., 86 F.3d 289, 293 (2d Cir.
1996) (identifying six factors: (1) how entity is referred to in documents creating it; (2) how
members of governing body are appointed; (3) how entity is funded; (4) whether function is
traditionally one of local or state government; (5) whether state has veto power over entity's
actions; and (6) whether state is bound by entity's obligations); Fitchik v. NewJersey Transit
Rail Operations, Inc., 873 F.2d 655, 659 (3d Cir. 1989) (in determining whether a state agency
may assert sovereign immunity, court must consider (1) whether payment of the judgment
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multiplicity of state entities entitled to claim immunity may create
additional problems. While a state constitutional provision or
legislative enactment waiving sovereign immunity on behalf of the
state is binding on every instrumentality of the state that would
otherwise be entitled to assert its immunity, the impact of other
actions waiving sovereign immunity on state actors other than those
undertaking those actions is less clear.
When a sovereign entity asserts a right of set-off under § 553,266
most courts have followed non-bankruptcy law67 in concluding that
the sovereign is a single entity and the debt owed by a debtor to one
agency or department may be set off against the obligations of
another agency or department to the same debtor."s They have
reached this conclusion against a backdrop of the language of § 553,
which recognizes the right of offset of a "creditor." "Creditor" is
defined to be an "entity that has a [prepetition] claim against the
debtor,""9 and "entity" is defined to include "governmental unit.",
71
"Governmental unit," the same term used in the operative
provisions of § 106, means, among other itemized governmental
would come from state treasury; (2) status of agency under state law; and (3) degree of
autonomy the agency enjoys).
.. See 11 U.S.C. § 553 (1999). Section 553 does not create a right of set-off applicable in
bankruptcy cases. It merely makes applicable in bankruptcy (with some exceptions) the right
of set-off as it exists outside of bankruptcy. Section 553(a) states in part that "this title does
not affect any right of a creditor to offset a mutual debt owing by such creditor to the
debtor ... against a claim of such creditor against the debtor." See id.
See, e.g., Cherry Cotton Mills, Inc. v. United States, 327 U.S. 536,539-40 (1946).
m See, e.g., United States v. Mamvell, 157 F.3d 1099, 1102 (7th Cir. 1998); Hal, Inc. v.
United States (In reHal, Inc.), 122 F.3d 851, 853 (9th Cir. 1997); Turner v. Small Bus. Admin.
(In reTurner), 84 F.3d 1294, 1296-97 (10th Cir. 1996) (en banc); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. LTV
Steel Co. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 94 F.3d 772, 778-79 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Butz
(In re Butz), 154 B.R. 541, 544 (S.D. Iowa 1989); Burton v. Riley (In re Burton), Nos. 97-
17534DAS, 97-1017DAS, 1998 WL 126067, at *2 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. March 19, 1998); Gibson v.
United States (In re Gibson), 176 B.R. 910, 915 (Bankr. D. Ore. 1994); In rejulien Co., 116
B.R. 623, 624-25 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1990); In reThomas, 84 B.R. 438, 440 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
1988), rev'd in part on other grounds, 91 B.RI 731 (N.D. Tex. 1988), amended, 93 B.R. 475 (N.D.
Tex. 1988). But see In re Lakeside Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 151 B.R. 887, 891-92 (N.D. fI1. 1993);
William Ross, Inc. v. Biehn Constr., Inc. (In reWilliam Ross, Inc.), 199 B.R. 551, 556 (Bankr.
W.D. Pa. 1996); Shugrue v. Fischer (In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc.), 164 B.R. 839, 843 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1994);Jarboe v. United States Small Bus. Admin. (In re Hancock), 137 B.R. 835, 846-
47 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1992) (mutuality is lacking between claims involving separate
agencies).
o 11 U.S.C. § 101(10) (A) (creditor defined as "entity that has a claim against the debtor
that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor").




entities, "State... [or] department, agency or instrumentality of...
a State.. . ." ' In essence, these decisions are predicated on
interpreting the term "governmental unit" which is one of the
building blocks for the definition of "creditor" in § 553 as meaning
a sovereign and all its constituent agencies and departments as a
single unit entitled to offset debts owing by one constituent element
against those owed to another, rather than considering each a
separate "governmental entity" (and thus a separate "creditor")
entitled to set off only its own debts against those owing by the
debtor. Section 106(c), which authorizes set-off against claims of
"governmental units" notwithstanding assertions of sovereign
immunity, has been interpreted the same way."
Although some decisions have interpreted the term
"governmental unit" in precisely this same way for purposes of the
waiver provision of § 106(b),273 others have not.274 But whether or
not they interpret "governmental unit" to point to a single sovereign
7 The definition of"governmental unit" in § 101(27) reads in full:
'governmental unit' means United States; State; Commonwealth; District; Territory;
municipality; foreign state; department, agency, or instrumentality of the United
States (but not a United States trustee while serving as a trustee in a case under this
title), a State, a Commonwealth, a District, a Territory, a municipality, or a foreign
state; or other foreign or domestic government.
Id. § 101 (27).
' See, e.g., Doe v. United States (In reDoe), 58 F.3d 494, 498 (9th Cir. 1995); Ossen v.
Department of Social Servs. (In re Charter Oak Assocs.), 203 B.R. 17, 23-24 (Bankr. D. Conn.
1996); Wallach v. New York State Dep't of Taxation & Fin. (In re Bison Heating & Equip.,
Inc.), 177 B.R. 785, 789-91 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1995). But see William Ross, Inc. v. Biehn
Constr., Inc. (In reWilliam Ross, Inc.) 199 B.R. 551,556 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1996).
See, e.g., Wyoming Dep't of Transp. v. Straight (In re Straight), 143 F.3d 1387, 1390-91
(10th Cir. 1998); Brewer v. New York State Dep't of Corr. Servs. (In re Value-Added
Communications, Inc.), 216 B.R. 547, 550 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1997), rev'd, 224 B.R. 354 (N.D.
Tex. 1998); Nana's Petroleum, Inc. v. Clark (In re Nana's Petroleum, Inc.), 234 B.R. 838, 848-
49 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1999); In re Charter Oak Assocs., 203 B.R. at 22-23; Hiser v. Pennsylvania
Dep't of Pub. Welfare (In reSt. Mary Hosp.), 125 B.R. 422, 425-26 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991). Cf
Hughes-Bechtol, Inc. v. Ohio (In re Hughes-Bechtol, Inc.), 124 B.R. 1007, 1018 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 1991); Storey v. Toledo (In re Cook United, Inc.), 117 B.R. 301, 305-06 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 1990); St.Joseph's Hosp. v. Department of Pub. Welfare (In re St.Joseph's Hosp.), 103
B.R. 643, 651 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989) (reaching same result interpreting Hoffman v. Connecticut
Dep't of Income Maint., 492 U.S. 96, 96 (1989)).
' See, e.g., In re Raphael, 238 B.R. 69, 75 n.10 (D.N.J. 1999); Bezner v. EastJersey State
Prison (In re Exact Temp, Inc.), 231 B.R. 566, 570-71 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1999). Cf WJM, Inc. v.
Massachusetts Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 840 F.2d 996, 1003 n.10 (1st Cir. 1988); Brewer v. New
York State Dep't of Corr. Servs. (In reValue-Added Communications, Inc.), 224 B.R. 354, 357
(N.D. Tex. 1998); Rocchio & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Transp. (In re Rocchio & Sons, Inc.),
165 B.R. 86, 88 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1994) (declining to decide issue).
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entity, most courts have emphasized the requirement of § 106(b)
that waiver extends only to claims "that arose out of the same
transaction or occurrence" as the claim as to which the
governmental unit waived immunity, and conclude that a claim by
an agency or department of the government other than that which
filed a proof of claim can not be considered to arise out of the same
transaction or occurrence as the claim as to which waiver occurred
by filing.275 Of course, to the extent that "same transaction or
occurrence" is interpreted more broadly, courts could reach a
different conclusion.276
If § 106(b) has not survived Seminole Tribe,2" the applicable
standards under GardneP5  limit waiver only to those claims
"respecting the adjudication of the [filed] claim."2 79  Because,
pursuant to § 502 (d), the court must disallow a claim of any "entity"
(which includes a "governmental unit") which refuses to turn over
estate property or which has received an avoidable transfer or
preferential set-off,5 ' if "governmental unit" is interpreted on the
single entity theory applicable to rights of set-off under § 553, a
claim filed by one governmental agency or department could easily
be interpreted to waive immunity with respect to claims against a
separate agency or department pursuant to the turnover or
' See, e.g., WJM, Inc., 840 F.2d at 1003-04; In reRaphae4 238 B.R- at 75 n.10; In re Value-
Added Communications, Inc., 224 B.R. at 359; Sacred Heart Hosp. v. Department of Pub.
Welfare (In reSacred Heart Hosp.), 204 B.R. 132, 141 (E.D. Pa. 1997), affd, 133 F.3d 257 (3d
Cir. 1998); Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. Public Investors Life Ins. Co., 866 F. Supp. 301,304 (W.D.
La. 1993); In reExact Temp, Inc., 231 B.R. at 571; In reHavens, 229 B.R. 613, 625 (Bankr. D.NJ.
1998); In re Charter Oak Assocs., 203 B.R. at 23; In re William Ross, Inc., 199 B.R. at 554-55; In re
Rocchio & Sons, Inc., 165 B.R. at 88; Unicare Homes, Inc. v. Four Seasons Care Ctrs, Inc. (In re
Four Seasons Care Centers, Inc.), 119 B.R. 681, 683-84 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1990).
' In In re Straight, 143 F.3d at 1391-92, the court characterized the "transaction or
occurrence" giving rise to both claims as "the Debtor's business." The court in Schulman v.
California State Water Resources Control Board, (In re Lazar), 200 B.R. 358, 378 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
1996), found a logical relationship between the bankruptcy trustee's claim against the
California Storage Tank Cleanup Fund to the State of California's claim for unpaid taxes
(including taxes payable to the Fund). An even broader interpretation was adopted in In re
Cook United, Inc., 117 B.1R at 306, where the court identified the bankruptcy petition filing
itself as the same "occurrence" giving rise to both claims.
See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
See Gardner v. New Jersey, 329 U.S. 565 (1947).
2 d 1dat 574.
' Section 502(d) states in part that "the court shall disallow any claim of any entity from
which property is recoverable under sections 542, 543, 550, or 553 of this title or that is a
transferee of a transfer avoidable under section 522(f), 522(h), 544, 545, 547, 548, 549, or
724(a) of this title...." 11 U.S.C. § 502(d) (1999).
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avoidance powers that would justify disallowance of the filed claim
under § 502 (d).
The difficulties of determining the scope of the waiver of
sovereign immunity occasioned by the filing of a proof of claim, not
only as to other claims of the same agency or department, but also
as to claims of other agencies or departments, provides additional
support for the proposition that application of the waiver doctrine
as it now exdsts is unpredictable and therefore inefficient, and
results in inconsistent decisions between courts, which is also
inherently unfair both to debtors and creditors. A better system is
needed.
IV. GETTING To WAIVER
After the Supreme Court's decision in Seminole Tribe,28' we are
left with a bankruptcy system in which the purported abrogation of
sovereign immunity in § 106(a) is unconstitutional if that section
was enacted pursuant to the Bankruptcy Clause of the
Constitution,2 s2 and it is unlikely § 106(a) was, or could be, enacted
pursuant to Congress's powers under section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which the Supreme Court has concluded is the only
constitutional basis for abrogation of state sovereign immunity."3
Yet, we have a federal bankruptcy system that is premised upon the
participation of all interested parties, including those sovereign
creditors entitled to immunity from compulsory suit in federal
court. The myriad potential involvements of state entities in
bankruptcy cases and the damage that can be done the policies
underlying our bankruptcy system if states can choose not to
participate 84 mandates a solution to state sovereign immunity in
bankruptcy that both respects the rights of the sovereign states and
furthers the goals of the uniform federal system. But the solutions
that have been proposed-empowering the federal government (or
a representative thereof) to pursue bankruptcy causes of action
against the states,' seeking injunctive relief against state officials
2 SeeSeminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
* See supra notes 32-63 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 64-110 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 114-44 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 148-59 and accompanying text.
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under Ex parte Young,285 or seeking redress in state courts287-- while
providing constitutional deference to state sovereignty, inadequately
respond to the federal objectives.
The problem of sovereign immunity can be overcome only
when it disappears, when the nonconsenting state entities who opt
out of the bankruptcy process become consenting, participating
players by waiving the immunity to which they would otherwise be
entitled. But waiver itself, although it remains a viable means of
vitiating sovereign immunity even after Seminole Tribe, has its own
ambiguities and limitations. Short of a duly-enacted or adopted
legislative or constitutional provision waiving immunity, it is unclear
what actions constitute a waiver, who may take such actions on
behalf of the state,2 what potential claims against the state are
covered by any such waiver,a ° and whether such waiver extends to
state departments or agencies other than that which took the action
resulting in waiver.291
Even when those issues can be resolved in an individual case,
we are left with a system in which states are encouraged, by
economic self-interest, to engage in selective submission to
bankruptcy court jurisdiction, waiving immunity when the cost of
doing so is less than the benefits to be derived from participation,
and opting out when the benefits of participation accrue not to the
state but to the estate and the other creditors. The state may pick
and choose, case by case, claim by claim, department by
department, when it wants to be a player and when it does not. No
other creditor has the right to exclude itself voluntarily from the
bankruptcy system. Given the policy of equal treatment of similarly-
situated creditors underlying the Code,2 no creditor should have
that right unless such special treatment is constitutionally
compelled. Although state sovereign immunity requires that states
be given the choice whether to submit to federal jurisdiction, it does
not require that states be given total flexibility in making that
See supra notes 160-80 and accompanying text.
"' See supra notes 181-99 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 203-39 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 240-48 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 249-64 and accompanying text.
" Seesupranotes 265-80 and accompanying text.
See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
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choice. Section 106(b) and Gardnerv. NewJersey provide the states
more freedom of choice than their sovereign status requires. A new
approach to waiver is necessary that both respects state sovereign
immunity and promotes the federal bankruptcy goal of equal
treatment.
States can be put on an equal footing with other bankruptcy
creditors only if they voluntarily waive their sovereign immunity with
respect to all cases, all agencies and departments, and all claims.
This can be accomplished by uniform legislation enacted in the
state legislatures of all fifty states, pursuant to which each state
would consensually waive sovereign immunity to the extent
provided in the abrogation provisions of § 106(a). 4
But how can we achieve this goal? Is there any way of getting to
waiver by every state? To answer this question, we must explore the
limits imposed by the Constitution on Congress in seeking state
legislative action, and the mechanisms Congress may use to obtain
its objectives consistent with those limits.
329 U.S. 565 (1947).
A waiver that mirrors the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 106(a) would put the states on an
equal footing with the federal government, as to which § 106(a) remains effective even after
Seminole Tribe. Such legislation could read:
(a) The State of [], for itself and for all of its agencies, departments, subdivisions or
other entities entitled to assert sovereign immunity (herein collectively referred to
as the "State"), hereby waives its sovereign immunity to the extent set forth herein
with respect to the following:
(1) Sections 105, 106, 107, 108, 303, 346, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 502, 503,
505, 506, 510, 522, 523, 524, 525, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550,
551, 552, 553, 722, 724, 726, 728, 744, 749, 764, 901, 922, 926, 928, 929, 944,
1107, 1141, 1142, 1143, 1146, 1201, 1203, 1205, 1206, 1227, 1231, 1301, 1303,
1305, and 1327 of United States Code title 11.
(2) The federal court may hear and determine any issue arising with respect to
the application of such sections to the State.
(3) The federal court may issue against the State an order, process or
judgment under such sections or the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure,
including an order orjudgment awarding a money recovery, but not including
an award of punitive damages. Such order orjudgment for costs or fees under
United States Code title 11 or the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure
against the State shall be consistent with the provisions and limitations of
section 2412(d) (2) (A) of United States Code title 28.
(4) The enforcement of any such order, process orjudgment against the State
shall be consistent with appropriate nonbankruptcy lav applicable to the
State.
(5) Nothing herein shall create any substantive claim for relief or cause of
action not otherwise existing under United States Code title 11, the Federal
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure or nonbankruptcy law.
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A. Tenth Amendment
Just as Congress cannot constitutionally abrogate a state's
sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article I powers, it cannot
commandeer the state's legislative process by mandating the
enactment of specific legislation without violating the Tenth
Amendment2a The Supreme Court explored the constitutional
limits of congressional power over state legislatures in New York v.
United States.2s
6
In an effort to ensure adequate disposal sites for low level
radioactive waste, Congress enacted the Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985,297 which, among other
provisions, required states that did not provide for disposal of all
low-level radioactive waste generated within their boundaries by
January 1, 1996 in accordance with the instructions of Congress298 to
take title to and possession of such waste at the request of the
generator or owner thereof, and to be liable for all damages
incurred by the waste generator or owner as a result of the state's
failure to do so.2t This provision gave the states two choices: either
adopt legislation implementing the disposal mechanics for low-level
radioactive waste proposed by Congress, or take title to the waste
and assume responsibility for its disposal. The State of New York,
while acknowledging that Congress itself had the Constitutional
power to regulate with respect to the disposal of low-level
radioactive waste, asserted that Congress did not have the power to
force the states to regulate with respect to such disposal. New York
' See Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 761-62 (1982);
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981) (finding no
Tenth Amendment violation). Cf Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925-35 (1997)
(Congress cannot compel state executives to administer or enforce federal law consistent with
the Tenth Amendment). But cf Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 168-69 (2000) (Congress
cannot require state officials to assist in enforcing federal statutes regulating private
individuals, but may demand state compliance with federal law regulating state activities, even
when compliance requires time and effort on the part of state employees.).
2" 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
Pub. L. 99-240,99 Stat. 1842 (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 2021b etseq.).
The Act provided the states some alternatives for disposing of the waste. They could
contract with regional compacts that had established sites, 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(e) (1) (F) (1999),
or they could construct a disposal site themselves or as part of a compact, id. § 2021e(e) (1) (A)
&9 (B).
'Id. at §2021e(d) (2) (C).
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sought a declaratory judgment that the Act was, among other things,
inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution.
The Court struck down the "take title" provisions. Noting that
Congress has the Constitutional authority "to regulate individuals,
not States," and therefore "lacks the power directly to compel the
States to require or prohibit" even acts Congress could require or
prohibit directly,"0' the Court noted that the "take title" provisions
gave the states a choice between regulating with respect to disposal
of the waste-which Congress could not order the states to do-and
acquiring the waste from its producers-which Congress could not
order the states to do. 2 Because Congress lacked the power to
order states to implement either one of the two choices it gave
them, it lacked the power to require them to choose to do one or
the other s 3  Therefore, the "take title" provisions were
unconstitutional.
However, the Court emphasized that Congress could, within its
constitutional role, "encourage" a state to regulate, and "hold out
incentives to the States as a method of influencing a State's policy
choices."104 Two acceptable methods of encouragement identified
by the Court were the attachment of conditions to the receipt of
federal funds and offering the states the choice of regulating or
facing federal preemption,"°5 but the Court acknowledged there may
be other permissible methods, "short of outright coercion." 6
B. Conditional Spending Power
Use of the spending powerm' to encourage state action, which
Congress is powerless to compel directly, has long been recognized
as consistent with the Tenth Amendment. In the leading case of
' Amendment X states: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
soI NewYorkv. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992).
See id. at 175-76.




' Article I gives Congress the power, "To lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and
excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the
United States .... " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
[Vol. 17
Getting to Waiver
South Dakota v. Dole,"'0 the Supreme Court upheld a federal statute
conditioning the receipt of a portion of the federal highway funds
which a state would otherwise be offered on the state prohibiting
the purchase or possession of alcoholic beverages by persons under
the age of twenty-one. Quoting the spending power clause of the
Constitution, the Court stated that "[i]ncident to this power,
Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds,"
even when the objectives sought to be achieved by these conditions
are beyond the powers of Congress to legislate directly."° Despite
some academic criticism of this interpretation as inconsistent with
the Court's other federalism decisions,"'° the Court has adhered to it
even while cutting back on federal power under the Commerce
Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment."'
The Court in Dole recognized that congressional power to
condition receipt of federal funds on adherence to congressional
directives is not without limits. First, the federal spending itself
must, consistent with the language of the Constitution creating the
spending power, be aimed at the "general welfare,"3 2 although
Congress is entitled to substantial deference in this determination. 5
Second, Congress must make its conditions unambiguous, so that
the state may exercise its choice "knowingly, cognizant of the
483 U.S. 203 (1987).
Id. at 206-07. In so holding, the Court was following a long line of cases, including:
Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937), Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937), and
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936), where the Court embraced the Hamiltonian view that
the spending clause is a self-contained grant of Congressional power, limited only by its terms,
rather than the view of James Madison that the spending power could be used only to
effectuate other enumerated powers of Congress. See generally David E. Engdahl, The Spending
Power, 44 DuE LJ. 1 (1994) (discussing Hamilton's view of the spending power and
suggesting that the Court in Butler, Steward, and Helveringmisunderstood it).
"' See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal SpendingAfterLopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911
(1995); Thomas R. McCoy & Barry Friedman, Conditional Spending. Federalism's Trojan Horse,
1988 SuP. CT. REV. 85; Donald J. Mizerk, The Coercion Test and Conditional Federal Grants to the
States, 40 VAND. L. REv. 1159 (1987); AlbertJ. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending and the
Constitution, 39 STAN. L. REv. 1103 (1987); Ryan C. Squire, Effectuating Principles of Federalism:
Reevaluating the Federal Spending Power as the Great Tenth Amendment Loophole, 25 PEPP. L. REV.
869 (1998).
.. See, e.g., College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527
U.S. 666, 686 (1999) ("Congress may, in the exercise of its spending power, condition its
grant of funds to the States upon their taking certain actions that Congress could not require
them to take, and... acceptance of the funds entails an agreement to the actions.").




consequences" of accepting the funds.314 Third, the Court noted
that its cases had suggested that conditions on receipt of federal
funds might be invalid if they are unrelated "to the federal interest
in particular national projects or programs.""31  Fourth, the state
action Congress requires by the conditions can not be barred by
another constitutional provision.1 6 Finally, the Court further
suggested that "in some circumstances the financial inducement
offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at
which 'pressure turns into compulsion.'"
31 7
Although the threat of federal preemption is meaningless in
the context of bankruptcy, where the enactment of the Code has
already preempted state regulation, use of conditional spending as a
means of obtaining state waiver of sovereign immunity in
bankruptcy is worth examination. In order to pass muster, Congress
would first have to attach the condition to a funding bill authorized
by the spending power clause of the Constitution in that it must be
aimed at promoting the "general welfare." Given the reluctance of
courts to second guess the political process in this respect,"8 one can
assume that any spending bill Congress enacted would satisfy this
requirement.
Second, Congress would have to draft the condition clearly and
unambiguously, stating that acceptance of the federal funds under
"' Id. (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)). See
also Counsel v. Dow, 849 F.2d 731, 736 (2d Cir. 1988) (Pennhurst "Simply requires a clear
indication of congressional intent to impose such conditions").
"' Id. at 207-08 (citing Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978) (plurality
opinion); Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 295 (1958)).
316 Id. at 208 (citing Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist., 469 U.S. 256, 269-70
(1985); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 91 (1976) (per curiam); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333
n.34 (1968)).
... Id. at 211 (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548,590 (1937)).
..8 The Court in Dole emphasized that "the concept of welfare or the opposite is shaped
by Congress... ." Id. at 208 (quoting Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 645 (1937)); see also
Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397,423 (1970); Housing Auth. of Ft. Collins v. United States, 980
F.2d 624, 629 (10th Cir. 1992); Oklahoma v. Schweiker, 655 F.2d 401, 406 (D.C. Cir. 1981);
Boddie v. Wyman, 434 F.2d 1207, 1212 (2d Cir. 1970), af'd, 402 U.S. 991 (1971); Kansas v.
United States, 24 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1197 (D. Kan. 1998); United Seniors Ass'n, Inc. v. Shalala,
2 F. Supp. 2d 39,42 (D.D.C. 1998), affd, 182 F.3d 965 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Montgomery County
v. Califano, 449 F. Supp. 1230, 1245 (D. Md. 1978), affd without opinion, 599 F.2d 1048 (4th
Cir. 1979); Sparks v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 431 F. Supp. 411, 419 (W.D. Okla. 1977). See generally
Kit Kinports, Implied WaiverAfter Seminole Tribe, 82 MINN. L. REv. 793, 825 (1998) ("[N]othing
in the Court's Spending Clause or Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence supports the




the program would require a waiver by the state and all its
subdivisions and agencies of its sovereign immunity in all
bankruptcy cases to the extent specified in § 106 of the Code.
Having once redrafted § 106 to satisfy the Supreme Court's
objection that the original language did not make its intention to
abrogate sovereign immunity "unmistakably clear,"319 Congress
could undoubtedly draft a provision conditioning receipt of federal
funds on a similar waiver with sufficient clarity.
The fourth limitation on congressional power to condition
receipt of federal funds on state compliance with federal objectives,
the requirement that there be no constitutional provision barring
the action requested by Congress in its condition, should also be
easy to satisfy.20 Although the Constitution recognizes state
sovereign immunity in the Eleventh Amendment, no constitutional
provision precludes a state from waiving its immunity should it
choose to do so. Indeed, the Supreme Court has clearly indicated
that a state's waiver of sovereign immunity would be a permissible
quid pro quo for receipt of federal funds,3 1 and lower courts have so
held.5 2
The fifth limitation on conditional spending provisions-that a
state cannot be put to a choice that is so economically coercive as to
... Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't of Income Maint., 492 U.S. 96, 101 (1989) (quoting
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985)).
' The unconstitutional conditions doctrine has never been clearly defined. See generally
Meltzer, supra note 156, at 51; Rosenthal, supra note 310, at 1120-23; Kathleen M. Sullivan,
Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1413 (1989); Cass R. Sunstein, Why the
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Is an Anachronism (With ParticularReference to Religion, Speech,
and Abortion), 70 B.U.L. REV. 593 (1990); William Van Alstyne, "Thirty Pieces of Silver"for the
Rights of Your People: Irresistible Offers Reconsidered as a Matter of State Constitutional Law, 16 HARV.
J. L. & PUB. PoLY 303 (1993). But the Court in Dole explained the limitation as intended to
ensure that conditions on federal funding "not be used to induce the States to engage in
activities that would themselves be unconstitutional." South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210
(1987).
2 See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755 (1999) ("Nor, subject to constitutional
limitations, does the Federal Government lack the authority or means to seek the State's
voluntary consent to private suits") (citing Dole); Atascadero State Hosp., 473 U.S. at 246-47
("[T]he mere receipt of federal funds cannot establish that a State has consented to suit in
federal court .... The Act likewise falls far short in manifesting a clear intent to condition
participation in the programs funded under the Act on a State's consent to waive its
constitutional immunity.").
' See, e.g., Litman v. George Mason Univ., 186 F.3d 544, 555 (4th Cir. 1999); Clark v.
California Dep't of Corr., 123 F.3d 1267,1271 (9th Cir. 1997); Beasley v. Alabama State Univ.,
3 F. Supp.2d 1304, 1311-16 (M.D. Ala. 1998).
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become compulsion-has its critics.323 However, since the Supreme
Court struck down the provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act
of 1933 that conditioned farmers' receipt of federal financial
assistance on their reduction in crop production in 1937,24 no court
has yet found a condition on receipt of federal funds invalid as
overly coercivesa2 Congress could certainly tailor its spending bill to
limit the sanction for failure to waive sovereign immunity to a level
that would be unlikely to cross the line, wherever it may lie.
The major stumbling block to use of the spending power to
solve the sovereign immunity problem in bankruptcy comes with the
third limitation on use of conditional funding, the requirement that
the condition be related "to the federal interest in particular
3.. Some have argued that the amount Congress determines to withhold in the event a
state "chooses" not to comply with the condition will always be sufficient to eliminate any real
choice and thus is inherently coercive. See, e.g., W. Paul Koenig, Does Congress Abuse Its
Spending Clause Power by Attaching Conditions on the Receipt of Federal Law Enforcement Funds to a
State's Compliance with "Megan's Law"?, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 721, 749-54 (1998);
McCoy & Friedman, supra note 310, at 118-20. Others suggest that a state, which has the
power to tax its citizens, can never be economically coerced by the denial of federal funds,
however great the amount, even if the choice of replacing the foregone federal support with
state taxes is politically unpalatable. See, e.g., Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445, 448 (9th Cir.
1989). The state can always adopt the "simple expedient of not yielding to... federal
coercion." Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 143-44 (1947).
Others have noted that the line between encouragement and coercion is inherently subjective
and thus arbitrary. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 310, at 1973; Angel D. Mitchell, Conditional
Federal Funding to the States: The New Federalism Demands a Close Examination for Unconstitutional
Conditions, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 161,191 (1999).
'4 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 70-71 (1936). Although the Court framed its
conclusion in terms of coercion, in fact it held that Congress had attempted by use of the
spending power to regulate a subject beyond its powers-consistent with the Madisonian view
of the spending clause which it purported to reject. The Court changed course in substance
(while continuing to embrace the Hamiltonian idea of the spending clause) the following
year in Steward and Helvering.
m See, e.g., Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 569 (1974); United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330
U.S. at 143-44; California v. United States, 104 F.3d 1086, 1092 (9th Cir 1997); Virginia v.
Browner, 80 F.3d 869, 881-82 (4th Cir. 1996); Skinner, 884 F.2d at 448; Schweiker, 655 F.2d at
413-12; Kansas v. United States, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 1199; United Seniors Ass'n, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 42;
Jones v. Wake County Hosp. Sys., Inc., 786 F. Supp. 538, 546 (E.D.N.C. 1991). But see Bradley
ex reL Bradley v. Arkansas Dep't of Educ., 189 F.3d 745, 757, rehearing en banc granted, 197 F.3d
958 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding § 504 of Rehabilitation Act of 1993, which prohibits any program
or activity receiving federal funding from treating an individual differently "solely by reason
of" a disability, amounts to "impermissible coercion" because it forces state to renounce even
funding wholly unrelated to the Act if it does not want to comply). Some commentators
suggest that the coercion test should be applied more stringently, recognizing that in reality
states cannot afford to turn down significant federal funds. See, e.g.,James V. Corbelli, Tower of
Power South Dakota v. Dole and the Strength of the SpendingPower, 49 U. PiTT. L. REV. 1097, 1121-
25 (1988); Rosenthal, supra note 310, at 1135.
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national projects or programs."3 26  To what national projects or
programs is the Supreme Court referring? On the one hand, it
could be referring to any national projects or program with respect
to which Congress wishes the states to take action pursuant to the
condition to funding. On the other hand, it could be referring to
the national project or program for which the funds to which the
condition is attached are to be used.
If the former interpretation were correct, a waiver of sovereign
immunity by the states in bankruptcy proceedings could be justified
as related to the federal interest in the federal bankruptcy system
itself. Although that interpretation is attractive insofar as it furthers
the goal of obtaining state waiver in a constitutional manner, it is
inherently inconsistent with the Court's characterization of it as a
"limitation" on Congressional power because it imposes no
limitation on Congress at all. 27 If Congress attaches a condition to a
spending bill, it is always trying to obtain state action that would
further some federal objective. The Supreme Court could not have
meant that a condition is unconstitutional only when it is not
rationally related to a valid Congressional legislative power, or it
would be beyond the power of Congress to enact in the first place.
But if some relationship between the condition imposed on the
states and the federal program being funded by the funds to which
the condition is attached is required, it is difficult to identify any
federal funding program that has a relationship-even a tenuous
one-to a waiver of sovereign immunity in bankruptcy. 2 Without
such a relationship, the condition may fail constitutional scrutiny.
The Court, although urged in Dole to hold "that a condition on
federal funds is legitimate only if it relates directly to the purpose of
the expenditure to which it is attached, "'29 found it unnecessary to
do so, in part because "the condition imposed by Congress is
" Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't of Income Maint., 492 U.S. 96, 101 (1989) (quoting
Atascadero State Hosp., 473 U.S. at 242).
3" Indeed, David E. Engdahl, supra note 309, at 56, suggests that this "germaneness"
requirement, while appealing to those seeking to cure "fiscal bullying" by Congress,
"amount[s] to no more than cheap whiskey and snake oil" and is inherently inconsistent with
the Hamiltonian interpretation of the spending clause. See id. at 56.
... See Glauberman, supra note 157, at 108 n.274 ("it is difficult to imagine a federal
expenditure germane to the bankruptcy laws"); Meltzer, supra note 156, at 55 ("some of the
recent statutory provisions purporting to abrogate sovereign immunity-for example, in
bankruptcy proceedings-are not now, and could not easily be, associated with federal
spending programs").
' South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203,208-9 n.3 (1987).
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directly related to one of the main purposes for which highway
funds are expended-safe interstate travel."3" However, requiring a
relationship between the condition imposed on receipt of federal
funds and the very program being funded is far more consistent
with the Supreme Court cases from which the language of the third
limitation set forth in Dole was taken,'3 and the Supreme Court
suggested in New York v. United States that this was its
interpretation.5 2
Id. at 208. Justice O'Connor, writing in dissent, disagreed. She interpreted the
requirement imposed by the majority as requiring that "the conditions imposed... must be
reasonably related to the purpose of the expenditure," and characterized the minimum
drinking age condition as "not sufficiently related to interstate highway construction to justify
so conditioning funds appropriated for that purpose." Id. at 213-14 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). She would have limited permissible conditions on federal funding to those which
specify "in some way how the [federal] money should be spent." Id. at 216 (quoting Brief for
the National Conference of State Legislatures et al. as Amici Curiae).
- The language first appeared in Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978),
in which the Court found appropriate a condition that states owning civil aircraft flying the
navigable airspace of the United States pay an annual registration tax. The Court explained,
"We have repeatedly held that the Federal Government may impose appropriate conditions
on the use of federal property or privileges and may require that state instrumentalities
comply with conditions that are reasonably related to the federal interest in particular
national projects or programs.... A requirement that States, like all other users, pay a
portion of the costs of the benefits they enjoy from federal programs is surely permissible
since it is closely related to the federal interest in recovering costs from those who
benefit...." Id. The condition imposed by the Federal government creating payment of
user registration taxes was clearly related to the federal benefit provided to the state-use of
the national air system.
The Court cited to Ivanhoe Irrigation District v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 295 (1958), in
which the Court stated that,
... beyond challenge is the power of the Federal Government to impose reasonable
conditions on the use of federal funds, federal property, and federal privileges....
[T]he Federal Government may establish and impose reasonably conditions [in that
case, restrictions on the quantity of land under single ownership to which project
water could be supplied] relevant to federal interest in the proect [in that case, an
irrigation project to be funded by the federal government] and to the over-all
objectives thereof.
Id. (emphasis added). Again, the linkage between the condition and the federally financed
project was clear.
Also cited in Massachusetts was Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service Commission, 330 U.S.
127, 142-43 (1947), in which the Court upheld portions of the Hatch Act that allowed a
federal agency to withhold from a state program it funded an amount equal to two years'
compensation for any officer or employee of that state program who took an active role in
political campaigns. See Massachusetts, 435 U.S. at 461. Once more there was a specific
relationship between the condition-no political activities by state officers or employees
whose activities are funded by the federal government-and the federal program of funding
those activities.
3" See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992) ("Such conditions must...
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Therefore, even if receipt of federal funds for most programs
can appropriately be conditioned on the recipient state waiving
sovereign immunity with respect to suits against the state involving
the program so funded,333 the conditional spending power of
Congress is a far more problematic solution in bankruptcy where
the federal interest in the bankruptcy system promoted by the
condition would necessarily be entirely divorced from (and thus
unrelated to) the program to which the conditional funding is
attached.ss
bear some relationship to the purpose of thefederal spending" (citing Dole) (emphasis added)). See
also Bradley ex reL Bradley v. Arkansas Dep't of Educ., 189 F.3d 745, 757, rehearing en banc
granted, 197 F.3d 958 (8th Cir. 1999); Litman v. George Mason Univ., 186 F.3d 544, 552-53
(4th Cir. 1999); United States v. McCormack, 31 F. Supp.2d 176, 189 (D. Mass. 1998),
amen"ded No. 97-10168-NG, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21617 (D. Mass. Nov. 13, 1998); Childrens
& Parents Rights Ass'n of Ohio, Inc. v. Sullivan, 787 F. Supp. 724,735 (N.D. Ohio 1991);Jones
v. Wake County Hosp. Sys., Inc., 786 F. Supp. 538, 546 (1991). But cf Oklahoma v. Schweiker,
655 F.2d 401, 406-07,409 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (in a pre-Dole decision, rejecting a "rigid nexus test"
that would require condition be related to purpose of federal funds to whose receipt it is
attached, but acknowledging that condition at issue was in fact so related).
m SeegenerallyKinports, supra note 318, at 825, 831-32 (suggesting that Congress's power
to condition states' receipt of federal money on waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity
establishes that the doctrine of implied waiver remains viable after Seminole Tribe).
'm Kenneth N. Klee, James 0. Johnston & Eric Winston disagree with this proposition.
See Klee et al., supra note 106, at 1527-28 n.317. They maintain that (1) there need not be
"direct" relationship, but only a "reasonable" one, and (2) that the relationship need not be
between the condition and the federal interest served by the particular project or program
being funded, but merely between the condition and the federal interest served by the
condition, even if unrelated to the funding. See id. I do not disagree with their first point.
Indeed, although the Dole majority characterized the condition at issue there as "directly
related" to the federal goal of providing highway funds, in stating the limitation the majority
merely said that a condition may be invalid if it is "unrelated" to the federal interest in a
particular project or program. Even in dissent, Justice O'Connor said that she agreed with
the majority that a condition must be "reasonably related" to the purpose of the expenditure,
but found no reasonably relationship in that case. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 213
(1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The "reasonably related" language was also contained in
the cases to which both majority and dissent cited as the basis for the limitation. See supra
note 331. Therefore, despite the use of the words "directly related" by the Dole majority, I do
not believe either the majority or the dissent intended to require a closer connection than a
.reasonable" one. Cf Terry W. Dorris, Comment, Constitutional Law-South Dakota v. Dole:
Federal Conditional Spending is Subjected to a Multi-Pronged Analysis, 18 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 741,
758 (1988) (advocating use of a standard that would require the conditions be "substantially"
related to a "legitimate" federal project or activity).
But their second point is more problematic. As I previously stated, if the only
requirement imposed by the Court in Dole is that the condition on funding is reasonably
related to some conceivable federal interest, the only conditions that would be struck down
would be those that are irrational exercises of Congressional power. That is no limitation at
all, and cannot be what was intended by the Court in Dole.
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C. Conditional Regulation
When Congress has the power under Article I of the
Constitution to regulate private activity, the Court has also
consistently concluded that Congress may constitutionally give states
a choice between regulating in that area in accordance with federal
guidelines or facing federal preemption (thereby effectively
conditioning state regulation on the adoption of federal standards).
Thus, in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association,
Inc., the Court upheld provisions of the Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act of 1977 36 that permitted states to assume
permanent regulatory authority over surface coal mining operations
on private lands within their borders (rather than having the federal
government regulate with respect to those lands directly), only if
they submitted a proposed permanent program to the Secretary of
the Interior which implemented federal environmental protection
standards established by the Act and the regulations promulgated
pursuant thereto. The Court emphasized that,
. . . the States are not compelled to enforce the... [federal]
standards, to expend any state funds, or to participate in the
federal regulatory program in any manner whatsoever. If a State
does not wish to submit a proposed permanent program that
complies with the Act and implementing regulations, the full
regulatory burden will be borne by the Federal Government.
Thus, there can be no suggestion that the Act commandeers the
legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to
337
enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.
Similarly, in Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi,
3
1
the Court rejected a challenge to provisions of the Public Utility
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 that (among other things) required
State utility regulatory commissions to "consider" the adoption of
certain federally specified rate standards. "' The Court noted that,
452 U.S. 264 (1981).
Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91 Stat. 447 (1977) (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 1201
(1999)).
.. See Hode4 452 U.S. at 288.
See456 U.S. 742 (1982).




if a State has no utilities commission, or simply stops regulating in the
field, it need not even entertain the federal proposals.... Congress
could have preempted the field... ; [the statute] should not be
invalid simply because, out of deference to state authority, Congress
adopted a less intrusive scheme and allowed the States to continue
regulating in the area on the condition that they consider the
suggested federal standards. m
Conditional federal regulation is certainly not a solution to the
problem of the nonconsenting state in bankruptcy. Even the
drafters of the Constitution recognized the benefits to be derived
from a uniform federal system of bankruptcy,34' and although
Congress could give state courts jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases
conditioned upon waiver of sovereign immunity by the state for all
bankruptcy cases within its jurisdiction, few would argue that the
benefits to be derived from state waiver of sovereign immunity
outweigh the detriment that would be caused by eliminating the
exclusive federal jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases."
However, the conditional federal regulation cases help
illuminate the path towards other solutions to the extent that they
focus-as do the conditional spending cases in part-on the choice
Congress provides to the states. A state may either choose to
regulate in accordance with federal directives, or choose to leave the
field to federal regulation and enforcement. As long as a state is not
compelled to implement federal policy, the legitimate sovereign
interests of the state have been respected. The existence of choice
is all that the Tenth Amendment requires. m
D. Bankruptcy Incentives and Disincentives
Respect for state sovereign immunity renders Congress unable
to order states to waive their sovereign immunity in bankruptcy.
The absence of any federally-funded state program with a nexus to
the federal interest in bankruptcy may also doom any congressional
S FederalEnergy Regulation Comm'n, 456 U.S. at 764-65.
"' See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; see also supra note 196.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (1999).
As stated in Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi, "having the power to
make decisions and to set policy is what gives the State its sovereign nature." 456 U.S. at 761.
See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992) ("by any... permissible method of
encouraging a State to conform to federal policy choices, the residents of the State retain the
ultimate decision as to whether or not the State will comply").
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effort to condition a state's receipt of federal funds on such a
waiver. And although the conditional regulation opinions are
useful in their focus on the existence of choice as the touchstone of
state sovereignty, Congress has not conditioned state regulation of
bankruptcy on waiver of sovereign immunity but has preempted the
field, and the importance of a uniform federal bankruptcy system
far outweighs the benefits to be derived from waiver of state
sovereign immunity.
However, as the Supreme Court acknowledged in New York v.
United States, 4 conditional funding and conditional regulation are
not the exclusive methods for encouraging state action consistent
with federal goals. The Code itself provides a legislative mechanism
for rewarding states that choose to subject themselves to federal
bankruptcy jurisdiction, and withholding benefits from those who
choose to remain outside the system. This mixture of incentives and
disincentives-carrots and sticks-provides a solution to the
problem of the non-participating state that is within the power of
Congress, can be implemented quickly and without incremental
cost, should quickly achieve consensual waivers that are applicable
to all bankruptcy cases and all bankruptcy causes of action, and
thereby should put the states once again on an equal footing with all
similarly-situated creditors.
The Code currently not only welcomes states into the
bankruptcy courts when they choose to submit to federal
jurisdiction, and provides for them to share in the distributions
made to creditors from property of the estate, but it also provides all
"governmental units"345 preferred treatment in many respects. For
example, the trustee is required to "withhold from payments of
claims for wages, salaries, commissions, dividends, interest or other
payments" amounts required to be withheld under applicable state
or local tax law and remit the withheld amounts to the appropriate
governmental unit.36 Certain actions of governmental units with
respect to taxes are excluded from the automatic stay,"' as is the
505 U.S. at 144.
"Governmental unit" is defined by the Code as, "United States; State; Commonwealth;
District; Territory; municipality; foreign state; department, agency, or instrumentality of the
United States (but not a United States trustee while serving as a trustee in a case under this
tide), a State, a Commonwealth, a District, a Territory, a municipality, or a foreign state; or
other foreign or domestic goveiment .... 11 U.S.C. § 101 (27) (1999).
See id. §346(f).
M7 Section 362(b)(9) allows the governmental unit to audit, issue a notice of tax
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commencement or continuation of actions or proceedings by
governmental units to enforce their police and regulatory power.3s
Governmental units are given 180 days after the date of the order
for relief to file a proof of claim (or, if the governmental unit seeks
an extension before the 180-day period expires, such additional
time as the court provides for cause shown),9 where other creditors
in chapter 7, chapter 12, and chapter 13 cases must file a proof of
claim not later than ninety days after the first date set for the
meeting of creditors called under § 341 (a)," and the court has no
discretion to extend the time for filing.351 The bankruptcy court is
precluded from determining the right of the bankruptcy estate to a
tax refund until the trustee has given the governmental unit an
opportunity to respond to a request for such refund.352  Certain
taxes incurred by the estate and other amounts related thereto are
defined as "administrative expenses" under the Code, 53 and many
deficiency, demand tax returns and make an assessment, among other things. See id.
§ 362(b) (9).
Seei& § 362(b) (4).
... See id. § 502(b)(9); FED. R. BANKR. P. 3002(c)(1).
'o SeeFED.R;LBANKR.P.3002(c).
Bankruptcy Procedure Rule 9006(b)(1) generally permits the bankruptcy court to
enlarge a period specified by the bankruptcy rules or by court order "for cause" if the request
is made before the original period expires, or upon a showing of "excusable neglect" if the
request is made after expiration of the specified period. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9006(b) (1).
However, Rule 9006(b) (3) allows the court to enlarge the time for filing proofs of claim in
cases under chapter 7, chapter 12 and chapter 13 "only to the extent and under the
conditions stated in" Rule 3002(c). FED. R. BANKR. P. 9006(b) (1); see also FED. P. BANKR. P.
3002(c). Unless a creditor falls within one of the exceptions set forth in Rule 3002(c),
therefore, the court cannot extend the date for timely filing of a proof of claim under that
Rule. See, e.g., Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Burnswick Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 507 U.S. 380, 389 n.4
(1993) (dictum); In re Greenig, 152 F.3d 631, 634 (7th Cir. 1998);Jones v. Arross, 9 F.3d 79,
81 (10th Cir. 1993); Zidell, Inc. v. Forsch (In re Coastal Alaska Lines, Inc.), 920 F.2d 1428,
1432-33 (9th Cir. 1990).
2 See 11 U.S.C. § 505(a) (2) (B). Section 505(a) (2) (B) provides the governmental unit
120 days after the trustee's request to determine whether the refund is due; if the
governmental unit fhils to act in that time, the court may make an independent
determination. See i&. Section 505(b) also gives a governmental unit an opportunity to
examine tax returns and determine the estate's unpaid tax liabilities before the bankruptcy
court may do so independently. Similar deference is given to governmental units with respect
to expedited determinations of interests in and disposition of grain in a case concerning a
debtor owning or operating a grain storage facility; the governmental unit with regulatory
jurisdiction over the facility must be given notice of a request for an expedited determination,
must be given the right to appear and be heard on the any issue relating to the gain, and the
trustee must consult with the governmental unit before taking any action relating to
disposition of the grain. See id. § 557(e).
m' Seeid.§§503(b)(1)(B) & (C).
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unsecured claims of governmental units for taxes (income,
property, withholding, employment, excise, customs duties and
penalties) are given priority treatment in distribution of the
property of the estate."M
Certain tax debts and customs duties, including those entitled
to priority distributions, are generally excepted from discharge,"'5 as
are fines, penalties, or forfeitures payable to a governmental unit,356
student loans (which are often held by governmental units) , ' and
debts owed to states or municipalities that are in the nature of
support.38 A governmental unit may bar confirmation of a chapter
11 plan if it shows that "the principal purpose of the plan is the
avoidance of taxes."359
Of course, certain provisions of the Code single out
governmental units in less advantageous ways. For example,
governmental units may not discriminate against debtors with
respect to licenses, permits, charters, franchises, or other similar
grants,O nor with respect to student loans. 6  And the issuance,
transfer, or exchange of a security or the delivery of an instrument
of transfer under a confirmed chapter 11 plan is not subject to local
stamp or similar tax. 62 But the benefits afforded governmental units
under the Code far outweigh the special burdens imposed on them.
Some of the provisions favoring the governmental units are
intended to protect the public from harm, such as the exclusion
from the scope of the automatic stay of actions or proceedings by
governmental units to enforce their police and regulatory powers. " '
But others protect the government merely in its role as a creditor
(and an inefficient one at that). The only constitutional constraint
on the power of Congress to enact bankruptcy laws is that they be
"uniform... throughout the United States." 64 The Code need not
"4 See id. §§ 507(a) (8), 507(c).
See id. § 523(a) (1).
See id. § 523(a) (7).
See id. § 523(a) (8).
See id. § 523 (a) (18).
Id. § 1129(d).
See id. § 525(a).
See id. § 525(c).
.. See id. § 1146 (c).
See id. § 362(b) (4).
'6' Article I gives Congress the power "[t]o establish ... uniform laws on the subject of
bankruptcies throughout the United States." U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4. The "uniformity"
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provide preferred treatment to government entities, either state or
federal, if Congress chooses not to do so, and need not treat all
states the same way. Indeed, Congress need not provide any of the
benefits of the bankruptcy system to states that elect not to submit to
federal jurisdiction in all bankruptcy cases, and should decline to do
SO.
If Congress wishes to encourage states to waive their sovereign
immunity and voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the federal
courts in bankruptcy cases, it can pull up the welcome mat for those
that do not, effectively closing the door on selective submission to
federal bankruptcy jurisdiction. To use a sports metaphor, a state
should not be able to play only in those bankruptcy games it thinks
it will win; it should commit to take the field against all challengers
or choose to retire from competition all together. Respect for state
sovereignty requires that states be given a choice to submit to
federal bankruptcy jurisdiction or decline to do so. That choice is a
legitimate sovereign concern. But deference for state sovereignty
does not require that states be given the flexibility to pick and
choose the particular federal bankruptcy cases in which they wish to
participate. Differentiation between federal cases based on
economic factors is an illegitimate objective of state sovereignty and
Congress need not facilitate its achievement. Congress can
appropriately balance the legitimate goals of state sovereignty with
the federal objectives of the bankruptcy system by giving states the
choice of submitting to federal bankruptcy jurisdiction once and for
all, or opting out. Those who choose to opt out should be
precluded from filing a proof of claim or otherwise appearing in any
bankruptcy case, and their claims should be denied the benefit of
any exclusions from discharge.
What are the potential consequences of this proposal? The
most obvious is that those states that choose not to waive their
immunity would be unable to receive any distributions on account
of their claims in any bankruptcy case, while suffering the detriment
of having those claims discharged so that they could not recover on
the claims outside of bankruptcy. Congress would thereby be
to which the Constitution refers has been interpreted to be geographic rather than
substantive, i.e., the fact that the federal bankruptcy laws incorporate state legal concepts that
differ one from the other does not make them unconstitutional. See Hanover Nat'l Bank v.
Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 190 (1902).
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conditioning recovery on the state's claim upon an effective waiver
of sovereign immunity. Can Congress do so?
Attaching conditions to the receipt of private funds in
bankruptcy to which states would otherwise be entitled seems
entirely consistent with the Tenth Amendment constraints imposed
on congressional authority under New York v. United States5 and
South Dakota v. Dole.66 South Dakota v. Dole, of course, explored the
limitations on conditioning the receipt of federal funds on desirable
state action, such as waiver of sovereign immunity. As previously
discussed, 67 the Court, in Dole, suggested five limitations on
conditional spending power-that the federal spending promote
the general welfare, that the condition be unambiguous, that the
condition be related to the "federal interest in particular national
projects or programs," that there be no independent constitutional
bar on the state action sought by the condition, and that the
financial inducement offered by Congress not be unduly "coercive."
Although linking a waiver of state sovereign immunity in bankruptcy
cases to receipt of federal funds would likely meet any challenge on
four of the five limitations, I suggested that if the "related to" prong
means (as I believe it does) that there must be some reasonable
relationship between the condition imposed on the states and the
very program for which the funds to which the condition is attached
are being provided, there is no federal funding to states that relates
in any way to bankruptcy, and the condition of waiver would be
struck down.
But if the same limitations were deemed applicable to
conditional receipt of funds not from the federal government itself,
but through the auspices of its bankruptcy courts, the requirement
that states waive their sovereign immunity in all bankruptcy cases as
a condition to receiving funds in any such case would likely
withstand challenge. As it did for the conditional spending power
analysis, the Court would likely find congressional intent to promote
the general welfare supports modification of the Code to effectuate
such a condition. Similarly, Congress could surely express its
505 U.S. 144 (1992). The Tenth Amendment states, "The powers not delegated to
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
403 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (citing Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640-41 (1937);
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936)).
3'7 See supra Part IV.B.
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intentions dearly and unambiguously in its amendment. As
previously discussed, conditioning receipt of federal funds on a
waiver of sovereign immunity has not been found to require
unconstitutional action by a state. And the amounts at issue in
bankruptcy cases, even when considered in the aggregate, are, if
anything, far less likely to prove coercive to state action than the
smallest grants coming from Washington. The final limitation-the
"related to" requirement-which proves so problematic in the
conditional spending context, would be easily satisfied under this
approach. Both the condition imposed and the distributions to
which it would be attached are intimately related to the operation of
the bankruptcy system. If conditional bankruptcy distributions
under the jurisdiction of federal bankruptcy courts can be analyzed
as conditional federal spending for constitutional purposes, the
condition should be upheld.
Even if the recovery of funds from a bankruptcy estate cannot
be analogized to the grant of federal funds, under New York v. United
States, use of the conditional spending power is not the exclusive
method of encouraging state action; Congress is entitled to "hold
out incentives to the States as a method of influencing a state's
policy choices. "'6e Congress already provides the incentive of
recovery from a bankruptcy estate to those creditors-sovereign or
otherwise-who file a proof of claim and thereby submit to federal
jurisdiction by disallowing any claim as to which a timely proof of
claim is not filed.369 This condition to a bankruptcy recovery has
been upheld against constitutional challenge, despite the operation
of the bankruptcy discharge which precludes non-bankruptcy
- 570
methods of recovery.
' 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992).
See 11 U.S.c. § 502(b) (9) (1999). Only holders of "allowed" claims are entitled to
distributions in a chapter 7 liquidation. See id. § 726.
' See Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 190 (1902). Although Congress
cannot affect property rights of secured creditors holding interests in the debtor's property,
discharge of in personam debts are within the powers of Congress under the Bankruptcy
Clause because, unlike the States which are barred from doing so by Art. I, § 10, cl. 1 of the
Constitution, Congress may enact laws that impair the obligations of contract. See, e.g., United
States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 74 (1982); Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v.
Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 589 (1935); Ginsberg v. Lindel, 107 F.2d 721, 725-26 (8th Cir. 1939);
Lomas Mortgage USA, Inc. v. Elmore (In reElmore), 94 B.R. 670, 677 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1988);
In re Pape, 7 B.1R 443, 447 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1980); In reHeatron, Inc., 6 B.R. 493,494 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 1980).
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In modifying the Code to allow participation in bankruptcy
only by those states that effectively waive sovereign immunity not
merely by filing a proof of claim in a single case but by legislative or
constitutional enactment with respect to all cases, Congress would
do no more than provide an incentive that differs only marginally
from that it already adopts by conditioning payments in respect of
state claims to the filing of a proof of claim, which filing also
constitutes a waiver of state sovereign immunity."" This incentive
would encourage states to relinquish their constitutional immunity
once and for all with respect to federal bankruptcy jurisdiction, but
would not mandate it. States could continue to opt out of the
federal bankruptcy system, at the cost of foregoing any recovery
from a bankruptcy estate or from the bankrupt who receives a
discharge.3 2 Each state could do its own cost/benefit analysis. Is
the benefit the state will potentially derive from participation in
federal bankruptcy cases greater than the cost of the possible
liability the state will suffer if it is susceptible to suit in federal
bankruptcy court? If so, the state will choose to waive its immunity.
If not, the state will elect to remain immune.
Just because this choice is unpalatable does not render it
unconstitutional.3 Individual creditors are put to an equally
See supra Part 1I.A.1.
Use of the term "opt out" is not intended to suggest that affirmative action by the state
would be required to preserve its immunity. The default position, in the face of state inaction,
would be opting out. This may, of course, be less a function of political choice than absence
of political will. One commentator has suggested that, where transaction costs do not
interfere with bargaining, "if Congress wants to eliminate [state sovereign] immunity more
than the state wants to keep it," by application of the Coase Theorem it will be eliminated
through Congressional incentive to reach an economically efficient result. See Daniel A.
Farber, The Coase Theorem and the Eleventh Amendment, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 141, 142 (1996).
However, Seminole Tribe imposed transaction costs by eliminating congressional abrogation of
state sovereign immunity through low-cost Article I federal legislation. Instead, sovereign
immunity must be waived by legislative act on a state-by-state basis. "[I]t is possible that some
states will in the end by harmed by Seminole because political inertia will prevent them from
entering into waiver bargains that actually would be in their interests." Id.
'" The argument that a state does not "voluntarily" waive its sovereign immunity by filing
a proof of claim if failure to do so would deny it a share of the bankruptcy estate has been
consistently rejected. See, e.g., Texas v. Walker, 142 F.3d 813, 822 (5th Cir. 1998) (argument
that Eleventh Amendment should prevent a state from being put to the "Hobson's choice" of
either subjecting itself to federal court jurisdiction or taking nothing "is ultimately
unpersuasive"); WJM, Inc. v. Massachusetts Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 840 F.2d 996, 1004 (1st Cir.
1988) (rejecting the suggestion "that a waiver of a constitutional right lacks validity simply
because it is the outcome of a "no-win" situation"); Schulman v. California State Water Res.
Control Bd. (In reLazar), 200 B.R. 358, 380 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996) (in response to argument
that "[florcing the state to choose between waiving its constitutional rights ... or waiving its
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unpleasant (but constitutional) choice when they are forced to
submit to the equitable jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court and
thereby give up their right to ajury trial with respect to any defense
to their claim against the debtor if they wish to file a proof of claim
in order to receive a distribution in bankruptcy.3 4 As the Court
suggested in the conditional regulation cases,3 5 the key factor under
the Tenth Amendment is the existence of choice rather than
compulsion. The approach I am suggesting gives the state that
choice.
Similar congressional incentives, but more cautious in
approach, have previously been suggested by commentators. Joseph
Riga proposed that Congress could "reorder[] or condition[] the
states' bankruptcy claim priorities," as by "condition[ing] state tax
claim priority on a state's voluntary waiver of its immunity." 76
However, Riga went on to question whether such an approach
might amount to improper "conditioning [of] participation in
federal programs on a waiver of state immunity," within the
meaning of the now-overruled decision in Parden v. Terminal Railway
of Alabama State Docks Department.77 But the Supreme Court has now
made clear that the objectionable feature of Parden was the fact that
Congress statutorily inferred a waiver of sovereign immunity on the
part of states choosing to participate in interstate railroad
commerce and that the waiver was therefore "implied" or
"constructive" rather than "unequivocal. " 78 If participation in the
federal bankruptcy courts did not automatically abrogate sovereign
immunity as a matter of congressional directive, but was
conditioned on a pre-existing voluntary and unequivocal decision by
the appropriate state legislators to waive their sovereign immunity,
the rejection of Parden should not threaten its validity.
379
substantive claims is not a voluntary choice," stating that "[t]he facts that a particular creditor
finds these choices unattractive does not convert the choice into an involuntary decision").
" See Langenkamp v. Culp, 498 U.S. 42, 44 (1990); Granfinanciera, S.AL v. Nordberg,
492 U.S. 33, 57 (1989); Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 336 (1966).
"7 See supra Part IV.C.
't Riga, supra note 157, at 64; see also McKenzie, supra note 190, at 236-40 (suggesting
that conditioning state tax claim priority on state waiver of sovereign immunity can be
supported by conditional spending cases).
=' See Riga, supra note 157, at 65; Parden v. Terminal Ry. Of Ala. State Docks Dept., 377
U.S. 184, 192 (1964); see also I NAT'L BANKR. REV. COMM'N REP. 908-09 (1997) ("Whether a
waiver of this type would withstand Supreme Court scrutiny remains in some doubt...
", See supra note 203 and accompanying text discussing Parden.
' Cf Glauberman, supra note 157, at 87 n.145 (suggesting that Congress has the power
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Commentators Kenneth Klee, James 0. Johnson, and Eric
Winston also discussed what they labeled "conditional claims
allowance," by which Congress would amend the Code to provide
for allowance of a state's claim only if "the state has waived sovereign
immunity and Eleventh Amendment immunity regarding the claim
and compulsory counterclaims. " "°  If they are proposing that a
state's claim be allowed so long as the state has effectively waived
sovereign immunity with respect to that particular claim and all
compulsory counterclaims (an approach that would reach the same
result as § 106(b) were that provision found to be an
unconstitutional abrogation of immunity), their proposal does not
go far enough&s8' States should not be able to take advantage of
bankruptcy when they will benefit by it, and eschew its burdens in
other cases. The door to the federal bankruptcy court should not
be a revolving one, but should be unlocked for all cases and all
claims by the single key of voluntary waiver of state sovereign
immunity. In addition, Congress must not only close the
courthouse door to the nonconsenting state, but must eliminate the
preferred treatment afforded state claims-even those not asserted
in court-under the statutory provisions of the Code. The
exclusions from discharge may be far more valuable to state
creditors than the possibility of sharing in the distributions from
bankruptcy estates that are frequently unable to make any payments
to unsecured creditors. If their recovery were barred both inside
and outside of the bankruptcy court, they may be more willing to
submit to federal jurisdiction.
to condition ownership of patents or copyrights on a state passing a law waiving its sovereign
immunity from infringement suits).
Klee et al., supra note 106, at 1589-90.
" In the brief part of their article devoted to this subject, Klee, Johnston & Winston
propose an amendment to § 502(b) to disallow a state's claim unless the state has waived its
immunity regarding "the claim and compulsory counterclaims." Id. at 1590 (emphasis
supplied). This seems to suggest a waiver applicable only to the claim sought to be filed.
Elsewhere, however, they suggest that such a waiver could be effectuated "perhaps through an
act of [the state's] legislature." Id. Such a mechanism may in fact be consistent with a case-by-
case waiver, if, for example, the legislation adopted affirmatively stated that the filing of a
proof of claim in a bankruptcy case would waive state sovereign immunity with respect to that
claim and all compulsory counterclaims. On the other hand, Klee, Johnston, and Winston
may be proposing a single waiver applicable to all cases and all claims, consistent with the
proposal I make above. But unless that proposal is coupled with the elimination of
preferential treatment afforded states under the Code, particularly with respect to exceptions




The Supreme Court's decisions in Seminole Tribe, Boerne, Florida
Prepaid, and Kimel have undoubtedly made congressional abrogation
of state sovereign immunity under § 106(a) of the Code
unconstitutional. Yet, submission of state creditors to the
jurisdiction of federal bankruptcy courts is essential if the Code is to
achieve its twin goals of ensuring the uniform treatment of similarly-
situated creditors, and providing honest individual debtors the
chance to begin life anew, free from the burden of prepetition debt.
Some proposed solutions to the problem of the nonconsenting
sovereign state-such as empowering the federal government to
assert bankruptcy claims, relying on the Exparte Young doctrine, and
allowing bankruptcy claims to be brought in state court subject to
federal appellate review-are either too expensive, uncertain in
application, politically impracticable, constitutionally questionable,
or a combination of the above. The only true solution to state
sovereign immunity in bankruptcy is voluntary waiver of that
immunity by the states themselves.
But the doctrine of voluntary waiver has also had conceptual
difficulties when applied to bankruptcy cases. Unless a state takes
constitutional or legislative steps to waive its immunity expressly, it is
unclear whether the actions taken by a state, such as filing a proof of
claim or appearing in bankruptcy court, constitute an effective
waiver. Moreover, even if the actions would be effective if taken by
an authorized state official, courts are confused about what sort of
authorization is necessary to empower a representative of the state
to waive sovereign immunity. Even assuming the waiver is effective,
the scope of the waiver remains problematic, both with respect to
the claims against the state covered by the waiver and the entities
within the state bound by it.
Given these difficulties, voluntary waiver becomes the true
solution only when it is validly enacted by the state's lawmakers and
applies uniformly to every bankruptcy claim in every bankruptcy
case. Contrary to popular thought, there is a means of getting to
waiver, even after Seminole Tribe. Although Congress cannot
commandeer state legislative processes consistent with the Tenth
Amendment, it has the power to "encourage" legislative action
consistent with congressional policy objectives. Attaching
conditions to the receipt of federal funding and conditional
regulation have been the most frequent methods of providing this
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encouragement, but they are not the exclusive permissible methods
of inducing voluntary state action. The Code itself provides
Congress a mechanism for "incentivizing" states to waive their
sovereign immunity.
The Code provides many advantages to sovereign creditors who
consent to federal jurisdiction, the principal one of which is the
ability to share in distributions made from the bankruptcy estate.
But the Code currently provides advantages to sovereign creditors
even if they do not choose to submit to federal jurisdiction,
including generous exemptions from discharge for many of their
claims. If Congress wishes to bring nonconsenting states back into
the fold of the bankruptcy system, it must limit the benefits of that
system to those who validly and effectively waive their sovereign
immunity for all bankruptcy cases and all bankruptcy claims, and
deny the advantages of recovery against bankrupt debtors (either in
or out of bankruptcy), as well as the other preferential treatment
currently afforded to all governmental units, to those who choose to
opt out. Modifying the Code to limit access to federal bankruptcy
court to those states who elect to submit to federal bankruptcy
jurisdiction for all bankruptcy cases provides the states the one thing
required by respect for their sovereign position in a federal system-
a choice. The Tenth Amendment permits no less, but demands no
more. A legislative solution to state sovereign immunity, both at the
federal level through amendment of the Code and at the state level,
through appropriate uniform enactments waiving that immunity, is
easy to effectuate, inexpensive to administer, likely to achieve the
desired goals, and lacks apparent constitutional infirmities.
Congress can get to waiver. And Congress should.
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